Tyson v. . Post

Andrews, J. The question whether tne defendant Post acquired title to the plant and machinery of the marine railways embraced in the plaintiffs’ mortgage, as security for the $6,200 paid by him to the plaintiffs at the request of Carroll, *221 to enable the latter to complete the first payment on the contract with the plaintiffs for the purchase of the land, does not depend upon the character of the property, whether real or personal, when placed upon the mortgaged premises. There can be little doubt, however, that the machinery, shafting, rollers and other articles became as between vendor and vendee, and mortgagor and mortgagee, fixtures and a part of the realty. (McRae v. Central Nat. B'k, 66 N. Y. 489.) But, as by agreement, for the purpose of protecting the rights of vendors of personalty, or of creditors, chattels may retain their character as chattels, notwithstanding their annexation to the land in such a way as in the absence of an agreement would constitute them fixtures (Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344; Sisson v. Hibbard, 75 id. 542), so, also, it would seem to follow, that by convention, the owner of land may reimpress the character of personalty on chattels, which, by annexation to the land, have become fixtures according to the ordinary rule of law, provided only that they have not been so incorporated as to lose their identity and the reconversion does not interfere with the rights of creditors or third persons. The plant and machinery in question were personal property when placed on the land, and the only issue presented is, did the plaintiffs agree with Post that he might take the title to the plant and machinery for his security, free of the mortgage, and remove them at any time from the mortgaged premises, thereby reimpressing the property with the character of personalty. In determining this question it does not seem to us to be very material to inquire whether the deed from the plaintiffs to Cooney (the nominee of Carroll), and the mortgage back embraced, or was intended to embrace, the plant and machinery. Post was not a party to the instruments and is not concluded by them. The rights of Post depend wholly upon his agreement with the plaintiffs, and if they received his money upon the agreement that he should have the plant and machinery, with the right to remove them without restriction as to time, the agreement was valid although by paroi, and even if it contradicts the legal import of the mortgage, it being an *222 agreement between different parties, it is not within the rule which forbids paroi evidence to contradict a written instrument. The only point of disagreement between the parties relates to a restriction alleged to have been placed on the time within which Post should exercise the right of removal. The plaintiffs concede that the right of removal was given to Post, but they allege that it-was subject to the limitation that the right should be exercised before any proceedings were taken to foreclose the mortgage. The defendant on the other hand claims that the right was unrestricted and absolute. The paper executed by the plaintiffs on the closing of the transaction contains the restriction claimed by the plaintiffs. But we think the evidence sustains the contention of the defendant, that the paper was not delivered to or accepted by him, and that he had no knowledge of its contents. The question of fact, therefore, depends upon the other evidence bearing upon the actual agreement. It would not be useful to state the evidence in detail. It is sufficient to say that after a careful examination of the testimony, we have reached the conclusion that the claim of the defendant is most consistent with the conceded facts and is supported by a preponderance of evidence. The orders of the General Term should, therefore, be affirmed, and judgments absolute directed in accordance with the stipulations. All concur. ^ Judgments accordingly.'