Dobson v. . Pearce

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 158 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 159 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 160 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 162 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 164 A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally for error or irregularity, but is conclusive until set aside or reversed by the same court or some other court having appellate jurisdiction. (Smith v. Lewis, 3J.R., 157; Homer v. Field, 1 Pick., 435.) The jurisdiction of the court in which a judgment has been recovered is, however, always open to inquiry; and if it has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not acquired jurisdiction of the parties by the due service of process or by a voluntary appearance, the proceedings *Page 165 are coram non judice and the judgment void. The want of jurisdiction has always been held to be a valid defence to an action upon the judgment, and a good answer to it when set up for any purpose. So, fraud and imposition invalidate a judgment as they do all acts; and it is not without semblance of authority that it has been suggested that at law the fraud may be alleged, whenever the party seeks to avail himself of the results of his own fraudulent conduct by setting up the judgment, the fruits of his fraud. (See per Thompson, C.J., in Borden v. Fitch, 15 J.R., 121,and cases cited.) But whether this be so or not, it is unquestionable that a court of chancery has power to grant relief against judgments when obtained by fraud. Any fact which clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not avail himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will justify an interference by a court of equity. (Reigal v. Wood, 1 J.C.R., 402; McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. Rep., 139; Duncan v. Lyon, 3J.C.R., 351; Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 6Cranch, 206; Shottenkirk v. Wheeler, 3 J.C.R., 275.) Under our present judiciary system, the functions of the courts of common law and of chancery are united in the same court, and the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, are abolished, and the defendant may set forth by answer as many defences as he may have, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both. (Code, §§ 69, 150.) The Code also authorizes affirmative relief to be given to a defendant in an action by the judgment. (§ 274.) The intent of the legislature is very clear, that all controversies respecting the subject matter of the litigation should be determined in one action, and the provisions are adapted to give effect to that intent. Whether, therefore, fraud or imposition in the recovery of *Page 166 a judgment could heretofore have been alleged against it collaterally at law or not, it may now be set up as an equitable defence to defeat a recovery upon it. Under the head of equitable defences are included all matters which would before have authorized an application to the court of chancery for relief against a legal liability, but which, at law, could not have been pleaded in bar. The facts alleged by way of defence in this action would have been good cause for relief against the judgment in a court of chancery, and under our present system are, therefore, proper matters of defence; and there was no necessity or propriety for a resort to a separate action to vacate the judgment. In Connecticut, although law and equity are administered by the same judges, still the distinction between these systems is preserved, and justice is administered under the head of common law and chancery jurisdiction by distinct and appropriate forms of procedure; and hence, as it was at least doubtful whether at law the fraud alleged would bar a recovery upon the judgment, a resort to the chancery powers of the court of that state was proper if not necessary. The right of the plaintiff in the judgment was a personal right and followed his person; and, aside from the fact that he had resorted to the courts of Connecticut to enforce his claim under the judgment, the courts of that state, having obtained jurisdiction of his person by the due service of process within the state, had full power to pronounce upon the rights of the parties in respect to the judgment and to decree concerning it. It necessarily follows that the decree of the superior court of Connecticut, sitting as a court of chancery, directly upon the question of fraud, is conclusive upon the parties to that litigation and all persons claiming under them with notice of the adjudication. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon a point litigated between the parties, is conclusive in all subsequent controversies where the same point comes again in question *Page 167 between the same parties. (White v. Coatsworth, 2 Seld., 137; Embury v. Conner, 3 Comst., 522.) In the State of Connecticut, it is quite clear the question of fraud would not be an open question between the parties, but would be considered entirely settled by the decree of the court of that state; and as full faith and credit are to be given by each state to the judicial proceedings of every other state, that is, the same credit, validity and effect as they would have in the state in which they were had, the parties are concluded in the courts of this state by the judgment of the court in Connecticut directly upon the question in issue. (Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat., 234.) The decree of the court of chancery of the State of Connecticut as an operative decree, so far as it enjoined and restrained the parties, had and has no extra-territorial efficacy, as an injunction does not affect the courts of this state; but the judgment of the court upon the matters litigated is conclusive upon the parties everywhere and in every forum where the same matters are drawn in question. It is not the particular relief which was granted which affects the parties litigating in the courts of this state; but it is the adjudication and determination of the facts by that court, the final decision that the judgment was procured by fraud, which is operative here and necessarily prevents the plaintiff from asserting any claim under it. The court acquired jurisdiction of the parties by the commencement of the action, and the service of process upon the defendant therein, and his appearance by an authorized attorney; and the withdrawal of the action of debt upon the judgment did not deprive it of jurisdiction thus acquired. The judgment of the superior court must be affirmed, with costs.