Raggi v. H. G. Christman Co.

Dausman, J. (after stating the facts) In approaching the ultimate question for our determination, it is essential that we shall have in mind the fact that the Industrial Board is not a court. In the performance of its statutory duties, it is frequently required to act in a manner which closely resembles judicial action. Nevertheless, it is an administrative body. *342 It belongs to the executive department of the state government and may not exercise judicial power. State Constitution, Art. 3; Kingan & Co. v. Buford (1917), 65 Ind. App. 182, 116 N. E. 754. Our compensation law contains the following pro- ' vision: “ Sec. 62. Any party in interest may file in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the injury occurred, a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement approved by the board or of an order or decision of the board, or of an award of the board unappealed from, or of an award of the board rendered upon an appeal, whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though said judgment had been rendered in a suit heard and determined by said court. Any such judgment of said circuit or superior court unappealed from or affirmed on appeal or modified in obedience to the mandate of the Appellate Court, shall be modified to conform to any decision of the Industrial Board, ending, diminishing or increasing any weekly payment under the provisions of section 45 of this act upon the presentation to it of a certified copy of such decision.” (Acts 1915 p. 392.) The statutory provision for reducing an award of compensation to a judgment is new and strange. The idea that a court may first render a judgment and thereafter notify the parties strikes a lawyer as a genuine novelty. But, upon reflection, the mystery disappears. Every employer and every employee who fails to exempt himself from the provisions of the compensation law thereby constructively agrees to be bound by all the provisions of that law. §§2, 3, Compensation Law. One of the provisions of the law, to which the parties thus agree, is that, in an appropriate case, an award by the Industrial Board may be reduced *343 to a judgment without summons or any other prior notice from the court. The purpose of reducing an award of compensation to a judgment is obvious. It enables the person in whose favor compensation has been awarded to have execution in default of payment, and creates a lien on the property of the employer. Was the court authorized by the terms of the statute to render judgment on an award which denies compensation? The question must be answered in the negative. . The legislative purpose and intent evidenced by the section of the statute above quoted might have been stated in language more precise. Upon reflection, however, it becomes apparent that the contextual meaning of the words “any party in interest” is any person for whom compensation has been provided by an approved agreement or by a final award. When compensation is denied, the reason for such a transmutation fails utterly. The section of the statute above quoted is crude, to say the least. It is perplexing, not because it is new, but because it is inapt. Upon reflection, it becomes apparent that a better plan for accomplishing the same ends may readily be devised. There is a greater reason why the proceeding under the compensation law is not a bar to this action. The facts stated in the finding of the Industrial Board fail to disclose the reason for denying compensation; and, to that extent, the finding is defective. . The only inference to be drawn from the averments of the complaint, however, is that compensation was denied because the boy Leonard Raggi, now deceased, was unlawfully employed. Our compensation law is not applicable to cases where the employment is unlawful. New Albany Box, etc., Co. v. Davidson (1920), 189 Ind. 57, 125 N. E. 904; In re Stoner (1920), 74 Ind. App. 324, 125 N. E. 938; Driscoll v. Weidely Motors Co. (1921), 77 *344 Ind. App. 10, 133 N. E. 12; Indiana Manufacturers’, etc., Assn. v. Dolby (1921), 77 Ind. App. 116, 133 N. E. 171. The judgment is reversed; the' trial court is directed to sustain the demurrer to the answer, to take such other action as may be necessary to bring the record into accord with this opinion, and to permit further proceedings. McMahan, J., concurs in the result only.