Allard v. . Greasert

Earl, C. The judge at the Circuit regarded this as an entire contract of sale, and not severable; and if he was right in this, he properly nonsuited the plaintiffs upon that ground. If it was an entire contract, within the meaning of the law, the plaintiffs could recover only by showing entire performance, by a full delivery of all the articles purchased. But it is not necessary, in this case, to determine whether this was an entire or a severable contract, because the defendants also moved for a nonsuit upon the ground that the contract of sale was void under the statute of frauds. Although the judge did not place the nonsuit upon this ground, it may be considered here. He nonsuited the plaintiffs, and, even if he gave a wrong reason for it, and placed it upon the wrong ground, the nonsuit may be upheld upon any ground appearing in the case. (Curtis v. Hubbard, 1 Hill, 336; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y., 298; Deland v. Richardson, 4 Den., 95.) Even if this were a severable contract so far as relates to the performance of the same, within.the meaning of the statute of frauds it is an entire contract. The reasons for holding it to be such are clearly set forth in Baldey v. Parker (2 B. & C., 41), and Story on Sales (§ 241). This, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, is a contract for the sale of goods for the price of fifty dollars or more, and as there was no note or memorandum or payment, the question to be determined is, whether the goods were accepted and received by the buyers so as to satisfy the statute. By the terms of the contract, the goods were to be delivered to the Merchants’ Union Express to be carried to the defendants, and they were *5 so delivered. It is well settled that when there is a valid contract of sale, a delivery to a carrier, according to the terms of the contract, vests the title to the property in the buyer. It was decided, in Rogers v. Phillips (40 N. Y., 519), that a delivery, according to the contract, to a general carrier, not designated or selected by the buyer, does not constitute such a delivery and acceptance as to answer the statute of frauds. But it has been held that when the goods have been accepted by the buyer, so as to answer that portion of the statute which requires acceptance, a delivery to a carrier selected by the buyer will answer that portion of the statute which requires the buyer to receive. (Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y., 661.) So far as I can discover, it has never yet been decided in any case that is entitled to respect as authority, that a mere carrier designated by the buyer can both accept and receive the goods so as to answer the statute. (Benj. on Sales, 124.) The cases upon this subject are cited and commented upon, and the principles applicable to the question are so fully set forth in the two recent cases above referred to that no further citation of authorities or extended discussion is, at this time, important. It will be found, by an examination of the authorities, that, in most of the cases, where a delivery to a carrier has been held to satisfy the statute of frauds there had been a prior acceptance of the goods by the buyer or his agent. A buyer may accept and receive through an agent expressly or impliedly appointed for that purpose. There is every reason for holding that a designated carrier may receive for the buyer, because he is expressly authorized to receive, and the act of receiving is a mere formal act, requiring the exercise of no discretion. But there is no reason for holding that the buyer, in such case, intended to clothe the carrier, of whose agents he may know nothing, with authority to accept the goods, so as to conclude him as to their quality, and bind him to take them as a compliance with a contract of which such agents can know nothing. This case furnishes as good an illustration as any. The goods were boxed; the carrier could know nothing about them; *6 and its agents had no right to unpack and handle them. Its sole duty and authority was to' receive and transport them. In such a case, it would be quite absurd to hold that the carrier had an implied authority from the buyer to accept the goods for him. If the buyer does not accept in person, he must do it through an authorized agent. Here it is not claimed that there was express authority conferred upon the carrier to accept, and the circumstances are not such that such authority can be implied. Hpon this last ground, therefore, the nonsuit was proper, and the judgment must be affirmed, with costs. All concur. Judgment affirmed.