In Re the Appraisal, Under the Transfer Tax Act, of the Estate of Brez

Cullen, J. We are of opinion that all the questions presented oh this appeal, including both the construction and the constitutionality of the statute of 1899 (Chap. 70) providing for the present appraisal and taxation of remainders created by will upon contingencies of where the ultimate beneficiaries cannot be immediately ascertained, are disposed of by our recent decision in Matter of Vanderbilt (172 N. Y. 69), and the order appealed from must, therefore, be reversed on the authority of that case. We feel, however, justified in calling the attention of the legislature to an inequality caused by the statute, which may have escaped its notice and which we submit to its wisdom whether it would not be proper to remedy. In all the cases covered by this statute there must be one or more intermediate estates, generally life estates, during the period elapsing between the death of the testator and the happening of the contingency (commonly the death of the life tenant) on which the remainders become vested absolutely and the remaindermen become certain. The tax on the remainders being paid out of the corpus of the estate diminishes the income of the life tenant by the interest on the amount of the tax. The constitutionality of this provision, though it affects the life tenant, we have upheld because the *611 rate or amount of tax on the succession of the life tenant is within the discretion of the legislature to prescribe, and the scheme in effect is simply the imposition of an additional tax on the life tenant. It is evident, however, that the legislature has determined that in many instances the tax may be excessive; for while it directs that the tax shall be imposed at the highest rate for any possible succession that may occur in any contingency, it provides that if it eventually transpires that the succession which actually happens is subject to a lower rate the excess of tax, with interest, shall be repaid by the state. The interest on this excess ought fairly, to go to the life tenant, though the statute is silent on the subject. But even if given to the life tenant it can be repaid to his estate only after his death, for it is commonly his death that finally settles the rate of tax. This is hardly an equivalent for the diminution of his income during life, an income oftentimes necessary for his support. It seems to us that, bearing in mind the general character of the tax and that the legislature has deemed it right to prescribe different rates of taxation depending on the relation of the legatee or devisee to the deceased, if it is desired to make taxes on remainders payable immediately, it would be fairer to the life tenant to have the tax assessed at the lowest rate of any succession provided for by the will, and in case the remainder eventually vesting should prove taxable at a higher rate, then such increased tax should be payable at the time of its enjoyment. Nor would this change be detrimental to the state. Our experience informs us that in the majority of cases the remainders are first appointed to the issue of the life tenant and descendants of the testator and are given to collaterals or strangers only in default of issue. The lowest rate of tax thus usually proves the final rate. Where the state imposes in the first instance a higher rate of tax it becomes obligated to repay the excess after a lifetime with six per cent interest, while it could borrow the money at half that rate. The orders of the surrogate and Appellate Division should be reversed and proceedings remitted to the surrogate of Kings county to assess the tax as prescribed in the statute.