Richardson v. Stuberfield

Habt, J., (after stating the facts). The decree was wrong, for two reasons. In the first place, there was no completed contract of any kind between the parties for the purchase and sale of the land. It is the theory of the plaintiffs that the contract was completed when J. W. Stuberfield orallly accepted the proposition contained in the letter written to him by Charles Richardson on the 28th day of October, 1922. It will be noted from the terms of this letter that there was something more to he done between the parties. Richardson stated that, if his terms were acceptable to Stuberfield, he would be up there on November 2, 1922, to close out with him as theretofore agreed to. The letter showed that the contract was not complete and something, else remained to be done between parties. It is true that Stuberfield went to see Richardson and told him that he had come to accept his proposition. Richardson, however, at once told Stuberfield that he had changed his mind, and did not intend to purchase, the land. Stuberfield could not, by parol, accept the written offer made to him by Richardson while the latter was, at the same time, telling him that he had withdrawn his offer and would not purchase the land. The letter of Richardson was nothing more than an offer to purchase the land from Stuberfield, and he could withdraw it at any time before it was accepted. Stuberfield could not make an oral acceptance of the proposition while Richardson was, for all practical purposes, at the same moment of time withdrawing his offer. Moreover, the letter of Richardson was not of itself a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, because it in no way described or gave any means of identifying tbe land sold. Fordyce Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 85 Ark. 1, and Skinner v. Stone, 144 Ark. 353. It is well settled by these and other decisions of this court that every contract for the purchase of land must define its identity and fix its locality, or there must be such a description as, by the aid of parol evidence, will readily point to its locality and boundaries. An agreement for the sale of land which is required to be in writing by the statute of frauds must be. certain in itself, or capable of being made certain by reference to something else. In the case at bar there is nothing to point out or locate the land. It does not specify the county or State in which the land is situated. It does not state that it lies on any particular stream, or that it is situated near any well known place. It does not even refer to it as a farm known by a certain designated name. No natural object or permanent monument is referred to in the writing. Therefore, a court of equity will not specifically enforce a contract for the purchase or sale of land with such an uncertain description of the land as the one here sought to be enforced. Our decisions cited above are in accord with the general trend of authorities on the subject. Hall v. Cotton, 167 Ky. 464, 180 S. W. 778; L. R. A. 1916C, 1124; Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, L. R. A. 1917A, p. 563; and other cases cited in 25 R. C. L., p. 650. In Allen v. Kitchen, supra, the court said: “The distinction, however, should always be clearly drawn between the admission of oral and extrinsic evidence for the purpose of identifying the land described and applying the description to the property, and that of supplying and adding to a description insufficient and void on its face. ” It follows from the views we have expressed that the decree must be reversed, and the case will be remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiffs for want of equity.