Metropolitan Bank v. . Van Dyck

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 402 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 403 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 404 The question presented for our determination in these actions is one of the gravest importance, and challenges *Page 405 our most careful consideration. We are called upon to annul and set aside an act of the Congress of the United States, passed in conformity with the forms of the fundamental law, after grave deliberation by both houses of Congress, and which has assumed the form of a law, with the approval of the executive. Two departments of the government have therefore united, and all which by the provisions of the Constitution are required to unite, in the enactment of a law. The responsibility of determining whether these two departments have violated the Constitution is now cast upon the third department, that of the judiciary, and however great that responsibility may be, we have, in the discharge of the duties imposed upon us, to meet it, and decide whether or not the Constitution has been violated. Before proceeding to the discussion of the precise question presented for adjudication in the present cases, it will greatly aid us in arriving at a correct and intelligent conclusion to advert briefly to the system of government organized by the Constitution of the United States, the principles which should govern in the construction of that Constitution, and the decisions which have been made, touching the powers of Congress under various provisions of that Constitution. We are all familiar with the fact, that the first system of a general or national government, formed by the colonies in this country, upon their separation from the crown of Great Britain, and assuming the position of independent states, was that of a confederation of the several states. "Articles of confederation and perpetual union" were entered into between the several states; and the style of the confederacy was that of "The United States of America." Each state retained its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which were not by the articles of that confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled. The ratification clause of the articles solemnly declared, that "whereas it has pleased the great Governor of the world, to incline the hearts of the legislatures we respectively represent in Congress to approve of and *Page 406 to authorize us to ratify the said articles of confederation andperpetual union: Know ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said articles and perpetual union. And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that . . . the articles thereof shall beinviolably observed by the States we respectively represent; andthat the union shall be perpetual." History informs us of the defects and the weakness of the articles of confederation, and of the conviction of the whole country that a different and more efficient system of government must be devised to insure to the people of the several states, their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare. A convention assembled in Philadelphia in 1787, which framed a Constitution that received the sanction of the people of the several states, and under which a government was organized in 1789, which has challenged the admiration of the world, and under the benign administration of which we have become a great and powerful nation, among the first of the earth. The address of the convention to the people on submitting the result of their labors for approval, which was signed by George Washington, its President, says: "The friends of our country have long seen and desired that the power of making war, peace and treaties, that of coining money, and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union. . . . In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in view that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American — the consolidation of our Union — in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed upon our minds, led each State in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude than might have been otherwise *Page 407 expected; and thus the Constitution which we now present is the result of a spirit of amity and of that mutual deference and concession, which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." The Constitution, thus prepared, was submitted to the people of the several States in conventions assembled, and they aggregately declared, in ordaining and establishing the said Constitution for the United States of America, that "the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity," did ordain and establish the same. A perpetual Union was thus established by the articles of confederation; to render that Union more perfect was the object to be attained by the Constitution. It was to secure to the framers thereof, and to their posterity, the blessings enumerated. The consolidation of the Union and its perpetuity were not all that was contemplated. Absolute sovereignty and complete supremacy in the exercise of all government powers confided to the national government were intended to be secured, and it is believed that such intention was accomplished. All legislative powers thereby granted were vested in the Congress, and the powers so granted to Congress are specifically enumerated in the eighth section of article first; and lest there might be doubts suggested as to the fullness of the authority granted, to such specific enumeration this clause is added, "and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." The omnipotence of the British Parliament is not more absolute than is the supremacy of the Congress of the United States upon all subjects which are either expressly or impliedly delegated to it. The President of the United States, upon his *Page 408 induction into office, is sworn to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." He is the only officer in the national or state governments who is required to take that oath, and all executive, legislative and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, are required to be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States. (Sec. 3 of art. 6.) It is made the duty of the President, from time to time, to give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and to recommend such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, and it is the duty of Congress, within the powers delegated to it, to pass such laws as may be necessary and proper to aid the President in fulfilling the high and imperative trust reposed in him, and to enable him to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. To accomplish all these purposes, and for the execution of the powers thus conferred on the government of the United States, and for its own protection and preservation, and its own defence, the Congress of the United States has absolute control over all the citizens thereof, and of the property and resources of the nation, subject only to that accountability which a representative in a free government owes to his constituents; and that ordeal, happily, in our favored land, is of frequent recurrence. That there might not be any misapprehension as to the fact of this absolute and perfect supremacy, the Constitution emphatically declares that "this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every state shallbe bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." The judges of every state are expressly declared to be bound by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and as they have all taken an oath to support that Constitution, every safeguard would seem to have been provided to ensure their fidelity to that Constitution and the laws made under it. Such laws overrule *Page 409 the state constitutions, and the laws of every state, and if the latter conflict with the former, they are void and nugatory, and it is the imperative duty of the judges so to declare. These views, it is believed, are fully sustained by learned commentators, as well as by the authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the final arbiter of the powers of that government. (Story's Com. on the Constitution, §§ 354, 355, 356, 360.) In Marvin v. Hunter (1 Wheat., 304, 324), the Supreme Court said: "The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign capacity, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declared, by the people of the United States." Chief Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the court in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat., 416), observed: "From the conventions called to ratify it the Constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people, `is ordained and established' in the name of the people, and is declared to be ordained `in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.' The assent of the states in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it, and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived by the state governments. The Constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation and bound the state sovereignties. It has been said that the people had already surrendered all their powers to the state sovereignties, and had nothing more to give. But, surely, the question whether they may resume and modify the powers granted to governments, does not remain to be settled in this country. Much more might the legitimacy of the general government be doubted, had it been created by the states. The powers delegated to the state sovereignties were to be exercised by themselves. To the formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the state sovereignties were certainly *Page 410 competent. But when, `in order to form a more perfect union,' it was deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people and of deriving its powers directly from them was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the Union, then, is emphatically and truly a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them and for their benefit. . . . It is the government of all, its powers are delegated by all, it represents all, and acts for all." These quotations are thus liberally made, because of their pertinency to the present investigation, and for the reason that they are authoritative expositions of the objects and purposes of the Constitution, and of the source of its power, and are to be recognized and accepted as such by all tribunals. The government thus formed, is supreme and self-supporting and self-perpetuating. It cannot be dependent for its life or existence upon other governments or sovereignties, but has given to itself vigor and strength sufficient for its own preservation and perpetuity. This point was directly resolved in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland (supra), in which Chief Justice MARSHALL said: "If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this, that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. . . . Though any one state may be willing to control its operations, no state is willing to allow others to control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind the component parts. But this question is not left to mere reason; the people have, in express terms, decided it by saying, `this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land,' and by requiring that the members of the state legislatures and the officers of the executive and judicial departments of the states, shall take the oath of fidelity to it." *Page 411 The same doctrine was distinctly enunciated by Chief Justice TANEY, in the case of Ableman v. Booth (21 How., 506, 516), where he says: "The powers of the general government and of the states, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres; and the sphere of action appropriated to the United States, is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a state judge or a state court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." Again, we are to give to the various provisions of the Constitution such a construction as will most effectually subserve the great purposes of its formation, and best promote the general welfare of the grantors of the powers contained in it, the people, the source and fountain of all power. The grant of power is to be construed most favorable to the grantor, especially where the power is granted, or the agency created, for the benefit and welfare of the grantor, or principal. The rule which should govern in such a case is clearly laid down by Story (Com. on Const., § 413). He says: "But in construing a constitution of government framed by the people, for their own benefit and protection, for the preservation of their rights and property and liberty, where the delegated powers are not and cannot be used for the benefit of their rulers, who are but their temporary servants and agents, but are intended solely for the benefit of the people, no such presumption, to use the words in the most restricted sense, necessarily arises. The strict or the more extended sense both being within the letter, may be fairly held to be within their intention, as either shall best promote the very objects of the people in their grant, as either shall best promote or secure their rights, property or liberty." This court, in the case of The People v. New York CentralRailroad Company (24 N.Y., 485, 486), approved of the rule enunciated by JOHNSON, J., in Newell v. People (3 Seld., 93), that a constitution is an instrument of government, made and *Page 412 adopted by the people for practical purposes, connected with the commerce, business and wants of human life. For this reason, pre-eminently, every word should be expounded in its plain, obvious and common sense, and Judge DENIO, arguendo, in the same case, stated the principle of interpretation, which, while it commends itself to the good sense of all, is abundantly supported by authority, that a written constitution, framed by men chosen for the work by reason of their peculiar fitness, and adopted by the people upon mature deliberation, implies a degree of carefulness of expression proportioned to the importance of the transaction; and the words employed are to be presumed to have been used with the greatest possible discrimination. Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat., 188), in interpreting a provision of the Constitution of the United States, says: "As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who adopted it must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they said." We are now prepared to enter upon the inquiry, what powers have been conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, and whether any such powers authorize the enactment by that body of the act passed February 25, 1862. The express powers needful to be referred to, thus specifically delegated to Congress, are: 1. To levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. 2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States. 3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian tribes. 4. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin. 5. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States. 6. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal. *Page 413 7. To raise and support armies. 8. To provide and maintain a navy. 9. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. 10. The United States having guaranteed to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and engaged to protect each of them against invasion and against domestic violence, Congress has power to fulfill those engagements. 11. Congress has also power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. We are to apply to the construction of the powers thus delegated, the rule as settled in the case of McCulloch v.Maryland (supra), that the Government of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution; and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication. On the other hand, this instrument, like every other grant, is to have a reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms, and where a power is expressly given in general terms, is not to be restrained to particular cases, unless that construction grows out of the context, expressly or by necessary implication. Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Gibbons v. Ogden (supra), in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants expressly the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for the purpose. But this limitation in the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the Constitution, which has been pointed out by *Page 414 the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do the gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the terms, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument — for that narrow construction which would cripple the government and render it unequal for the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent — then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded . . . If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can inure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an instrument of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can never be executed by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred." No apology is necessary for quoting thus liberally from this profound jurist and learned expounder of the purposes and objects of the Constitution, and of the powers conferred by it *Page 415 upon the Congress of the United States, upon the departments and officers thereof. We should be doing great injustice to the framers of the Constitution, and a great wrong to the people who adopted it, to secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of liberty, if we give to it such a construction as will cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it was instituted. We must also bear in mind that no interpretation of the words, in which those powers are granted can be a sound one, which narrows their ordinary import, so as to defeat the objects for which that Constitution was made. That would be to destroy the spirit and to cramp the letter of the Constitution itself. Mr. Justice STORY, in delivering the opinion of the court inMartin v. Hunter (1 Wheaton, 304, 326, 327), says: "This instrument (the Constitution) like any other grant, is to have a reasonable construction according to the import of its terms; and when a power is expressly given in general terms, it is not to be restrained to particular cases, unless that construction grows out of the context expressly or by necessary implication. The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not in a sense unreasonably restricted or enlarged. The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specification of its powers, or to declare the means by which those powers should be carried into execution. It was foreseen that this would be a perilous and difficult, if not impracticable task. The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence. It could not be foreseen what new changes and modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter; and restrictions and specifications, which at the present might seem salutary, might in the end prove the overthrow of the system itself. Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the legislature, from time to time, *Page 416 to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its powers as its own wisdom and the public interests should require." We have had pressed upon us, with much force and eloquence, the tenth amendment to the Constitution, as containing a restriction upon the powers of the government of the United States. Its language is: The powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people. The same reservation, in substance, was contained in the second article of the articles of confederation, except that the word "expressly" was there placed before the word "delegated." The omission of this word in the tenth amendment is most significant, and shows the object was not to interfere with or restrict any of the powers delegated to the United States by the Constitution, whether expressly delegated or not. This is the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of McCullough v.Maryland (supra), where it is said, in the opinion, that "there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers, and which requires everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the tenth amendment, which was formed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word `expressly,' and declares only that the powers `not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people," thus leaving the question whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest, has been delegated to one government or prohibited to the other, to depend on a plain construction of the whole instrument. The men who drew and adopted this instrument had experienced the embarrassment resulting from the insertion of the word in the articles of confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments. A constitution to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of *Page 417 a legal code and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this was entertained by the framers of the American Constitution, is not only apparent from the nature of the instrument, but from the language." And it is emphatically asked, if this were not so, "Why else were some of the limitations found in the ninth section of the first article introduced? There was no express delegation of any of these powers to the Congress of the United States and the prohibition has no significance or meaning, unless it had been supposed that the powers thus prohibited could have been exercised, unless such prohibition had been made." So also the first eight amendments to the Constitution, are all in restraint of powers, which it was supposed could have been exercised by Congress without such prohibitions. None of them are applicable to any of the express powers delegated to Congress, but embrace an enumeration of certain implied powers, which it was assumed Congress might exercise under the general delegation of powers, unless specially prohibited from so doing. The omission in the ninth section of article first, and in any of these amendments, of any restraint upon or prohibition to Congress to legislate upon the subject, of what should or should not be a legal tender, possesses great significance and importance, as we shall hereafter see, when we come to consider that precise point more attentively. It is sufficient here to observe, that the Constitution contains no prohibition upon Congress from legislating on that subject. It can be hardly necessary to say that the prohibitions contained in the tenth section, which are specially made applicable to the states, have no relation to, and in no sense, impair or affect any of the powers of Congress. If these prohibitions were equally binding on Congress, as upon the states, then they were all prohibited to Congress equally. That the framers of the Constitution did not so regard it, is *Page 418 conclusively shown by the fact that, while they prohibited the states from doing several things, among others, to pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or grant any title of nobility, those three things were only prohibited to the Congress, and the reasonable and legitimate deduction from such omission is, that the other things not prohibited to Congress were allowed to be exercised by it, if those matters came within the purview of either the express or implied powers granted. This argument is not weakened by the fact that the Constitution expressly delegated to Congress the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to coin money, and omitted saying anything on the other matters prohibited to the states. Such would seem to have been the view taken by distinguished members of the house of representatives of the United States in the debate on the bill to incorporate the United States Bank, in June, 1811. Mr. Crawford, of Georgia, after ward Secretary of the Treasury, said: "If the state governments are restrained from exercising this right to incorporate a bank, it would appear, exnecessitate rei, that this right is vested in the United States. The entire sovereignty of this nation is vested in the state governments and in the federal government, except that part of it which is retained by the people, which is solely the right of electing their public functionaries." Mr. Alston, a member for South Carolina, said: "In the tenth article, first section, it is said, no state shall coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts; the interpretation which I give to it is, that the United States possess power to make anything besides gold and silver a legal tender. If what I conceive to be a fair interpretation be admitted, it must follow that they have a right to make bank paper a legal tender. Much more, then, have they the power of causing it to be received by themselves in payment of taxes." (Elliott's Debates, vol. 4, pp. 367, 368.) These positions do not appear to have been controverted in the debate. It seems here appropriate to refer to the provision of the particular act of Congress now under consideration. It was *Page 419 passed on the 25th of February, 1862, and is entitled "an act to authorize the issue of United States notes, and for the redemption or funding thereof, and for funding the floating debt of the United States." The first section authorized the Secretary of the Treasury "to issue, on the credit of the United States, one hundred and fifty millions of the United States notes," and declared that the same "shall be receivable in payment of all taxes, internal duties, excises, debts and demands of every kind, due to the United States, except duties on imports, and of all claims and demands against the United States of every kind whatsoever, except for interest upon bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin, and shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest as aforesaid." The question presented for decision in these actions is, has Congress the power, under the Constitution, to make a law declaring treasury notes, issued by the United States, and payable at its treasury, for the redemption of which the credit of the federal government is pledged, and for the payment whereof the entire property of the government and that of each citizen, which may be reached by taxation, is also pledged, a legal tender in the payment of debts, and lawful money of the United States? Before proceeding to the consideration of this question, it will be instructive to revert to the proceedings of the convention which framed the Constitution. The second clause of section eight of article first of the Constitution was originally reported in these words: "To borrow money and emit bills on the credit of the United States." This clause coming up for consideration in the convention, Mr. Governeur Morris moved to strike out the words "and emit bills on the credit of the United States," remarking that, if the United States had credit, such bills would be unnecessary — if they had not, unjust and useless. Mr. Madison said, will it not be sufficient to prohibit the making them a tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views. *Page 420 And promissory notes in that shape may, in some emergencies, be best. Mr. Morris replied, that striking out the words will leave room still for notes of a responsible minister, which will do all the good without the mischief. Mr. Gorham was for striking out without inserting any prohibition. He also said, as to Congress having the power to issue paper money: "The power, as far as it will be necessary or safe, is involved in that of borrowing." Mr. Mercer was a friend to paper money, and was, consequently, opposed to a prohibition of it altogether. He said "it would stamp suspicion on the government to deny it a discretion on this point." The clause was stricken out (Madison Papers, vol. 3, p. 1343, c.), but no prohibition on Congress was inserted to issue paper money or to make the same a legal tender. Mr. Madison adds, in a note at page 1346, that the vote of Virginia in the affirmative was occasioned by the acquiescence of Mr. Madison, who became satisfied that striking out the words would not disable the government from the use of public notes, as far as they could be safe and proper, and would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender either for public or private debts. Mr. Morris subsequently reported the Constitution to the convention, and the second clause of section eight was reported as it now stands, the words "on the credit of the United States," which had been erased, having been reinserted. The power was, therefore, given to Congress to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and it would appear to have been the understanding of the members of the convention, that such power authorized the issuing of notes or bills by the government. It is undeniable, that the convention, with its attention particularly directed to the consideration of the question, declined to prohibit their issue, and also declined to prohibit the making of them a legal tender in payment of either public or private debts. The exigencies of the government at an early day compelled a resort to the power of borrowing money on the credit of the United States, and such power has *Page 421 been exerted and rendered beneficial in the form of treasury notes, issued by it and on the public credit. On the 30th of June, 1812, the first act was passed authorizing the issue of these notes to the amount of $5,000,000, and the sixth section of the act declared that they should be received in payment of all duties and taxes laid by authority of the United States, and of all public lands sold by its authority. These notes, therefore, became a legal tender for debts of this character due the United States, and the act was approved by President Madison. Issues of treasury notes have been authorized by acts of Congress of February 25, 1813; March 4, 1814; December 26, 1814; October 12, 1837; January 31, 1842; August 31, 1842; July 22, 1846; January 28, 1847; December 23, 1857. President Madison, in approving the act of June 30, 1812, entirely overcame the scruple or doubt suggested by him that the bills which might be issued under the authority to borrow money, ought not or could not be made a tender for public debts. That Congress possessed that power is now settled by judicial authority. In Thorndike v. The United States (2 Mason, 1, 18), STORY, J., said: "By the statutes of the United States, under which treasury notes have been from time to time issued, it is enacted, that such notes shall be receivable in payment to the United States, for duties, taxes and sales of public lands, to the full amount of the principal and interest accruing due on such notes. It follows, of course, that they are a legal tender in payment of debts of this nature due to the United States, and by the very tenure of the acts, public officers are bound to receive them." We find, therefore, a long continued practice on the part of Congress in the issue of treasury notes on the credit of the United States, and declaring such notes to be a legal tender in payment of certain debts due to the United States, and the legality of such notes sanctioned by all departments of the government, and the power of Congress to issue the same and make them such legal tender, expressly affirmed by the courts. The deductions to be made from such facts will be hereafter *Page 422 adverted to. It should be observed here, that the power to issue treasury notes, on the credit of the United States, was distinctly conceded on the argument by the learned counsel, who appeared in opposition to the act of Congress now under consideration. Congress have continuously, since the year 1792, exercised the power of declaring what shall be a legal tender in payment of private as well as public debts, in reference to a metallic currency. Now, it is conceded that there is no express delegation of power to Congress to legislate at all, on the subject of legal tender, and, as has been remarked, neither is there any prohibition in the Constitution, upon Congress, forbidding such legislation, or declaring what it shall or shall not make a legal tender. This scrupulous omission to make any provision in the Constitution, on this subject, was not accidental. The attention of the convention was particularly attracted to it, as we have seen, and we cannot doubt that the members of the convention intentionally omitted inserting any provision on the subject, preferring to leave its exercise to the implied powers delegated to Congress. It is clear, from the remark of Mr. Madison in the convention, already quoted, that in his opinion Congress would have the power to declare bills or notes issued on the credit of the United States, a legal tender, unless prohibited from so doing, by some provision of the Constitution. Another significant circumstance as indicating the opinion of the convention that Congress had the power to legislate on the subject of legal tender, is found in the fact, that on the 6th of August, 1787, the Constitution, as previously agreed upon in the Convention, was reported by the committee of detail, nearly in the form it was subsequently passed. But article thirteenth of the then proposed Constitution, declared that "no state, without the consent of the Legislature of the United States, should make anything but specie a tender in payment of debts." This proposed clause of the Constitution, therefore, contained a distinct and unequivocal acknowledgment that it would be competent for Congress to give its consent *Page 423 to the legislatures of the several states, to make something else than a specie tender in payment of debts. It is also an explicit admission that such a power was vested in Congress, and that it, by consent, might permit state legislatures to do the same thing. It is an absurdity to say that Congress could consent that the legislatures of the states could do this, and not have the power of doing the thing itself; it of course could not grant to others powers it did not itself possess. On this clause coming up for final consideration, it was amended by making the prohibition upon the state legislatures peremptory and absolute, as the same now stands in the first subdivision of section ten of article first. The fact that the convention made the prohibition positive upon the states, does not militate at all against the argument derived from the conceded admission, that something else than specie could be made a tender for the payment of debts, with the consent of Congress. This seems an appropriate place to consider the legislation of Congress under the powers conferred upon it to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins. It is to be borne in mind, that no express power is given by the Constitution to Congress to establish, or make anything a legal tender in payment of debts; neither, as has been already observed, is there any prohibition contained in the Constitution forbidding legislation by Congress on that topic, or declaring what it shall or shall not make a legal tender. The framers of the Constitution could not have been ignorant that the power to declare what shall or shall not be a legal tender, or, in other words, lawful money of a country, was a necessary incident of sovereignty, and had ever been exercised by the sovereign power in all civilized nations. They were equally cognizant of the fact, that the colonies had invariably exercised this power; and that the states, on the application of the Continental Congress, and pursuant to its recommendation, had made the issue of paper money by the Continental Congress, for the purpose of carrying on the war of the revolution, a legal tender in payment of debts. This legislation by the states was invoked, because that Congress had no power to legislate *Page 424 on any subject, and such legislation could only be had through the instrumentality of the states. Such weakness and defect, in the powers of the Continental Congress, were among the controlling reasons for the formation of the new system, brought into being by the Constitution. In examining the history of legislation on this subject, we find that the first act of Congress relating to legal tender, is that of April 2d 1792, establishing "the mint for striking and coining gold and silver coins;" and by section sixteen it was enacted, that all the gold and silver coins which shall have been issued from said mint, shall be a lawful tender in all payments whatsoever. The first issue of silver dollars from the mint was not before October, 1794; and of gold coin not before July, 1795; and the whole amount of metallic money issued from 1793 to 1795, was only $463,541.80 in value. To provide a legal medium of commerce, an act was passed on the 9th of February, 1793, declaring that, from and after the first day of July, 1793, foreign gold and silver coins should pass current as money within the United States, and be a legal tender for the payment of all debts and demands, at the several and respective rates therein mentioned and prescribed. This act embraced the coins of Great Britain, Portugal, France, Spain, and the dominions of Spain. It was practically the first legal tender act ever passed by Congress. On the 4th of August, 1790, an act was passed by Congress, to provide for the collection of duties, which declared that certain foreign coins, therein enumerated, should be received in payment of duties at prescribed rates of value, but did not declare the same should otherwise be a legal tender. This provision of the act of 1790, was repealed by the act of February 9, 1793, the repeal to take effect July 1, 1793. Subsequently other acts have been passed by Congress, from time to time, changing the value of certain foreign coins and making them a legal tender, for the payment of all debts and demands, sometimes by weight and then again by tale. (Act of April 10, 1806; act of March 3, 1823, making foreign coins receivable in payment of public lands; act of 25th June, 1834, declaring *Page 425 certain foreign silver coins to be of the legal value, and to pass current as money within the United States by tale for the payment of all debts and demands; act of March 3, 1843.) By the act of June 28, 1834, foreign gold coins were directed to pass current as money within the United States, and be receivable in all payments by weight, of the fineness and at the rates therein mentioned. By the act of January 18, 1837, the standard for both gold and silver coins of the United States, was thereafter to be such, that of one thousand parts by weight, nine hundred should be of pure metal and one hundred of alloy, and the alloy of the silver coins should be of copper, and the alloy of the gold coins should be of copper and silver; provided, that the silver do not exceed one-half of the whole alloy. The weight of the gold and silver coins was prescribed, and they were declared to be legal tenders of payment according to their nominal value. And it was further provided in and by said act, that the silver coins theretofore issued at the mint of the United States, and the gold coins issued since July 1, 1834, should continue to be legal tenders of payment for their nominal value, on the same terms as if they were of the coinage of that act. By the act of 27th February, 1853, the weight of the half-dollar was reduced from 206¼ grains to 192 grains, and all the coins of lesser denominations in proportion, and they were made legal tenders in payment of debts for all sums not exceeding five dollars. We thus see that Congress, since the organization of the government, commencing in the presidency of Washington, has exercised plenary power and control over the subject of currency and legal tender laws; it has established the value of certain foreign coins at one time and changed it at another; has made them a tender in payment of all debts, now by weight, and then again by tale; repealed such laws and enacted them again, sometimes making such coins a legal tender in payment of all debts, and at other times limiting them to the payment for public lands or for duties and taxes, also making the evidences of the public debt or stock of the *Page 426 United States a legal tender in payment for public lands. (See act of March 3, 1797.) We also see that Congress has changed, from time to time, the standard of value of the coins struck by our own mint, debased them by altering the fineness and weight and the relative value of the gold and silver, and making the debased coins, as well as those of a greater value, not debased, equally a legal tender for the payment of all debts, public and private, at their respective nominal values. As has been before observed, there is no express grant of power to Congress to make gold and silver or anything else a tender in payment of debts, public or private. It is conceded that Congress may properly say what the United States may receive in payment and discharge of debts due to it, and that it may therefore rightfully say in what currency or metals or things payment may be made of them. Admitting this, it is contended that it does not follow that Congress has the power to say what shall be a tender and discharge of a debt due from one individual to another. Our review of the legislation of Congress has shown us, that under the clause of the Constitution authorizing it to coin money and regulate the value thereof, Congress has uniformly declared that the money so coined, and the value of which has thus been regulated, should be received as a legal tender in payment of all debts, equally whether due to the government or to private individuals, and that under the power to regulate the value of foreign coins, it has so, from time to time, regulated and prescribed their value, and made them a legal tender in payment of all debts. It has made coins of unequal intrinsic value and fineness equally a tender in payment of debts at their respective nominal values. All these powers have been thus exercised by Congress from the foundation of our government, and so far as my investigations have enabled me to say, they have been unchallenged. We are not furnished with any case where they have been questioned by the courts, and what inference such a uniform course of legislation, acquiesced in by the courts and by the country, should have, would seem to be well established. *Page 427 The general rule of construction which has been sanctioned is, that contemporaneous and legislative exposition regarding a power furnishes strong proof of the existence of such power. Judge STORY says, in reference to a question of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: "This weight of contemporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence of enlightened State courts, and these judicial decisions of the Supreme Court through so long a period do, as we think, place the doctrine upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken without delivering over the subject to perpetual and irremediable doubts." (Martin v.Hunter, 1 Wheat., 421.) In Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheat, 421), Chief Justice MARSHALL observed, that "this concurrence of statesmen, of legislators and of judges, in the same construction of the Constitution, may justly inspire some confidence in that construction." "An uniform course of action, involving the right to the exercise of an important power for half a century, and this almost without question, is no unsatisfactory evidence that the power is rightfully exercised." (Briscoe v. Bank ofKentucky, 11 Peters, 257.) "The uniform construction given to a provision of the Constitution by the legislature, with the silent acquiescence of the people, including the legal profession and the judiciary, and the injurious results which would come from a contrary interpretation, are proper elements of a legal judgment on this subject." (Per BLACK, Ch. J., Moores v. City of Reading, 21 Penn., 188; see also Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn., 277.) MARCY, J., in People v. Green (2 Wend., 274), says: "Great deference is certainly due to a legalized exposition of a constitutional provision, and especially when it is made almost contemporaneously with such provision, and may be supposed to result from the known views of policy and modes of reasoning, which prevailed among the framers of the instrument expounded." Chancellor WALWORTH, in the case of The People v. Coutant (11 Wend., 511), said: "Upon a question of real doubt as to the meaning of a particular clause in the Constitution, a legislative construction, if deliberately given *Page 428 is certainly entitled to much weight, although it is not conclusive upon the judicial tribunals." Many more cases might be cited in maintenance of the same propositions, but they are entirely unnecessary. Applying these rules to the points now under consideration, no doubt can remain that the early and long continued and uniform practice of Congress in passing legal tender enactments was warranted by the Constitution, and the acts thus passed were constitutional and valid. The power to make tender laws by Congress is an implied power, and it may be derived from many of the express powers conferred upon that body. If the power exists, then the government is, what it was intended it should be, sovereign, within its own sphere of action, as much so as if this power had been given in express words; and we have seen that Congress is expressly authorized by the Constitution to make all laws necessary and proper to carry this or any other granted power into execution. The general rules of construction apply here, that when a power is granted in general terms, the power is to be construed as co-extensive with the terms of the grant, nor is it to be restricted to particular cases, because it may be susceptible of abuse. This point is very ably and conclusively discussed by Judge STORY, in his work on the Constitution, and as this alleged or anticipated abuse of the power has been much pressed upon us in this argument, as a reason why we should hold that the power does not exist, a more particular reference to the suggestions and reasons of this learned and authoritative commentator may be permitted. In section 425 he says: "A power given in general terms is not to be restricted to particular cases merely because it may be susceptible of abuse, and, if abused, may lead to mischievous consequences. This argument is often used in public debate, and in its common aspect addresses itself so much to popular fears and prejudices that it insensibly acquires a weight in the public mind, to which it is in nowise entitled. . . . . But the argument from a possible abuse of power against its existence or use, is in its nature not only perilous, but in respect to governments would *Page 429 shake their very foundation. Every form of government unavoidably includes a grant of some discretionary powers. It would be wholly imbecile without them. It is impossible to foresee all the exigencies which may arise in the progress of events, connected with the rights, duties and operations of the government. If they could be foreseen it would be impossible, ab initio, to provide for them. The means must be subject to perpetual modification and change: they must be adapted to the existing manners, habits and institutions of society, which are never stationary; to the pressure of dangers or necessities; to the ends in view; to general and permanent operations, as well as to fugitive and extraordinary emergencies. In short, if the whole society is not to be revolutionized in every critical period, and remodeled in every generation, there must be left to those who administer the government a large mass of discretionary powers capable of greater or less actual expansion, according to circumstances, and sufficiently flexible not to involve the nation in utter destruction from the rigid limitations imposed upon it by an improvident jealousy. Every power, however limited, as well as broad, is in its own nature susceptible of abuse. No Constitution can provide perfect guards against it. Confidence must be reposed somewhere; and in free governments, the ordinary securities against abuse are found in the responsibility of rulers to the people, and in the just exercise of the elective franchise, and ultimately in the sovereign power of change belonging to them, in cases requiring extraordinary remedies. Few cases are to be supposed, in which a power, however general, will be exerted for the permanent oppression of the people, and yet cases may easily be put in which a limitation upon such a power might be found in practice to work mischief, to incite foreign aggression or encourage domestic disorder. The power of taxation, for instance, may be carried to a ruinous excess; and yet a limitation upon that power might, in a given case, involve the destruction of the independence of the country." Nothing could be added to the pertinency, cogency or conclusiveness of these views. Mr. Justice JOHNSON, in delivering *Page 430 the opinion of the court in Anderson v. Dunn (6 Wheat., 204, 220), uses the following apt and expressive language: "The idea is Utopian that government can exist without leaving the exercise of discretion somewhere. Public security against the abuse of such discretion must rest on responsibility, and stated appeals to public approbation. Where all power is derived from the people, and public functionaries, at short intervals, deposit it at the feet of the people, to be resumed again only at their own wills, individual fears may be alarmed by the monsters of imagination, but individual liberty can be in little danger." If, then, Congress has the power to establish a legal tender, is there any constitutional reason why the exercise of the power should be restricted to a particular medium? If Congress can coin any metallic substance, under the power to coin money, and stamp it with an arbitrary value, as it is conceded it may, then it follows from the practice of the government, and the rules and principles enunciated, that it can make such stamped metal a legal tender, at any designated value. Intrinsic value of the thing stamped or coined, has nothing to do with the question of power. Such metals, so stamped, are not issued or put in circulation on the faith or credit of the United States government. No pledge is made to redeem them, and they may possess little or no intrinsic value; yet it is not denied, that such pieces of metal so stamped or coined may be lawfully issued, and made a legal tender, and thus become lawful money of the United States. It is difficult to perceive, if this can be done with pieces of metal, why it is not equally within the power of Congress to declare the treasury notes which it may lawfully issue as a circulating medium, and which it may lawfully make a tender in payment of debts due to it, a legal tender also in payment of all debts. These notes are issued on the faith and credit of the whole Union, and the property of which, and of all its citizens, are pledged for their ultimate redemption; and if the metals may be made a tender, why may not notes equally be made a legal tender in payment of all debts, if the exigencies of the government should require *Page 431 it to be done, and Congress, in its wisdom, should think such necessity existed? That Congress was not confined to the use of the precious metals in providing a currency for the people is apparent from the views expressed by Mr. Madison, than whom no man better understood the powers of Congress, and the necessities and wants both of the government and the people. In his annual message to Congress of December 5, 1815, he says: "The absence of the precious metals will, it is believed, be a temporary evil, but until they can again be rendered the general medium of exchange, it devolves on the wisdom of Congress to provide asubstitute, which shall equally engage the confidence and accommodate the wants of the citizens throughout the Union. If the operation of the state banks cannot produce this result, the propable operation of a national bank will merit consideration; and if neither of these expedients be deemed effectual, it may be necessary to ascertain the terms upon which the notes of the government (no longer required as an instrument of credit) shall be issued upon motives of general policy, as a common medium ofcirculation." History informs us that the effect of serious and protracted wars is to produce a hoarding and withdrawal of the precious metals from circulation, and a suspension of specie payments on the part of banking institutions. So inevitable is this result that no legislation is effective to prevent it. The Bank of England, with the assent of the privy council, suspended specie payments in 1797, during the war with France, and such suspension continued, with the assent of parliament, until in 1823. Parliament, by the act of May 3, 1797, sought to give currency to the Bank of England notes, and compelled the use of them in payment of debts, by prohibiting the arrest and holding to bail of any person, unless it should appear, that no offer to pay the sum of money claimed, in notes of the Bank of England, payable on demand, had been made. And the act of 3 and 4 William IV, 1833, declared that the Bank of England notes should be a legal tender in payment of all sums above five pounds. *Page 432 In the United States, during the war of 1812, the government was compelled to make use of the money of the suspended banks to enable it to carry on the war. The results of that experiment are graphically depicted, by a great statesman of that period, familiar with all the operations of the government, and a principal actor in the events of his day. Mr. Calhoun, in his speech in the Senate of the United States, on the 16th of January, 1840, on the motion of Mr. Benton to strike out the nineteenth and twentieth sections of the Independent Treasury Bill, the clauses which permitted the reception and disbursement of federal paper, after remarking that he was the friend of the final and complete divorce of the government and the banks, and that if the government should have the blindness to repudiate its own credit, it would go far to defeat the policy of the bill, by restoring, in the end, the very union it intended to dissever, said: "The reason is obvious. Paper has to a certain extent a decided advantage over gold and silver. It is preferable in large and distant transactions, and cannot, in a country like ours, be dispensed with in the fiscal actions of the government, without much unnecessary expense and inconvenience, the truth of which would soon be manifest if the government should consent to dispense with the use of treasury drafts. But this is not the only form in which it may be necessary or convenient for it to use its own credit. It may be compelled to use it for circulation in a more permanent form, as the only means of avoiding what I regard a great evil — a federal debt. I am decidedly opposed to government loans. I believe them to be in reality little better than a fraud on the community, if made in bank notes, and highly injurious if made in large amounts in specie. I saw enough in the late war to put me on my guard against them. I saw the government borrow the notes of insolvent banks, the credit of which depended almost exclusively on the fact that they were received and disbursed by the government as money. I saw the government borrow these worthless rags — worthless but for the credit it gave them — at the rate of eighty for one hundred, that is for every *Page 433 eighty dollars it borrowed of these notes, it gave one hundred dollars of its stock, losing six per cent interest. Still worse, I saw the government, with the view of conciliating the notes of the banks, which were fleecing the community, permit them to discredit its own paper, by refusing to receive the treasury notes at par, though bearing six per cent interest, for their own worthless trash, without interest, and thus degrading and risking its own credit below that of insolvent banks. All this I saw. "Now sir, I hold that it is only by the judicious use ofgovernment credit, that a repetition of a similar state of things can be avoided in the event of another war. It may be laid down as a maxim, that without banks and bank notes, large government loans are impracticable, and without somesubstitute, such loans, in the event of war, will be unavoidable. The only substitute will be found to be in thedirect use by the government of its own credit. Now, as I regard the borrowing from the banks, not only as one link in the connection between government and banks, but as inevitably leading to the use of bank notes in the collection and disbursement of the revenue, I also regard the use by thegovernment of its own credit, in the form of treasury notes, or some other or better form, as indispensable to the permanent success of the policy of this bill. If the government had reliedon its credit, instead of loans from the banks, in the late war, if it had then refused to receive and pay away bank notes, as this bill proposes, or had had but the manliness to refuse to receive the notes of banks which refused to receive its own at par, I venture little in saying, that the expenses of the war might have been reduced forty millions. For these reasons I cannot assent that the government should repudiate the use of its own credit; nor do I believe that such is the sense of this body. Should there be any one of a contrary opinion, let him submit a direct proposition to prohibit the government from the use of its credit. I would be glad to see the vote on such a proposition. Instead of being unanimous in its favor, as the mover of the *Page 434 amendment would have us believe, it is far more probable, it would be nearly so the other way." And in his speech of the 19th of September, 1837, on the bill authorizing the issue of treasury notes, Mr. Calhoun advocated the issue of such notes, without interest, in order to introduce them into general circulation in the place of bank notes. He goes on to state that a paper currency in some form, if not necessary, is almost indispensable in financial and commercial operations of civilized communities, and that paper issued on the credit of the government is less liable to fluctuation in value and abuse, and that bank notes do not possess these requisites in the same degree; that paper money ought to rest on demand and supply simply, which regulates the value of everything else; that nothing but experience could determine what amount and of what denomination might be safely issued, and he concludes by saying: "Believing that there might be a sound and safe paper currency founded on the credit of the government exclusively, I was desirous that those who are responsible and have the power, should have availed themselves of the opportunity of the temporary deficit in the treasury." It is certainly a matter of great felicitation that, in the present crisis and condition of the country, the government, warned by the evils and the enormous sacrifice attendant upon, and the embarrassments created by the use of the depreciated paper of suspended banks, for the purpose of carrying on the present war waged by the insurgents who are seeking its overthrow, has availed itself of its own credit, and has thus far been abundantly supplied with means to prosecute a war, gigantic in its proportions, and calling for enormous expenditures. We have abundant authority, if any were needed, for taking judicial notice of the existence of the present war, of its extent, and of the condition of the country. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent prize cases, say: "They cannot ask the court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence of a war which all the world acknowledges to be *Page 435 the greatest civil war known in the history of the human race, and thus cripple the arm of the government, and paralyze its powers by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms." We take notice of the fact that, to maintain armies and provide a navy for the prosecution of the war, more money is needed annually than all the specie within the United States, and that a resort by the government, to the use of its own credit, was not only a matter of necessity, but the result has demonstrated that it was a measure of prudence and wisdom. Notwithstanding the vast amounts which have been raised and expended, and the enormous debt created, the credit of the government is now higher than it was at the commencement of the struggle, and a generous and patriotic people are now daily voluntarily pouring into its treasury, millions of money to aid and enable the government to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the Union. Fortunate will it be for the government and the people, if, on a careful examination, it shall be ascertained by the courts that these measures which have produced such benign and important results, are in harmony with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and authorized by it. We have seen that the issue of treasury notes by the government, upon the faith and credit of the nation, is a lawful means of obtaining money. Instead of using these notes, as was done in the war of 1812, to procure in exchange for them the notes of suspended banks at ruinous rates, to be used as a circulating medium, the advantage is apparent, if the government can legitimately use its own notes for that purpose. The slightest reflection will show that they must be more valuable, and entitled to a higher degree of credit than the circulating notes of any banking institution. The bills of the latter have only pledged for their ultimate redemption the property of the corporation issuing them, while those of the government, as already observed, have pledged for their redemption the faith and property and revenues of the nation, and that of its citizens which may be reached by taxation, the extent of which has no limits, provided only that it is uniform. We have seen that the notes *Page 436 so issued by the government, have been, and lawfully might be made, a tender in payment of all debts due to the government, and that the government lawfully used them in payment of all debts owing by it, and received them in payments of all debts, dues, taxes, excises and imposts collected or received by it or due to it. We cannot fail to see that the government, in making these payments to its soldiers, who are fighting its battles, to its hardy and brave mariners who are maintaining the honor of their country's flag upon the ocean, and to the various and numerous persons who do work for it, and furnish supplies for it, will but imperfectly have made such compensation and payment, if the notes so paid out cannot be used by the recipients for the purpose of discharging debts also due by them. The making such notes, therefore, a legal tender in payment of all debts, gives to them the element of general circulation and credit, and is a means for conferring upon them universal convertibility in payment of all debts. If Congress possesses this power, we cannot but perceive that its exercise in the present emergency is of incalculable benefit and advantage to the government and the people, whose agent it is. The question then for consideration is, whether the provision in the act of February, 1862, making these notes a legal tender, was a means useful or conducive or adapted to carry into execution any of the powers expressly conferred upon Congress. Those who challenge the validity of the act, must show, that at no time, and under no circumstances which may arise, is such a law useful, necessary or proper to aid in the execution of any or all of the powers expressly conferred upon Congress. Is such a law necessary to carry into effect any specific power given to Congress? Have these means a natural connection with any specific power? Are they adapted to give it effect? Are they appropriate means to an end? Are such means conducive to the exercise of any power granted to Congress? It is believed the doctrine is so well settled by authority upon this branch of our discussion, that it cannot be shaken, and that at this day it is not open for debate. Analogous cases will show the extent *Page 437 to which the doctrine has been carried. It is known that the United States, from an early day, have claimed and exercised, by virtue of an act of Congress, priority in the payment of all debts due to it by citizens of the several States, over those due to such citizens or to the States. There can be no authority for saying that there is any express grant in the Constitution to Congress to declare such priority, yet it was so declared, and has been uniformly sustained and recognized by the courts. In the case of The United States v. Fisher (2 Cranch, 358), the power of the United States Congress to declare such priority was ably and instructively discussed by the most eminent counsel of that day, and the opinion of the court by MARSHALL, Chief Justice, unequivocally affirms the power. He says: "In the case at bar, the preference claimed by the United States is not prohibited; but it has been truly said, that under a Constitution conferring specific powers, the power contended for must be granted or it cannot be exercised. It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. "In considering this clause it would be incorrect, and would produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose it might be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary, because the end might be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice ofmeans, and must be empowered to use any means which are in factconducive to the exercise of a power granted by theConstitution. The government is to pay the debt of the nation, and must be authorized to use the means which appear most eligible to effect that object. It has, consequently, a right to make a remittance by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will render the transaction safe. This claim of priority on the part of the United States will, it has been said, interfere with the right of the State sovereignties respecting *Page 438 the dignity of debts, and will defeat the measures they have a right to adopt to secure themselves against delinquencies, on the part of their own revenue officers. But this is an objection to the Constitution itself. The mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the necessary consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects to which the legislative power of Congress extends." The case of McCulloch v. Maryland (supra), claims a more extended and careful examination than it has yet received. No case in the judicial history of the country was ever more carefully and elaborately argued, and the learned and exhaustive opinion of Chief Justice MARSHALL is a model of profound reasoning, evincing an intimate knowledge of constitutional law and a thorough acquaintance with the structure and principles of our government. "Monumentum œre perenius." Well might the eloquent and erudite William Pinckney prophetically say, of this opinion, that he saw in it "a pledge of the immortality of the Union." It is an authoritative commentary upon the Constitution and a judicial exposition of its powers and those of the different departments of the government. As such it is to be received and adhered to. The question before the court was as to the power of Congress to create corporations. It was admitted that no such express power had been delegated to it by the Constitution. No slight importance was attached to the circumstance that in the Convention which framed the Constitution it had been proposed to confer this power expressly, and that the proposition was negatived. Mr. Webster, in his argument, said: "It was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to enumerate particulars. The true view of the subject is, that if it be a fit instrument to an authorized purpose, it may be used, not being specifically prohibited. Congress is authorized to pass all laws `necessary and proper' to carry into execution the powers conferred on it. These words `necessary and proper' in such an instrument are properly to be considered as synonymous.Necessary powers must here intend such powers as are suitable and fitted to the object; such as are best *Page 439 and most useful in relation to the end proposed. If this be not so, and if Congress could use no means but such as wereabsolutely indispensable to the existence of a granted power, the government would hardly exist; at least it would be wholly inadequate to the purposes of its formation." Mr. Wirt, the attorney-general, arguendo, said, it was not requisite that the particular thing done by Congress "should beindispensably necessary to the execution of any of the specified powers of the government. An interpretation of this clause of the Constitution, so strict and literal, would render every law which could be passed by Congress unconstitutional; for of no particular law can it be predicated that it is absolutely and indispensably necessary to carry into effect any of the specified powers, since a different law might be imagined, which could be enacted, tending to the same object, though not equally adapted to attain it. As the inevitable consequence of giving this very restricted sense to the word `necessary,' would be to annihilate the very powers it professes to create; and, as so gross an absurdity cannot be imputed to the framers of the Constitution, this interpretation must be rejected." In relation to the argument, that all powers to be exercised by Congress were enumerated in the Constitution, Mr. Wirt also observed: "The Convention well knew that it was utterly vain and nugatory to give to Congress certain specific powers, without the means of enforcing those powers. The auxiliary means, which are necessary for this purpose, are those which are useful and appropriate to produce the particular end; `necessary and proper' are there equivalent to needful and adapted. Such is the popular sense in which the word necessary is sometimes used. That use of it is confirmed by the best authorities among lexicographers. Among other definitions of the word `necessary,' Johnson gives `needful;' and he defines `need' the root of the latter by the words `want, occasion.' Is a law then wanted, is thereoccasion for it, in order to carry into execution any of the enumerated powers of the national government, Congress has the power of passing it. To make a law constitutional, nothing more is necessary *Page 440 than that it should be fairly adapted to carry into effect some specific power given to Congress. This is the only interpretation which can give effect to this vital clause of the Constitution, and being consistent with the rules of the language, is not to be rejected because there is another interpretation equally consistent with the same rules, but wholly inadequate to convey what must have been the intention of the Convention. Among the multitude of means to carry into execution the powers expressly given to the national government, Congress is to select, from time to time, such as are most fit for the purpose. It would have been impossible to enumerate them all in the Constitution; and a specification of some, omitting others, would have been wholly useless. The court, in inquiring whether Congress has made a selection of constitutional means, is to compare the law in question with the powers it is intended to carry into execution; not in order to ascertain whether other or better means might have been selected, for that is the legislative province, but to see whether those which have been chosen, have a natural connection with any specific power; whether they are adapted to give it effect; whether they are appropriate means to an end." Chief Justice MARSHALL, in the unanimous opinion of the court, said: "Among the enumerated powers of the government we find the great powers to levy and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to declare and conduct a war, and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, and all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are intrusted to its government. It can never be pretended that these vast powers draw after them others of inferior importance, merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can never be advanced. But it may be with great reason contended, that a government intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depend, must also be intrusted with ample means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, *Page 441 and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarass its execution, by withholding the most appropriate means." . . . "The government which has a right to an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means, and those who contend they may not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of affecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of establishing that exception. . . . But the Constitution of the United States has not left the right of Congress to employ the necessary means for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of powers, is added that of making `all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof.' The counsel for the State of Maryland have urged various arguments to prove that this clause, though in terms a grant of power, is not so in effect; but is really restrictive of the general right which might otherwise be implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers. . . . But the argument on which most reliance is placed, is drawn from the peculiar language of this clause. Congress is not empowered by it to make all laws which may have relation to the powers conferred on the government, but such only as may be `necessary and proper' for carrying them into execution. The word `necessary' is considered as controlling the sentence and as limiting the right to pass laws for the execution of the granted powers, to such as are indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory: that it excludes the choice of means and leaves to Congress in each case, that only which is most direct and simple. Is it true that this is the sense in which the word `necessary' is always used? Does it always import an absolute physical necessity so strong, that one thing, to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. If reference *Page 442 be had to its uses, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authority, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means without which the end would be entirely unattainable. Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions contain words which, when taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is essential to just construction that many words which import something excessive should be understood in a more mitigated sense — in that sense which common usage justifies. The word `necessary' is of this description. It has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; and is often connected with other words which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind will the same idea be conveyed, by these several phrases. This comment on the word is well illustrated by the passage cited at the bar, from the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution. It is, we think, impossible to compare the sentence which prohibits a state from laying `imposts, or duties on imposts or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,' with that which authorizes Congress `to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution,' the powers of the general government, without feeling a conviction that the convention understood itself, to change materially the meaning of the word `necessary,' by prefixing the word `absolutely.' This word, then, like others, is used in various senses, and in its construction the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into view. Let this be done in the case under *Page 443 consideration. The subject is the execution of these great powers, on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. "It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to ensure, as far as human prudence could ensure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which the government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by inscrutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone, without which, the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. . . . This clause, as construed by the State of Maryland, would abridge, and almost annihilate this useful and necessary right of the legislature to select its means. That this could not be intended is, we should think, had it not been already controverted, too apparent for controversy. We think so, for the following reasons: "1st. The clause is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers. "2d. Its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted. "No reason has been or can be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow the discretion of the national legislature, under words which purport to enlarge it. The framers of the Constitution wished its adoption, and well knew that it would be endangered by its strength, not its weakness . . . *Page 444 The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its bestjudgment, in the selection of measures to carry into executionthe constitutional powers of the government. If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the Constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble . . . But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all the means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to the end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." We have made these very liberal extracts from this opinion, because the points discussed and decided in it dispose of those principally presented for consideration in the present actions. The attempt would be futile to restate them, in language equally clear, appropriate and forcible. The doctrines of this opinion have been recognized as the law of this country for nearly half a century, and judicial propriety forbids that the points thus deliberately decided should again be opened for discussion and examination. They have lately received the approval of the Supreme Court in the case of The People v. The TaxCommissioners, (2 Black, 620). The principle settled in this case is decisive, we think, of the present actions. It was there held that Congress, under the power to borrow money, had the power to declare that the stocks or securities issued by the government of the United States, in the execution of that power, although held as property by citizens of the several states, could lawfully be exempted from taxation, under *Page 445 the laws of the several states. If this immunity can be granted by Congress, to the stocks and securities issued by the United States, under the power to borrow money, it is difficult to perceive why Congress may not, under the same power, make the treasury notes, issued for that purpose, a legal tender, if it thought that so making them was a means for the more readily accomplishing and making effectual the expressly delegated power. If the one is constitutional, it logically follows that the other is also. We accept these expositions of the powers of Congress by the Supreme Court of the United States as unquestionable, and we concede that upon all questions arising upon the construction of the federal Constitution, the decisions of that court are to be received as authority and final, and they will be followed by the courts of this State, whatever may be their own views upon the question. Such has been the uniform current of authority in this State. (Hicks v. Hotchkiss, 7 Johns. Ch., 297; Mather v.Brook, 16 Johns., 233; People v. Platt, 17 id., 195;Matter of Wendell, 19 id., 153; McCormick v. Pickering, 4 Comst., 276; Roosevelt v. Cebra, 17 Johns., 108; Cochran v.Van Surlay, 20 Wend., 365; Kunsler v. Kohans, 5 Hill, 317;North River Steamboat Company v. Livingston, 3 Cowen, 713.) We find, therefore, the law to be settled that, where the power is given to Congress to do a particular thing, the means necessary and proper for its execution are also delegated, and that Congress alone is the judge of the means most proper to be selected to aid in the execution of the power. The end must be legitimate, that is in good faith necessary to execute and make effectual some one of the delegated powers, and thus brought within the scope of the Constitution, then all means, which are appropriate, which tend, or are adapted to the end, and which are not prohibited, but are in harmony with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, were also delegated to Congress, and may constitutionally be adopted by it. It must be seen that this necessarily is so. The Constitution was framed for coming ages and for all time, and for a great country, and for millions of people. It was to render more perfect a *Page 446 perpetual Union. When framed its constituents were less than four millions. Its benign provisions now afford protection to over thirty millions, and it would be idle to speculate upon the increase, growth and power which the people, sheltered by its ægis, may yet attain. A Constitution, thus framed for an expanding country, increasing in population, in arts, wealth, and national resources, must necessarily be general in the enumeration of its powers; and all means necessary and proper, in execution of those powers, had also to be left to the exigencies of the times, and the wants and necessities of the people, for whose benefit the Constitution was made, and for whose protection it is administered, by their agents. Such an emergency, it is believed, had arisen in the prosecution of a war, forced upon the government by the most formidable rebellion known to history. The Constitution and Union must be preserved, protected and defended. For this purpose armies and navies had to be provided and maintained, and enormous expenditures incurred. It has been settled that the government had the authority to issue treasury notes upon the faith and credit of the United States, to such an amount and in such denominations as it thought expedient and proper. It was not doubted that such notes might be used as a circulating medium, and the government had either to use its own notes as such, or upon the credit of them, as in the war of 1812, borrow the notes of suspended banks at a ruinous sacrifice and loss, and use them in payment of its army and navy, and for the supplies which it needed. Wisely, it is believed, Congress determined to rely upon the means and credit of the nation, and do directly what was heretofore done indirectly, and the ruinous consequences of which were so eloquently depicted by Mr. Calhoun. The notes of the government, being thus to be used, and a lawful tender in payment of all debts due to the United States, were not the powers conferred upon Congress rendered more effectual by making them a legal tender in payment as well of private as of public debts? As a simple question of power, as already suggested, it is not apparent why Congress had not the same power to *Page 447 make them a legal tender in the one case as in the other. It was certainly never intended by the founders of the government that it was to have a currency for itself and a different one for the people. The provision that all taxes should be uniform, is indicative of the idea that the currency of the country should be uniform also, and it is not believed that this important and express injunction of the Constitution can be observed unless the currency be uniform throughout the United States. The effect of making our own coins and foreign coins a legal tender in payment of debts, has been to make them of uniform value throughout the United States, and the same result is attained by making treasury notes a legal tender. That which is a legal payment to the soldier in the field, the laborer who toils for the government, or the farmer or mechanic who supplies it with the products of his farm or workshop, is equally available to them to discharge debts which they owe. If this were not so, it is plainly to be seen that the notes of the government must remain in the hands of those to whom they are first paid, or be parted with by them at great loss. To obviate all these inconveniences and difficulties, Congress has declared, when it authorized the issue of these notes, that they should be a legal tender as well for private as public debts, adopting this as a means to give full effect to the power it possessed of borrowing money, and to raise and support an army and navy, and to levy and collect taxes. It cannot be denied that the end sought to be attained is legitimate; that it is within the scope and spirit of the Constitution, and it is for Congress to select the appropriate means, and if they are adapted to the end and not prohibited, they are constitutional. It is not the province of the judiciary to say that the best means have not been adopted, or that those adopted were indispensable. The range of selection of means rests solely in the discretion of Congress, and if that discretion is unwisely exercised, the remedy is by a change of members of that body and a repeal of the law. A similar principle has been declared by the courts of this State in an analogous case. By section 1 of article 1 of the *Page 448 Constitution of this State, it is declared that corporations may be formed under general laws, and shall not be created by special act, except in cases where, in the judgment of the legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws. By this provision of the Constitution it is left to the legislature to decide whether the objects of a corporation can be attained under a general law. It is well settled in this State that whether a special act of incorporation is necessary or not, is a matter entirely for the judgment and discretion of the legislature, and that the courts have no power to review this action of the legislature. (Mosher v. Hilton, 15 Barb., 657;United States Trust Co. v. Brady, 20 Barb., 119; People v.Bowen, 30 Barb., 24.) These two last cases have been affirmed in this court. (21 N.Y., 517.) It must certainly be conceded that the choice of means, in the present case, is more clearly legitimate than those selected by Congress in other instances, in the exercise of its delegated powers, and if such means were constitutional, it is not perceived why those adopted, in the act under consideration, will not stand the same test. We have seen that under the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, Congress has, unquestioned, since the organization of the government, made the money so coined a legal tender in payment of all debts. So, under the clause to regulate the value of foreign coin, in like manner, it has made such foreign coin a legal tender. In pursuance of the authority to borrow money on the credit of the United States, it issued treasury notes and made them a legal tender in payment of all debts due the United States. So, in virtue of the authority to pay the debts of the Union, it has been said by the Supreme Court, that Congress might lawfully give to all debts due to the United States a priority of payment over debts due to the States, or to any citizen. For instance, the Constitution confers on Congress the power to declare war. Now the word "declare" has several senses. It may mean to proclaim, or publish. But no person would imagine that this was the whole sense in which the word is used in this connection. It should be interpreted in the sense *Page 449 in which the phrase is used among nations, when applied to such a subject matter. A power to declare war is a power to make and carry on war. It is not a mere power to make known an existing thing, but to give life and effect to the thing itself. (1 Story Const., § 428, and Bas v. Tingey, 4 Dall., 37.) And the true doctrine has been expressed by the Supreme Court: "If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be any serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction." (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 188, 189.) No power is given in express terms to Congress, to exact or require an oath from any officer of the government, or any security for the faithful discharge of the duties of an office. Yet we are well aware that such securities have been required by virtue of many acts of Congress, and in numerous instances have been enforced against the sureties. The power vested in Congress, may certainly be carried into execution without prescribing an oath of office. The power to exact this security for the faithful performance of duty is not given, nor is it indispensably necessary. All the powers delegated to Congress may be exercised without requiring an oath of office. It might be argued, with as much plausibility as other incidental powers have been assailed, that the Convention was not unmindful of this subject. The oath which might be exacted — that of fidelity to the Constitution — is presented, and it may be contended that no other can be required. Yet, he would be charged with insanity, who should contend that the legislature might not superadd to the oath, directed by the Constitution, such other oath of office as its wisdom might suggest. (McCulloch v. Maryland, supra.) So with respect to the whole penal code of the United States. Whence arises the power to punish in cases not prescribed by the Constitution? All admit that the government may legitimately punish any violation of its laws, and yet this is not among the enumerated powers of Congress. The right *Page 450 to enforce the observance of law, by punishing its infraction, might be denied with the more plausibility, because it is expressly given in some cases. Congress is empowered to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and coin of the United States, and to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations. The several powers of Congress may exist in a very imperfect state, to be sure, but they may exist and be carried into execution, although no punishment should be inflicted in cases where the right to punish is not expressly given. Take, for example, the power to establish post offices and post roads. This power is executed by the single act of making the establishment. But from this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along the post roads, from one post office to another. And from this implied power has again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the mail. It may be said with some plausibility, that the right to carry the mail and to punish those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post office and post road. The right is, indeed, essential to the beneficial exercise of the power, but not indispensably necessary to its existence. So of the punishment of stealing or falsifying a record or process of a court of the United States, or of perjury in such courts. To punish these offences is certainly conducive to the due administration of justice. But courts may exist and may decide the causes brought before them, though such crimes escape punishment. (Per MARSHALL, Chief Justice, in McCulloch v. Maryland, supra.) The case of The United States v. Marigold (9 How., 560), is an important one upon the point now under discussion. In that case the prisoner was indicted and convicted of the crime of having brought into the United States false, forged and counterfeited coin, in the resemblance and similitude of the gold and silver coins of the United States coined at its mint, knowing the same to be false, forged and counterfeited, with intent to utter, publish and pass the same. This was in violation *Page 451 of the 20th section of the Crimes Act of 3d March, 1825. Justice DANIEL, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "Congress are, by the Constitution, vested with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations; and however, at periods of high excitement, an application of the terms `to regulate commerce,' such as would embrace absolute prohibition, may have been questioned, yet, since the passage of the embargo and non-intercourse laws, and the repeated judicial sanctions those statutes have received, it can scarcely, at this day, be open to doubt, that every subject falling within the legitimate sphere of commercial regulation may be partially or wholly excluded, where either measure shall be demanded by the safety or by the important interests of the entire nation." He further says: "Whatever functions Congress are, by the Constitution, authorized to perform, they are, when the public good requires it, bound to perform; and on this principle, having emitted a circulating medium, a standard of value, indispensable for the purposes of the community and for the action of the government itself, they are accordingly authorized and bound in duty to prevent its debasement and expulsion." He also says: "We trace both the offence and the authority to punish it to the power given by the Constitution to coin money, and to the correspondent and necessary power and obligation to protect and to preserve in its purity this constitutional currency for the benefit of the nation. While we hold it a sound maxim that no powers should be conceded to the federal government, which cannot be regularly and legitimately found in the charter of its creation, we acknowledge equally the obligation to withhold from it no power or attribute which by the same charter has been declared necessary to the execution of expressly granted powers, and to the fulfillment of clear and well defined duties." We think it has been demonstrated that, as Congress has the power to issue treasury notes on the credit of the United States, if it be necessary to render such notes effectual for the purposes for which they are issued that they should be made a legal tender in payment of all debts, Congress may, in its *Page 452 discretion, adopt such means to carry out a delegated and conceded power. That such necessity existed to make the notes so issued, a legal tender, is evidenced by the action of the executive and legislative departments of the government. It is no unimportant consideration, in support of the act of Congress making the government notes a legal tender in payment of private debts, that such tender insures uniformity in the currency, and puts all creditors on an equality. The soldier, who earns his dues by perilous services, and those who aid the government in furnishing it with labor or materials, are compelled to take this currency, and by this act it is available equally to them in discharge of their debts. Those whose patriotism leads them to serve or trust the government of the country, are not compelled to do so on any less advantageous terms than those who labor for or trust private citizens. If there is any hardship in receiving the notes of the nation, it falls equally on all, and if it be a contribution for the support and maintenance of our liberties, it is equally made by all in exact proportion to the means which each possesses. Again, it is urged that this act of Congress is unconstitutional and void, as it impairs the obligation of contracts. To arrive at this result, it is argued that, as the bond and mortgage mentioned in the second action, were made before the passage of the act and, by their terms, the amount secured thereby was payable in lawful money of the United States, the obligation is impaired by something being made lawful money which was not such at the time the contract was made. In the bank cases, it does not distinctly appear when the bills, payment of which were demanded in gold and silver, were issued; but assuming that they were issued anterior to the passage of the act, then the same question is presented as that which arises upon the bond and mortgage. While all must concede that legislation on the part of Congress which should, in effect, impair the obligation of a contract, would be unjust and to be deprecated, yet it is also apparent that there is no constitutional prohibition upon legislation of that character. The prohibition contained in the *Page 453 Constitution is applicable only to the states. This point was expressly decided by Judge WASHINGTON, in Evans v. Eaton (1 Peters C.C. Rep., 322). He said there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States, which forbids Congress to pass laws violating the obligation of contracts, although such a power is denied to the states. Congress, in the exercise of its delegated powers, may unquestionably pass laws, the effect of which would undoubtedly be to impair or affect the validity of contracts. An act declaring war would annul a vast amount of contracts, based on a contemplated peace, yet the power to declare war by Congress is undoubted, and the effect its exercise would have on existing contracts could in no manner circumscribe or affect the exercise of the power. The embargo acts, passed during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, not only impaired but destroyed numerous contracts, entered into upon the assumption that commercial relations were to continue uninterrupted, but the acts were adjudged to be constitutional on the ground that the power to make them was incidental to and a corollary from the right to regulate commerce. The bankrupt act of 1841 impaired the obligation of contracts in the most decided manner, yet the law was held to be constitutional under the general power granted to Congress. InMatter of Kleim (1 How. S.C., 277), Judge CATRON said that the reason why the power to pass bankrupt laws was given to Congress was to secure to the people of the United States, as one people, a uniform law by which a debtor might be discharged from the obligation of his contracts, and his future acquisitions exempted from his previous engagements; that the right of debtor and creditor equally entered into the mind of the framers of the Constitution. The great object was to deprive the states of the dangerous power to abolish debts. Few provisions of the Constitution have had more beneficial consequences than this, and the kindred inhibition on the States that they should pass no law impairing the obligation of contracts. In Kunzler v. Kohans (5 Hill, 325), COWEN, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The directly granted power over bankruptcies, however, carries *Page 454 the incidental authority to modify such obligation, so far as the modification may result from a legitimate exercise of the delegated power. Having satisfied myself that it is plenary, and with a single qualification, viz., uniformity, entirely equal to the power of parliament, I shall devote very little time to the inquiry what that may be. No one will deny that parliament may modify and discharge the obligation of contracts in exercising the powers over bankrupts and their creditors. Such a power is, indeed, prohibited to the States." See also Thompson v. Alger (12 Metcalf, 442). It follows, therefore, that if Congress had the constitutional power to pass the act of February 25, 1862, it is not in conflict with the Constitution, and therefore void, for the reason that the effect of the act may be to impair the obligation of contracts. But it is correctly argued that such is not the legitimate effect of the act, and that the obligation of no contract is impaired by it. Take, for instance, the contract contained in the bond and mortgage — it is to pay the sum of $8,000 in lawful money of the United States. Now what was lawful money at the time the debt was payable or paid, or tender of payment made, if so used for such purpose, would be a compliance with or fulfillment of the terms of the contract. Such would seem to be the uniform current of decision, and such was the rule of law recognized at a very early period. In the case of Faw v. Marteller (2 Cranch, 20), where Faw had, in the year 1779 covenanted to pay as rent yearly, well and truly, the sum of twenty-six pounds, Virginia currency, which consisted at that time of paper money, but it was withdrawn from circulation by a law of 1781, and it was claimed that the sum contracted to be paid was paper money and not specie, on the ground that paper money was lawful currency when the debt was contracted. Chief Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, however, said: "This can only mean money current at the time the rents shall become payable. It cannot be contended that he could satisfy the terms of the lease by paying the rents in 1782 in paper currency." He further said: "The position, then, that the value of the *Page 455 money at the time when the consideration for which it was to be paid was received, is the standard by which the contract is to be measured, is not a correct one." Dowmans v. Dowmans' Exrs. (1 Wn. Virg. Rep., 26), was a suit on a bond for £ 53, payable in Virginia currency, to which the defendant pleaded a tender. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the tender must be money current at that time (that is, the time the tender is made), otherwise it is not money at all. There was no paper money current as money in April, 1790, when this plea was offered, and the tender was held bad, although made in the currency named in the bond. In Pong v. De Lindsay andothers (1 Dyer, 82 A.), in debt on bond for payment of £ 24 sterling, plea of tender: that at the time of the payment of said sum of money, certain money was current in England in the place of sterlings called pollards, viz., two pollards for one sterling, and that at the day aforesaid, the defendant tendered a moiety of said debt in pollards. The tender was held good, and the note of the case is, that if, at the time appointed for payment, a base money is current in lieu of sterling, tender at the time and place of that base money, is good, and the creditor can recover no other. A case is also cited from the year books (11 H. VII, 5 b.) where one is to pay at such a day five quarters of wheat; at the day of the contract they were worth fifty pounds, at the day of payment five pounds. The judgment shall be, that he recover five quarters of wheat or five pounds. And the defendant may deliver the wheat if he please, but the sum of money ought, of necessity, to be referred to the day of the payment. Queen Elizabeth, in order to pay the royal army, which was maintained in Ireland for several years, to suppress the rebellion of Tyrone, caused a great quantity of mixed money, with the usual stamps of the arms of the crown and inscription of her royal style, to be coined in the tower of London, and transmitted that money to that kingdom, with a proclamation dated May 24, in the 43d year of her reign, by which she declared and established this mixed money, immediately after *Page 456 the said proclamation, to be lawful and current money of the kingdom of Ireland, and expressly commanded that this money should be so used, accepted and reputed by all her subjects and others using any traffic or commerce within the kingdom. In April, before the proclamation was issued, when the pure coin of England was current in the kingdom of Ireland, one Brett, a merchant of Drogheda, bought certain goods of one Gilbert, in London, and became bound in an obligation in the penal sum of £ 200, on condition to pay to said Gilbert, his executors, c., one hundred pounds sterling, current and lawful money of England, at which day, c., Brett made a tender of the £ 100 in the mixed money of the new standard, in performance of the condition of the obligation; and the question before the council was on the petition of said Gilbert to the privy council in Ireland, whether the defendant Brett should now, upon the change or alteration of money within the kingdom, be compelled to pay the said one hundred pounds in other or better coin than in the mixed money, according to the rate and valuation of it, at the time of the tender. And inasmuch as the case related to the kingdom in general, and was also of great importance in consideration and reason of state, the Lord Deputy required the chief judges (being of the privy council) to confer on and consider the case, and return to him their resolution touching it, who, on consideration of all the points, resolved that the tender of the one hundred pounds in mixed money was good and sufficient in the law to save the forfeiture of the bond, and that the defendant should not be obliged, at any time after, to pay any other money, in discharge of the debt, than this mixed money, according to the rate and valuation it had at the time of the tender; and, thereupon, it was resolved, by the privy council, among other things, that though at the time of the contract and obligation made in the present case, pure money of gold and silver was current within this kingdom (Ireland) where the place of payment was assigned, yet the mixed money being established in this kingdom before the day of payment, may well be tendered in the discharge of the said obligation, *Page 457 and the obligee is bound to accept it; and if he refuses it and waits until the money be changed again, the obligor is not bound to pay other money or better substance; but it is sufficient, if he be always ready to pay the mixed money according to the rate for which they were current at the time of the tender; and this point was resolved, on consideration of two circumstances, viz.: the time and place of the payment, for the time is the future, viz.: that if the said Brett shall pay or cause to be paid £ 100 sterling, current money, c., and therefore such money shall be paid, as shall be current at such future time; so that the time of payment, and not the time of the contract, shall be regarded (Davies Rep., page 28.) To the same point is the case ofBarrington v. Potter (Dyer, 81 b., fol. 67.) After the fall and debasement of money, in 5 Ed. VI, debt was brought against executor of lessee for years, for rent arrears for two years, which fell due at Michaelmas term, 2 Ed. VI. The lease was dated on the 21st of November, in the thirty-first year of Henry VIII. At the time the rent fell due, the shillings, which at the time the action was brought were decried to 6d., were current at 12d. The defendant pleaded tender of the rent, at the days when it was due, in peciis monetœ, anglicœ vocat shillings, and said that every shilling at the time of the tender was payable for 12d., but that plaintiff, nor any one for him, was ready to receive it, and concludes that he is uncore prist to pay the currency, indictis peciis vocat shillings secundum ratum, c. The plaintiff demurred, but afterwards accepted the money secundumratum predictum, without costs or damages. If money be made current by proclamation, at a higher rate than its intrinsic value, a tender in such money, according to its current value, is good. If a foreign coin be made current in this kingdom by proclamation, a tender in such money is good, for it thereby becomes a lawful money of the kingdom. (Bacon Ab., Tender, b. 2, vol. 7, p. 325.) An obligation to payment generally is discharged by a payment in legal currency. (Per MARSHALL, Ch. J., in UnitedStates v. Robertson, 5 Peters, 644.) In James v. Stull (9 Barb., 482; affirmed in the Court of *Page 458 Appeals in 1852), it was held that where a mortgagor authorized the mortgagee, in case of default, to proceed and sell the mortgaged premises "according to law," it means the law in existence at the time of sale, not that in existence at the date of the mortgage, and that a law, passed after the date of the mortgage, prescribing a shorter time of sale than that existing at the date of the mortgage, was not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, as impairing the obligation of contracts. (See also Conkey v. Hart, 4 Kern., 22; Mason v.Haile, 12 Wheat., 370.) We have arrived, therefore, at the conclusion, that the act of Congress under consideration is not obnoxious to the imputation, that it impairs the obligation of contracts. The notes of the respondents, and the bond and mortgage, were each payable in lawful money of the United States, and we have seen by a uniform current of authority that what is lawful money at the time of payment, or at the time of tender of payment, is the lawful money, intended and referred to in the obligation. Such money, thus lawful at the time of payment or tender, can be used to discharge the obligation. It has universally been so held, in all cases, where the coin has been debased or changed intermediate the date of the contracts and the time of payment. Take the case, so forcibly put by one of the learned counsel in this case. It was contended that the bond stipulated for so much gold. It however speaks of a repayment of $8,000 of lawful money of the United States. Let the theory be tested. If a debt was owing of one thousand dollars, and the debtor tendered to his creditor, in payment of this sum ninety-four eagles, struck and coined before 1834, which, as to quantity and value of gold contained in them are equal to one hundred eagles struck and coined after 1834, would this be a legal or lawful tender? If the sufficiency of the tender consists in the fact of the amount of gold tendered, it certainly would, but if it is to be determined by the amount of lawful money, it clearly would not. The court must hold that the debtor contracted to pay the one thousand dollars, lawful *Page 459 money of the United States, and that such obligation is not discharged by the payment of $940 in gold, though those pieces tendered might contain the same amount and value of gold, as one thousand dollars of lawful money, in coin, contains. It is the lawful money of the United States, made such by its authority, that can only be effectually used, in payment of debts, without reference to the intrinsic value of the thing tendered or paid. It cannot but be a matter of congratulation that our government, when it had a rebellion to put down, far more formidable than that of Tyrone, in Ireland, instead of imitating the bad example of the British government, by debasing the coin, and issuing mixed money, and making it a legal currency, availed itself of its constitutional right, of issuing money on the faith and credit of the nation, for the redemption of which the whole property thereof is pledged. Such money will ultimately be redeemed by the precious metals on the resumption of specie payments, a day not far distant, we may hope, if we read correctly the auspicious indications of the times. We have endeavored to bring to the consideration of the question presented in these cases, all the deliberation and care, which its great importance demanded. It has appeared to us, that the great principles which control them have long been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, and that applying those doctrines to the cases under consideration, the result is inevitable, and not doubtful. Our aid has been invoked, to declare unconstitutional and void, an act of the Congress of the United States, passed after grave deliberation, with the concurrence of some of the most eminent men of the country, passed in a crisis of our national affairs when it was deemed by the legislative and executive departments of the government vital to our national existence. No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance and of the grave responsibility involved in its decision. We must not fail to reflect upon the universality of the rule, that whenever the constitutionality of a law of Congress *Page 460 or of a state legislature is involved, the legal presumption exists in favor of its validity. There is this distinction to be made in considering an act passed by the legislature of the State, and one passed by the Congress of the United States. In reference to a state law, the question of its constitutionality depends upon whether the act falls within any of the express or implied prohibitions of either the state or national Constitutions. In passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress, the question is, whether the act is embraced within any of the great powers expressly granted to Congress, or may be included among the more numerous and incidental powers, and the means which are legitimate and appropriate to carry these powers into execution. But in both classes of cases, the obvious and natural intendment must be indulged in favor of the law arising from the fact that it has received the approval both of the legislative and executive departments of the government, the departments charged with the duty of making laws, the incumbents of which have given their sanction to the law, acting under a sense of their official responsibility and the obligations of an oath to support the Constitution. It is, therefore, a well settled rule, prescribed in adjudged cases, for the action of the courts, that a law which has been regularly enacted, must not be set aside by the judiciary rashly, or inconsiderately, or for light causes, or because they may have doubts of its wisdom or necessity, that every doubtful question is to be thrown in favor of the law, and that it can only be adjudged void when its repugnancy to the Constitution is plain and clear. (Morris v.The People, 3 Denio, 381; Ex parte McCollom, 1 Cowen, 564;Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat., 29; Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass., 345.) Chief Justice SAVAGE, in Ex parte McCollom (supra), says: "Before the court will deem it their duty to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional, a case must be presented in which there can be no rational doubt." And Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Fletcher v. Peck (supra), said: "It is not on slight implication and vague conjecture, that the legislature *Page 461 is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered void. The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such, that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other." Judge LOTT, in the case of Morris v. The People (supra), said: "The presumption is always in favor of the validity of a law, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated." PARKER, Ch. J., in Adams v. Howe (supra), said: "We must premise, that so much respect is due to any legislative act, solemnly passed and admitted into the statute book, that a court of law, which may be called upon to decide its validity, will pronounce it to be constitutional, unless the contrary clearly appears. So that in any case, substantially doubtful, the law will have its force. The legislature is, in the first instance, the judge of its own constitutional powers, and it is only when manifest assumption of authority or misapprehension of it, shall appear, that the judicial power will refuse to execute it. Whenever such a case happens, it is among the most important duties of the judicial power, to declare the invalidity of an act so passed." A legislative act is not to be declared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation between the legislative and judicial powers. Before proceeding to annul by judicial sentence what has been enacted by the law-making power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumptions. (People v. Supervisors of Orange,17 N Y, 235.) It is urged by the counsel for the appellant, in the first above entitled cause that, as the Constitution of this State declares that the legislature shall provide by law for the registry of all bills and notes, issued or put in circulation as money, and shall require ample security for the redemption of the same in specie (sec. 6 of art. 8), it is not lawful to redeem the same in anything else than specie. A complete answer to this argument is, that the legislature have never acted under this injunction of the Constitution. As already observed, the provision of law in this state is, that the bills of the banking associations are to be redeemed in lawful money of the United *Page 462 States, and if the same are redeemed, or offered to be redeemed, in such lawful money, the bank superintendent has no authority conferred upon him by law, to sell the securities deposited with him. The legislature have never authorized him to sell the securities so deposited, in the event of any banking association refusing to redeem its bills in specie. It is only in the event of their refusal to redeem in lawful money of the United States, that he is authorized to proceed and sell the securities. If the views hereinbefore stated are sound, it follows, that neither of the respondents in the first above entitled cause has refused to redeem its bills in the lawful money of the United States, and that therefore the bank superintendent has been properly restrained from proceeding to sell the securities of the respondents deposited with him. For the reasons already stated I arrive at the clear conviction that Congress, under the authority conferred upon it to borrow money on the credit of the United States, had the authority to make the treasury notes of the government, issued for such a purpose, a legal tender, as well in payment of debts due to the United States, as those of a private nature. I do not wish to be understood as intimating that the same thing could not be done by virtue of the authority conferred upon Congress to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to regulate the commerce of the Union; to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin; to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy; to fulfill the guarantee of the Constitution that each State shall ever have a republican form of government, and shall be protected against invasion and domestic violence, and to enable Congress to discharge the solemn and imperative duty resting upon it, to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the high trust devolved upon the President, to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and to provide for and furnish him with all the means necessary for that purpose. It is sufficient for the present discussion, that the power which has been exercised by Congress is believed *Page 463 to be authorized by the Constitution, and arriving at that result, the cases under review are disposed of. If my brethren concur in these views, the judgment in the first above entitled cause will be affirmed, with costs, and the judgment in the second above entitled cause will be reversed, and judgment given for the plaintiff with costs, and that the defendant therein deliver up the bond and mortgage mentioned in the case submitted, and acknowledge satisfaction thereof, and discharge the same of record.