Brown v. . Montgomery

Denio, J. I think there was no error in the charge to the jury in the Superior Court. The law unquestionably is, as it was assumed on the argument, that notice to the plaintiffs’ agent, Cutting, while he was actually engaged in attempting to sell the check, of the failure of the drawers, was equivalent, so far as the present action is concerned, to notice to the plaintiffs themselves. What Chard informed him, was not precisely that Farnham & Co. had failed, but that their check on the bank at which they kept their account was that day protested for non-payment. This, prima facie, was notice that they had suspended payment; for when a business man in a commercial town fails to meet his paper, payable at a bank, and especially his checks upon the barde at which he keeps his account, the natural inference which every one draws is, that he is no longer able to pay his debts. Such a circumstance may occur from oversight or accident, but those are exceptional cases. The failure to meet the paper is itself a suspension of payment, and notice of such a fact, unaccompanied with any explanation which would give it a different character, is notice of the commercial failure of the party. That it was so understood by Cutting and Chard is evident from the fact that they speculated upon the question, whether the members of the firm drawing the cheek would ultimately be able to pay. Upon that question, Chard, as a creditor is apt to do, took the most favorable view. It is apparent that neither of them expected the check to be paid on presentation when it should mature, five days afterwards. The Superior Court considered that the confidence which Chard expressed in the ultimate solvency of the members of the firm, did not relieve Cutting from the duty of communicating to the defendants the fact that its check had not been met. I am of the same opinion. Up to that time the drawers were in good *292 credit, and their paper of this kind, we are to presume, was promptly met. Thereafter, the holders of such paper were to be put upon their legal diligence in the courts, with a fair expectation, perhaps, that they might ultimately be able to obtain payment. The difference between a bank check having five days to run, and which is then to be paid, and a suspended debt against parties who have failed, is sufficiently obvious. The defendants purchased this check as one of the former class, while the plaintiffs’ agent well knew that it belonged to the latter, and withheld that knowledge from the defendants. The plaintiffs’ conduct is less censurable, morally, than it would be had it been proved that they personally knew of the failure of the drawers; but in point of law, the case is the same as though, after hearing that Farnham & Co. had failed, they took the paper which they held against them into the street, and sold it to parties who had not heard of that event. Such sin act could not be justified at law any more than in the forum of conscience. The judge was therefore perfectly correct in instructing the jury, that it was the duty of Cutting to communicate to the defendants what he had heard Chard say as to the protest of the other check. He was also correct in advising them that the consequence of omitting to do so was, that the plaintiffs could not recover on the note. Where a party negotiates- commercial paper, payable to bearer, or under the blank indorsement of another person, he cannot be sued on the paper because he is not a party to it; but he nevertheless warrants that he has no knowledge of any facts which prove the paper to be worthless, -on account of the failure of the makers, or by its being already paid, or otherwise to have become void or defunct; for, says Judge Story, any concealment of this nature would be a manifest fraud. (Story on Prom. Notes, § 118.) The plaintiffs’ counsel argued that, according to the case of Nichols v. Pinner (18 N. Y., 295), the plaintiffs and their agent were warranted in maintaining silence aá to the failure of Farnham & Co., though they knew it and the defendants did not. But the cases are essentially different. There we *293 decided, that where a merchant, knowing himself to be in-insolvent, purchases goods without disclosing the fact, there being no inquiry made, he is not necessarily guilty of fraud, as he may honestly believe that he can go on and retrieve his affairs. Where so much of the trade of the country is conducted without invested capital, or on borrowed capital, it must often happen that a merchant who is ultimately successful has known periods of commercial disaster when his property would not pay his debts. It would be too strict to hold, that under such circumstances he must in all cases go into liquidation, or expose himself to probable bankruptcy by disclosing his condition. But the case does not countenance the position, that a dealer who has been of known standing, but who has suddenly failed in business, can go to those who were acquainted with his former character, but who have not heard of his failure, and innocently purchase their property on credit. Judge Selden, in his opinion, puts that case as one not covered by the judgment. The judge was also right in stating to the jury, that the non-payment of the check, spoken of by Chard, was evidence upon the question of the insolvency of the drawers. I have already stated what I consider the necessary inference from such a circumstance among business men. The judgment must be affirmed. Johnson, Oh. J., Comstock, Gray and Grover, Js., concurring, Judgment affirmed.