Goldsmith v. . Goldsmith

Finch, J. The findings in this case show a situation which permits the application of an equitable remedy. They establish that Mrs. Goldsmith, while the owner and in possession of a house and lot known as the Myrtle avenue property, met with an accident which incapacitated her for its further care and management, and induced her to commit it to her son, the defendant," Leopold- That son was of age but unmarried and lived with the family, which further consisted of four children, three daughters and one son, all of them, with perhaps a single exception, minors, and two of them under ten years of age. The Myrtle avenue property furnished a home for the family which was supported partly by the rental of a portion of the house, partly by the husband and father, and to some extent by the labor of Annie, the eldest daughter, upon whom the household management devolved after the disability of the mother. The means of the family were narrow and limited. The home which they occupied was very essential to their comfort and support, but even that was incumbered by a mortgage, the annual interest of which was a charge upon their resources. In this state of affairs the findings show that the mother conveyed the house and lot to her son, Leopold, upon a promise on his part to hold it for the benefit of the other four children in common with himself, and give to them their shares in it. He paid no consideration for it beyond the promise thus made. It was a further part of the arrangement that he should have all the accruing rents, but should j)ay the interest on the mortgage and the taxes on the "property, and was to have his board in the family without charge. In pursuance of this arrangement the deed was executed and delivered, and Annie herself took it to the clerk’s office for record. It is quite evident that this was an arrangement founded upon the relation of mother and son, and brothers *317 and sisters, involving the trust and confidence growing out of that relation, and intended as a settlement of the family affairs. It furnished a home for all in which they were to have a common right, and which was to he for their joint benefit. The deed was made in February, 1887. The mother died in March of the next year. The plan originally adopted was carried out during her life and for some considerable time after her death. The daughters furnished Leopold his board without compensation or charge, as was arranged, and occasionally paid out small sums for ordinary repairs of the house. A time came when Leopold sold the Myrtle avenue property, and with a portion of the proceeds bought a house and lot on De Kalb avenue. There is evidence that on this occasion he was asked to take the deed in the name of all the children interested, but objected on the ground that it would be troublesome and inconvenient, and promised to execute a separate paper acknowledging and securing their rights in the property. Soon after he totally repudiated the agreement, and claimed to be the sole and absolute owner of the property, and now defends against the children, insisting that the agreement, if made, was void for uncertainty, and because it rested solely in parol. There was enough of evidence to warrant the finding that Leopold at the time of the conveyance promised his mother that he would hold the property in trust for the plaintiffs herein. What he said on that occasion was expressed in somewhat different terms by different witnesses, but the substance of all of it concurred in the promise that he would hold the legal title for the benefit of the plaintiffs. That agreement was reflected in the action of both parties for some years after it was made, and induced the plaintiffs to do what otherwise they would not have done, and furnish Leopold his board without charge. The conduct of the latter in now denying the rights of the plaintiffs operates as a manifest fraud upon them and upon the purpose of the dead mother in seeking to provide for her children. It would be a reproach to equity if it proved unable to. redress such a wrong. *318 It may be granted that no express trust was created, and that the judgment cannot be sustained on that ground, but we think the case is one in which equity will raise out of the situation, from the grouped and aggregated facts, an implied trust to prevent and redress a fraud, and which trust will be unaffected by the Statute of. Frauds and may properly be enforced. The general rule was declared, in Wood v. Rabe, (96 N. Y. 425, 426), to be, that when a person, through the influence of a confidential relation, acquires title to property or obtains an advantage which he cannot conscientiously retain, the court, to prevent the abuse of confidence, will grant relief. It was added that, while the fraud must be something more than the mere breach of a verbal agreement, yet, where the transaction is one between parent and child, and involves the greatest confidence on one side and the greatest influence on the other, the case is one, in which equity may properly intervene. One of the findings in this case is “ that at the time said deed was delivered the defendant understood that his mother reposed confidence in him, and with that understanding accepted the conveyance and the confidence of his mother.” There is no room to doubt the truth of that finding. There was not only involved the relation of mother and son, but that of brothers and sisters, for whose benefit the agreement was made. The absence of a formal writing grew out of that very confidence and trust, and was occasioned by it, as was also the subsequent performance by the children of the condition to furnish board without pay. Upon the whole transaction, therefore, including the confidential relation of the parties and its nature as a family arrangement very much beyond a mere business relation, we think it was competent for a court of equity to impress upon the property and its proceeds an implied trust for the benefit of the children. It is true that an intended fraud is not explicitly and by the use of that word charged in the complaint, but all the facts are there, fully and clearly stated, showing the fraud attempted to be perpetrated, and all that is omitted is the word or expression characterizing the necessary inference. We have held that *319 such an omission after judgment is not material where the facts themselves have been sufficiently pleaded. ( Whittlesey v. Delaney, 73 N. Y. 575.) We think, therefore, that there was no error in awarding the relief, and that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur. Judgment affirmed.