Willis v. Plymouth & Campton Telephone Exchange Co.

1. The defendants' contention that their motion for a nonsuit should have been granted is based on the proposition that a master owes the servants he employs to repair his instrumentalities no duty of inspection. Is this an accurate statement of the rule to be applied in this case to determine the rights and duties of the parties? In this jurisdiction, in so far as instrumentalities are concerned, the only duty the law imposes on the master for the benefit of experience servants is that of notifying them of the dangers peculiar to the service because of any abnormal or unusual condition of his instrumentalities, of which he either knows or would have known if he had used ordinary care for their safety, and of which they neither know nor are in fault for not knowing; intending by "notifying," not merely calling their attention to the peculiar physical condition of his instrumentalities, but giving them all the information necessary to enable them to appreciate fully the dangers peculiar to the service because of any abnormal or defective condition of his instrumentalities. Since a master performs his full duty, in so far as experienced servants are concerned, when he notifies them of the extraordinary or abnormal dangers of the service, it is true that he owes servants employed to make repairs no duty to notify them of the dangers off the service which are not caused by some unusual or abnormal condition of the instrumentalities to be repaired; for risks not created in that way are the usual or ordinary dangers of the service, and as to such risks the master owes his servants no duty, no matter what they are employed to do. But when, as in this case, the dangers incident to making the repairs arise from the master's failure to maintain his instrumentalities in the usual or ordinary way, he is in fault as to servants injured while making repairs, if he did and they did not know of the abnormal risk caused by the unusual condition of his instrumentalities (Aldrich v. Railroad. 67 N.H. 380); for such risks are not the usual or ordinary hazards of the service, but are among the extraordinary or unusual risks, of which it is the duty of the master to notify his servants when he does and they do not appreciate the peculiar dangers of the service incident thereto. Although the defendants owed the interstate no duty to notify him of the dangers ordinarily incident to straightening up poles the usual depth in the ground, still it was their duty to do whatever the ordinary man would have done for his safety. It is not intended by this that it was the defendants' duty to furnish the *Page 456 intestate with poles safe for him to climb, or even with poles maintained four feet in the ground; but it was their duty to do what the ordinary man would have done to ascertain whether their poles were originally set the proper depth in the ground, or whether they had been pulled up since they were set. It is not, therefore, an accurate statement of the master's duty to say that he owes the servants he employs to make repairs no duty of inspection. He owes such servants, as well as those whom he employs to use his instrumentalities, the duty of doing whatever the ordinary man would do to discover the abnormal or extraordinary dangers of the service, and to notify them of those dangers of which he does and they do not know. Since this was the defendants' duty, the test to determine whether they were in fault for the intestate's death is to inquire whether (1) they did, and (2) he did not, know that the pole in question was less than the usual depth in the ground, and fully appreciate the risk peculiar to the work of straightening it up because of this fact; if it is found that they did and he did not appreciate that risk, (3) whether the fact the pole was in the ground but two and one half feet was an abnormal condition; and if it was, (4) whether they used ordinary care to notify him of the dangers peculiar to the service because of it. Wood M. S., ss. 414, 415. The defendants' manager thought the pole leaned because the wires had pulled it out of the ground. It can be found from the testimony in respect to the intestate's habit never to climb a pole, or to permit others to climb it, unless he thought it was safe to do so, that he did not know the pole had been pulled up, or in any event did not appreciate the risk incident thereto. It is conceded that the pole ought to have been at least four feet in the ground; consequently the only question to be considered on this branch of the case is whether it can be said that the defendants did all the ordinary man would have done to notify the intestate of the danger peculiar to his work because the pole was less than the usual depth in the ground. All they did for that purpose was to tell him to use a guy rope if the pole leaned badly. As the defendants' servants were in the habit of construing that instruction, it meant that he was to use a guy rope whenever he thought, all things considered, it was not safe to climb a pole without it. But if it is conceded that the intestate understood it was not safe to climb any pole that leaned badly without using a rope, it can still be found that the defendants did nothing to notify him of the danger they knew was peculiar to climbing this pole, for it can be found that this pole did not lean badly. In short, it can be found that they sent him out to do this work without giving him any information whatever in respect to the *Page 457 extraordinary danger incident thereto, although they either knew or ought to have known of it, and also knew or ought to have known that there was no ground stain or other surface indication to show that the pole was less than the usual depth in the ground, and that in that situation a man of the intestate's experience would be as likely to attribute the leaning of the pole to the fact that the brace had sunk into the soft sand, as to the fact that the wires had pulled the pole out of the ground. It cannot be said that under these circumstances the ordinary man would not have done something more than the defendants did to notify the intestate of the abnormal danger incident to straightening up this pole. 2. Concede that the defendants' first request should not have been refused because it assumed that the intestate was instructed to inspect poles for himself and not to climb one that leaned badly without using a guy rope, and it does not follow that the court erred in refusing it. As has been seen, it is not an accurate statement of the law as applied to the facts of this case to say that the defendants were under no duty to the intestate "to inspect the pole in question." It was their duty to do what the ordinary man would have done to ascertain whether this pole was originally set at the usual depth, or whether since then the wires had pulled it up; and if they found either that it was not set at the usual depth, or that it had been pulled out of the ground, to notify the intestate of it. 3. The defendants' second request was also properly refused. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that if the defendants furnished the intestate "with suitable tools and apparatus with which to do his work and Willis failed to use them, and if this failure in any way contributed to the accident, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover." If it is conceded that the defendants provided the guy rope for use on this pole, and that it was a suitable rope for that purpose and would have prevented the accident, the plaintiff could still recover if they failed to tell the intestate to use it, and he did not know and was not in fault for not knowing that he ought to use it. In that case, the fact that the rope would have prevented the accident is simply immaterial to the issue of the plaintiff's right to recover. 4. Neither can the defendants complain because the court refused to instruct the jury that if the intestate "failed to follow the instructions which were given him, and if the accident was in any way caused by his failure to follow them, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover." Exceptions overruled. All concurred. *Page 458 The foregoing opinion was filed October 5, 1909. The defendants having moved for a rehearing, further argument in writing was invited upon the exception to the refusal to give the following instruction to the jury: "If Willis failed to follow the instructions which were given him, and if the accident was in any way caused by his failure to follow instructions, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover."