Silvey v. Panhandle Coal Co.

Dausman, J. (after making the foregoing statement). — The primary question presented by this appeal is whether the workman has been awarded all the compensation that is legally his due. There is no conflict in the evidence as to the kind of injury or as to how the injury occurred. The only controversy relates to the rights and duties of the parties under the law. An attentive and thoughtful reading of the finding of facts and the award based thereon cannot fail to 'reveal that something is lacking. Did the injured workman suddenly pass from a condition of total disability to a perfectly normal condition? A transition of that kind would be something unusual in human experience. Common observation does not prepare men to believe that a workman who suffered an injury to his spine which resulted in total disability for 3 5/7 weeks would, at the end of that period, suddenly become able to resume hard labor in a coal mine. The usual award in such cases is for compensation “during total disability not to exceed 500 weeks.” That plan leaves the way open for future adjustments in accordance with changed conditions, and is therefore eminently fair and just. In cases like the one at bar, a great responsibility rests upon the men of medical science, and their opinions and conclusions are ordinarily entitled to great weight where they have made a personal examination of the patient. Equipped with a *117 store of knowledge acquired by study and observation, the doctor is in a position to ascertain his patient’s condition uninfluenced by anything except the cold scientific truth. The patient’s situation is quite different. He has a vivid recollection of the accident; he has endured the pain; and the doubt, the fear and the anxiety are his. In this case, we must rely almost entirely upon the doctor’s testimony concerning the workman’s physical condition. Now observe the statement of Dr. Funk: “This case resolves itself into a subjective proposition. Considering the history of the accident and the history of the case following, we would suspect he had a left side sacro iliac sprain. These sprains always give trouble for quite awhile, sometimes several months; but on continued rest over the extended time this patient has had since the injury, with no history of recurrent injury, we would expect his condition to be well enough along for light work at this time; and the most of these complaints are usually entirely well after this period. We must base our conclusions here on subjective symptoms which makes it difficult to say anything definitely.” The presumption is that the injured workman is entitled to full compensation until he is able to resume work of the same kind or of the same general character as the work in which he was engaged at the time he received the injury. Bruce v. Stutz Motor Car Co. (1925), 83 Ind. App. 257, 128 N. E. 161. See, also, Mellen Lumber Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1913), 154 Wis. 114, 142 N. W. 187, L. R. A. 1916A 374, Ann. Cas. 1915B 997; International, etc., Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1914), 157 Wis. 167, 147 N. W. 53, Ann. Cas. 1916B 330; McDonald v. Industrial Comm. (1917), 165 Wis. 372, 162 N. W. 345; Hanley v. Union Stock Yards Co. (1916), 100 Nebr. 232, 158 *118 N. W. 939; Foley v. Detroit United Railway (1916), 190 Mich. 507, 157 N. W. 45; Jameson v. Walter S. Newhall Co. (1918), 200 Mich. 514, 166 N. W. 834; Miller v. S. Fair & Sons (1919), 206 Mich. 360, 171 N. W. 380; Woodcock v. Dodge Bros. (1921), 213 Mich. 233, 181 N. W. 976, 17 A. L. R. 203; Myers v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. (1921), 214 Mich. 636, 183 N. W. 913; Geis v. Packard Motor Car Co. (1921), 214 Mich. 646, 183 N. W. 916. It should be specially observed that Dr. Funk says “we would expect” the workman’s “condition to be well along for light work at this time.” He also says that the man should be “ordered to work.” Of course, Dr. Funk does not realize that the Industrial Board has no power to order men to work. It is provided by the statute, however, that if the employer desires to reduce the amount of compensation for which he is liable, 'he may furnish the injured workman employment suitable to his capacity, and if the workman refuses employment of that kind, “he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the Industrial Board the refusal was/justifiable.” §32 Compensation Act, §9477 Burns 1926. In order that the real intent of the compensation law may be realized in this case, it is necessary that the award be reversed and a new finding of facts be made in accordance with the evidence heretofore presented to the board, granting compensation to the workman during total disability not exceeding 500 weeks. And to hear evidence as to whether there has been any change in appellant’s condition since the former hearing and to make such further award as the evidence may warrant. The award is reversed, and the Industrial Board is directed to proceed in accordance with this opinion.