Crane v. . McDonald

Vann, J. The material allegations in a bill of interpleader, according to an early decision ¡by the Court of Errors, are: (1) That two or more persons have preferred a claim against the complainant; (2) that they claim the same thing; (3) that the complainant has no beneficial interest in the thing claimed; and (4) that he cannot determine, without hazard to himself, to which of the defendants the thing belongs. (Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cow. 691, 703.) It was also held in that case that the complainant should annex to his bill an affidavit that there is no collusion between him and any of the parties and that he should bring the money or thing claimed into court so that he could not be benefited by the delay of payment which might result from the filing of his bill. This method of procedure, in substance, still prevails. (Dorn v. Fox, 61 N. Y. 268.) The plaintiff insists that he has conformed to the practice thus laid down in every particular, while the appellant contends that the complaint is not sufficiently specific with reference to the claims of the defendants, and that no privity is shown between them in relation to their respective demands. The complaint describes the claim of the defendant McDonald more fully than that of the defendant Goodrich, because the former had sued him and had thus furnished him with a definite description. While the claim of the latter was not clearly nor fully described, enough was set forth to show that it was not a mere pretext, but that it apparently rested upon a reasonable and substantial foundation. If the appellant desired that it should be made more definite and certain, his remedy *655 was by motion under section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (N eftel v. Lighthstone, 77 N. Y. 96.) Upon the trial, according to the old chancery practice, as it appeared by the answers of the defendants that each claimed the fund in dispute, no other evidence of that fact was required to entitle the plaintiff to a decree. (Balchan v. Crawford, 1 Sandf. Ch. 380.) In this case, however, the point was not left to be determined by the pleadings, but evidence was introduced upon the subject' and it appeared that at least a fair doubt existed as to the rights of the conflicting claimants. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to decide, at his peril, either close questions of fact or nice questions of law, hut it was sufficient if there was a reasonable doubt as to which claimant the debt belonged. When a person, -without collusion, is subjected to a double demand to pay an acknowledged debt, it is the object of a bill of interpleader to relieve him of the risk of deciding who is entitled to the money. If the doubt rests upon a question of fact that is at all serious it is obvious -that the debtor cannot isafely decide it for himself, because it might be decided the other way upon an actual trial, while if it rests upon a question of law, as was said in Dorn v. Fox (61 N. Y. 270), “so long as a principle is still under discussion * * * it would seem fair to hold that there was sufficient doubt and hazard to justify the protection which is afforded by the beneficent action of interpleader.” Although the claim of Mi’. Goodrich has since been held untenable by this court (Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 N. Y. 157), it does not follow that no doubt existed when this action was commenced, because the Supreme Court, both at Special and General Term, held that it was valid and attempted to enforce it. This conflict in the decisions of the courts show that the adverse claims of the defendants involved a difficult and doubtful question and is a conclusive answer to the contention of the appellant that the plaintiff did not need the aid of an action of this character. Was it possible for him to safely decide a point so intricate as to cause those learned in the law to differ so widel y? *656 The law did not place so great a resjjonsibility upon him, but provided him with a remed/ to protect himself against the double liability, or, to speak more accurately, against a double A’-exation on account of one liability. (Dorn v. Fox, supra; Caulkins v. Bolton, 31 Hun, 458; 98 N. Y. 511; Johnston v. Stimmel, 89 N. Y. 117; Schuyler v. Pettisser, 3 Edw. Ch. 191; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige 199; M. & H . R. R. Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige 384; Bell v. Hunter, 3 Barb. Ch. 391; Badeau v. Tyler, 1 Sandf. Ch. 270; German Ex. Bank v. Commr’s of Excise, 6 Abb. [N. C.] 394; B. & M. R. R. Co. v. Arthur, 10 id. 147; Pomeroy Eq. Jur. §§ 1320-1327; Story Eq. Jur. §§ 800-824.) It required, however, that he should act in good faith, and he insists that he furnished ample evidence upon that question. He offered to pay the money to Mrs. McDonald if she would indemnify him against the claim of Mr. Goodrich, but she refused to do so, and commenced an action to recover the amount involved. A like offer to Mr. Goodrich upon- the condition that he should furnish indemnity Avas declined, and legal proceedings were threatened. Heither defendant would recede from the position thus taken, but both persisted in their respective demands. The plaintiff thereupon paid the money into court pursuant to its order, and then commenced this suit annexing to his complaint, in addition to the usual Aerification, an affidavit stating that the action Avas brought in good faith and Avithout collusion Avith either defendant or with any person “ in their behalf.” It did not appear that he had attempted to favor the position of either claimant. These facts, with others appearing in the record, furnished adequate support to the conclusion of the trial judge that the plaintiff acted in good faith. The appellant contends that no such privity was sIioavii to exist between the defendants as to authorize the plaintiff to bring an action to cause them to interplead. While the early authorities were exacting upon this subject, many of the later eases have been less rigid, and some have ignored it altogether. The doctrine seems to have been abro *657 gated in England, partly by statute and partly by judicial decisions. Mr. Pomeroy, referring to the rule, seys that “ it is a manifest imperfection of the equity jurisdiction that it should be so limited. A person may be and is exposed to danger, vexation and loss from conflicting independent claims to the same thing, as well as from claims that are dependent, and there is certainly nothing in ’the nature of the remedy which need prevent it from being extended to both classes of demands.” (Pomeroy Eq. Jur. § 1324, note.) Our statutory interpleader by order apparently does not recognize the doctrine. (Code Civ. Pro. § 820.) A somewhat similar statute in England led the courts of that country to declare that they no longer felt bound, even in an equity action, by the narrow principle previously laid down. (Attenborough v. London, etc., Dock Co., L. R. [3 C. P. Div.] 450.) It is not necessary, however, for us to decide whether the rule still exists, or to what extent it exists in this state, because, according to the most exacting authorities, where the adverse titles of the claimants are both derived from a common source, it is sufficient to authorize an interpleader. Such is the case under consideration. Mrs. Graves, as the owner of the contract in question and of the money that was invested therein, was the common source of title to both defendants. The title of Mrs. McDonald, as claimed, for it is the claim only that is here material, was by assignment of the legal title from Mrs. Graves, while the claim of Mr. Goodrich was by an equitable assignment from the same person. Each defendant, acknowledging the original title of Mrs. Graves, claimed the same debt under her, and the title of each was, therefore, derivative, as that word is used with reference to this subject. (Pomeroy Eq. Jur. § 1327.) The plaintiff: held the money to discharge the debt substantially as a stakeholder, having no beneficial interest therein and being under no independent liability to either claimant. He does not deny the title of Mrs. Graves, but, affirming it, places himself upon the uncertainty as to which of the two persons claiming from her is entitled to receive the fund. *658 Whether the claim of Mr. Goodrich was based on a lien by contract, or a lien by attachment, or both, it originated with Mrs. Graves, who at one time owned all that was claimed by either defendant. His lien had been sanctioned by a decree of the Supreme Court nearly a year before the trial of this action, and, although that judgment was subsequently reversed, it was still in force when the judgment now under review was rendered. The lien of the attachment, as it was claimed to exist, arose after the covenant to pay the sum in question was entered into by the plaintiff, and, although that lien also was subsequently held invalid, it was sufficient to support an action of inter-pleader and is a complete answer to the contention of the appellant that this suit was not regularly brought, owing to the contractual relation between herself and the plaintiff. If the actual truth were a defense to a bill of interpleader, the argument of the appellant would be conclusive, but necessarily the plaintiff in such an action has the right to rely upon what is claimed to be true, as otherwise the remedy would be of no value. After carefully examining all of the exceptions involving questions of law, we think that none of them were well taken, and that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs. All concur, except Follett, Ch. J., not sitting. Judgment affirmed.