W. A. McDonald & Sons v. McQueen

Smith, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The appellee was Superintendent of Education of Hancock County from January 4, 1932, to January 4, 1936, during which time he issued a number of what *273 we will designate as teachers’ pay certificates that were purchased by the appellants, for the payment of which there is no money in the county treasury, and was not when the certificates were issued. This action is under section 6732, Code of 1930, which the reporter will set out. 1 The evidence discloses that the county school fund was frequently inadequate to pay the expense of maintaining the public schools, nevertheless, they were kept open. See City of Louisville v. Greer, 166 Miss. 554, 148 So. 356. Pay certificates were issued to teachers by the appellee and purchased by the appellants who would collect them when sufficient money would come into the school fund therefor. Whether a number of the certificates sued on were in fact issued, or, if issued, had been surrendered to the appellee and presumably paid became, on the evidence, a question of fact for the jury, so that the only real question presented is whether the court below erred in excluding the remainder of the certificates from the evidence. These certificates differed from those referred to in the preceding paragraph and were in this form: “County Superintendents Pay Certificate — :-Rural School District-Hancock County, Miss.-19 — . “To the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors: “I hereby certify, That--is entitled to the sum of -Dollars for services rendered as teacher in the *274 Public Schools in said County at the —--School House--Term of 193--193 — , as per contract, when funds are available to pay same and upon surrender of this Certificate to me. Payable out of Common School Funds. ( Í___ “County Superintendent of Education” These blanks were filled out to fit each case. Under section 6732 of the Code, teachers’ pay certificates issued by the County Superintendent in excess of the current school funds are void, and the purpose of the statute in making the superintendent responsible on his bond for the face thereof to purchasers is to protect purchasers against the fraud of the superintendent in issuing them. The statute has no application when the certificate discloses on its face that it was issued in violation thereof and is void. A certificate so disclosing, is not such as the statute contemplates. Affirmed.