Humphrey v. Hollowell

Evans, C. J. The-plaintiff had been duly convicted in the *222 district'court of Polk County of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses, in violation of Section 13045 of the Code of 1924. The contention in his behalf was, and is, that the facts charged in the indictment disclosed a violation only of Section 13047, and that such' offense was a misdemeanor only, and not triable by indictment. Reliance is had upon oúr holding in State v. Marshall, 202 Iowa 954, the contention being that the holding of the district court is pursuant' to our holding in the cited case. The question, therefore, is whether the facts charged, in the indictment classify the case as one which should have been prosecuted as a misdemeanor, under Section 13047, or as a felony, under Section 13045. The indictment herein charges that the prisoner obtained from the Likly Luggage ■ Company, merchandise to the value of more than $80, by certain false pretenses. These Were that he presented to the Likly Luggage Company a purported request or' order, purporting to' be signed by B. D. Lyons, the purchasing manager of the Armand Company, of Des Moines; that, upon the faith of this purported order, the said Likly Luggage Company delivered to Humphrey, the prisoner, two traveling bags of the value of $40 each. The order was set forth in the following form: “Purchase Order No. 704 “Armand Company “Des Moines, Iowa “Armand Company “Des Moines,. Iowa “Approved Order No. 704. “By C. J. M.. “Purchasing Department “Likly Luggage Co. * ‘ City ‘ ‘ Please furnish us: “1 Gladstone Bag (tan)...............: . . ..'$40.00 “1 Traveling Bag (tan)..............'......$40.00 “Invoice must bear Order No. “B. D. Lyons “Pch. Mgr.” The indictment also charged that the said Humphrey rep *223 resented himself to.be W. M-. Lawler. It was also charged therein that said purported order was spurious and false in all respects, and that it was never issued or authorized by the Armani Company, nor executed by its. purchasing manager, nor by anyone else in its behalf. The substance of. the charge, therefore, was that the prisoner obtained the goods in question by the presentation of a false and forged order, which was wholly spurious and invalid as against any of the persons pun porting to be parties thereto. This statement is. quite sufficient in itself to wholly refute the claim that the holding .of the district court was consonant with our holding in State v. Marshall, supra. Section 13047, Code of 1924, is as follows: “Any person who shall make, draw, deliver, utter, or give any check, draft, or written order upon any bank, person, or corporation and-who secures money, credit,-or thing of value therefor, and who knowingly shall not have an arrangement, understanding, or funds.with such bank, person, or corporation sufficient to meet or pay the same, shall be guilty of a, misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof,. shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed one hundred dollars, or.by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed thirty days.” We held in State v. Marshall, supra, that the enactment of Section 13047 indicated the legislative intent to carve out of Section 13045 a lesser offense, and to make the same punishable as a misdemeanor only. What was the offense thus intended to be carved out? We described it in the-Marshall case as follows: “Section 13047 seems to cover completely those cases of false pretense wherein the pretense consists in presenting a check upon a bank where knowingly sufficient funds are not on deposit to meet the same. Section 13049 provides that payment within three days after a demand will bar the prosecution. This is a recognition- of the fact that a check overdrawing an account is not necessarily worthless. It is still a promise to pay, and recovery can be ha'd thereon against.a solvent maker.” It will be noted that Section 13047 describes no offense predicated upon a forged, false, or spurious instrument. The only offense described is predicated exclusively, upon a genuine instrument, duly executed by the purported maker thereof, and valid as against him, as a promise to pay. The false pretense which is denounced in this section is that pretense .that funds *224 áre On deposit in the hands of th'e drawee of the check sufficient to meet the check, when presented. No other pretense or tokén comes'under' the'condemnation of this particular section. Offenses predicated in whole ’or in part upon á spurious instrument, or false pretense’s other than that' pointed out -in Section 13047, are punishable under the provisions of Section’ 13045.’ ' ’ The offense described in this indictment does not bear even a Close semblance to that described in Section 13047. Its false token was’ not that the maker óf the instrument had funds with the drawee óf the order. It was that the instrument presented was itself spurious, and that the person presenting it wan not the person whóin he represented himself to be. The instrument itself was invalid for any' purpose, as against the purported parties thereto. ■ Pursuant to' the Marshall case, we hold again that the lesser offense' carved out of Section 13045 by ’ Section 13Ó47 ’ is orie predicated upon the pretense, knowingly'false, that’a genuine instrument has been protected by deposit or arrangement with the drawee-‘thereof for its payment. Where- the false pretense goes beyond this; then the offense is punishable under Section 13045; and this is so even though the pretense defined in Section 13047 be included with such other false'pretenses: ■ ' ' ■ ' The order of thé district court discharging the prisoner is accordingly reversed, and the cause’is remanded for further orders‘consistent herewith. — Reversed'and remanded. All the justices concur.