Gernhart v. Heritage Homes, Inc.

Per Curiam. This action was instituted to claim damages resulting from a defective condition in the basement of a home purchased by the plaintiffs from the defendant. Pursuant to $ 52-434 of the General Statutes, upon a written stipulation of the parties, the court referred the matter to a state trial referee of the Circmt Court on April 22, 1974, to hear the case and report the facts to the court. On September 25, 1974, that report was made and filed in court on October 3, 1974. That report was accepted on June 4, 1975, and judgment rendered forthwith. On June 17, 1975, the defendant filed motions to “re-open” and to vacate the judgment, claiming that it was “erroneous, null and void” because it was “not rendered before the close of the next term or session of the court after the trial of tMs matter as specified by Section 51-29.” From the denial of those motions, the defendant has appealed. The decisive issue presented on tMs appeal is whether § 51-29 of the General Statutes 1 is applicable to proceedings before a state trial referee. It *561 should be pointed out that at the time of the reference, the referee was a retired judge of the Circuit Court. That identical issue was examined in great detail, both from a legislative and historical perspective, in the case of Florida Hill Road Corporation v. Commissioner of Agriculture, 164 Conn. 360, 362, where the court concluded “that a state trial referee is not a ‘judge of the superior court or the court of common pleas’ but is sui generis, sits as a special tribunal, and is not restricted by the terms of § 51-29.” In the Florida Hill Road case, the court was concerned with the action of a retired Supreme Court judge, who had the authority to render judgment. In the present case we are dealing with the action of a retired Circuit Court judge, who is not empowered to render judgment but can merely hear the ease and report the facts. A hearing before a state referee as a committee, who, as such, is not authorized to exercise the powers of the court, can in no sense be considered the commencement of a trial before a judge of the Superior Court or the Court of Common Pleas within the meaning of Connecticut General Statutes § 51-29. We see no merit in the claim of the defendant that the court erred in denying its motions to “re-open” judgment and vacate the judgment. There is no error. Parskey, D. Shea, and Sponzo, Js., participated in this decision. Footnotes [1] “[General Statutes] See. 51-29. continuance of trial beyond TERM OF SESSION. RENDERING OF JUDGMENT IN NEXT TERM. Any judge of the superior court or the court of common pleas, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such trial and render judgment after the expiration of the term or session of the court at whieh such trial was commenced; but such trial shall be ended and judgment rendered therein before the close of the next term or session.”