Mickles v. . Dillaye and Others

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 82 The right of a mortgagor who has made default in the payment of the mortgage debt according to his contract and especially where the mortgagee or his assigns has lawfully acquired the possession, is in equity *Page 83 and not a strict legal right. It would be impossible for the plaintiff to obtain possession of these premises by any suit or proceeding known to the law, except a suit in equity. When the mortgagor comes into a court of equity in such cases to redeem he must do equity to the mortgagee, or the court will consider the estate absolute in the latter; and the redemption, when allowed, will be decreed either absolutely or under certain conditions according to the nature and justice of the case. (Powell onMortgages, 387, 388). In conformity with this idea of the nature of the equity of redemption, the Court of Chancery has always obliged the mortgagor to submit to equitable conditions. It was formerly held for example that if the mortgagor, after giving the mortgage, had borrowed a further sum of the mortgagee, the latter was not obliged to submit to a redemption until both debts should be paid, (id., 391, 392). The tendency of modern decisions has been to limit and define the power of the mortgagee to insist upon conditions to the redemption. It is by no means intended to state there is any unlimited discretion in courts of equity to compel the owner of an estate bound by a forfeited mortgage to do whatever may in a popular sense and without regard to legal precedents be considered equitable in the particular case. It is, however, useful to bear in mind the origin and true character of the right of redemption, when called upon to determine a case not falling within any settled course of adjudication. It is still the rule that the mortgagor seeking to redeem must do equity to the mortgagee, or those who have succeeded to his rights; and where it has not been settled what is equity under the circumstances which attend a given case, the court must determine it according to its own sense of what is morally just and right. Where the conventional relation of mortgagor and mortgagee is shown and acknowledged between the parties, there is no reason why the latter should be allowed to obstruct the right of redemption by expending money upon improvements. *Page 84 He can at any time call upon the debtor, by suit of foreclosure, to elect whether he will pay the debt or incur an absolute forfeiture; and if he is found making costly improvements there is good reason to suspect a design to avail himself of the present inability of the debtor to discharge the incumbrance in order to confirm his title to the estate by embarrassing the right of redemption. The general rule is therefore understood to be that upon taking the account in a suit for redemption against a mortgagee in possession, he is to be charged with the rents and profits, and be allowed only for necessary reparations. (Moore v. Cable, 1 John. Ch. R., 387; Quin v. Brittain, 1Hoffman's Ch. R., 353; Story's Eq., § 1016.) So, if the mortgager having in fact only a redeemable estate should, even in good faith, deny the mortgagee's equity, this ought not to prejudice the latter provided he had done nothing to mislead the mortgagor, and had not unreasonably slept upon his rights. In order to apply the cases in which permanent improvements have been allowed to be taken into the account, it is necessary to have a clear view of the situation of these parties at the time the improvements were made. The defendant Dillaye was in possession as owner under a deed with warranty from a person in possession holding a similar evidence of title from one who had purchased the premises at a sale made professedly upon the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the true source of title, and who had taken possession under that foreclosure. It is easy to see that an examination, such as a very cautious man would have made, would have shown the invalidity of the foreclosure. But the omission to make an examination was not such gross negligence as to charge the defendant with bad faith. He cannot claim that the estate is irredeemable because he supposed it to be so; but he is not deprived by his omission to examine, of the position of a person acting in good faith without actual notice. The referee has found, what could not be doubted upon the evidence, that *Page 85 he believed himself to be the absolute owner of the lot. But the plaintiff had very materially aided him in coming to this conclusion, or rather, he had suffered him to fall into that error by an unjustifiable breach of his own obligation. His mortgage was executed in March, 1841. One-fourth of the principal and one year's interest were payable in about one year thereafter, and the whole debt was payable on the 1st day of June, 1845. He was in default for a portion of the debt for eleven years, and the whole amount of principal and interest had been in arrears more than seven years when this suit was commenced. He had not paid the smallest amount, and so far as appears, had never during that period recognized his indebtedness. Conceding, as we must do upon this case, that the sale by P.D. Mickles to the plaintiff, and the giving back of the bond and the mortgage sought to be redeemed was a real and not a colorable transaction, the plaintiff was in possession, up to the sale upon the foreclosure, by P.D. Mickles as his servant or agent or as his tenant. This possession was voluntarily abandoned and given up to Wheaton upon his purchase after foreclosure sale, and the latter immediately entered upon the reception of the rents and profits as owner, and he and those who succeeded him have continued to possess the premises as owners, unchallenged and without actual knowledge of this right of redemption, until shortly before the commencement of this suit, a period of eight years. When Dillaye erected the building, he and those who had preceded him in the title under the supposed foreclosure had been in possession as owners about six years. It is not found by the referee that the plaintiff was ignorant that his agent or tenant had been put out of possession upon pretence of the old mortgage, or that Wheaton and his grantees were in possession, claiming as owners under that proceeding; and considering that the premises lie in one of the most considerable interior towns, and upon the great thoroughfare through the state, it is no wise probable that he was ignorant. The *Page 86 referee finds indeed that he was not aware of the improvements while they were going on. This is not inconsistent with a full knowledge that his tenant had yielded up the possession to a party claiming the absolute title, and that the occupants were in possession, believing themselves to be the owners. The fact probably is that both parties acted in ignorance of their rights. The old mortgage is claimed to have been extinguished by the operation of a technical rule of law. Had it remained on foot the right to redeem both mortgages would not have been of much if any value until the defendant had improved the premises by the expensive erection which he put upon them. If the plaintiff was not aware of the extinguishment of the old mortgage he would naturally have considered his interest as nominal; and this, I am persuaded is the explanation of his long inaction. The case, when Dillaye erected the building, was this: He really had the title of a mortgagee in possession, but he supposed he was the absolute owner. The plaintiff had in fact an equity of redemption, but he had abandoned the possession to the defendants, who entered as owners; and he had ceased to claim any interest in the lot. He now finds that he has a valuable equity of redemption; and the question is whether he ought to pay for the improvement as a condition to the redemption. It was necessary that Dillaye should make expenditures to a considerable amount to render the premises tenantable at all; but he laid out more than was strictly necessary, though not more than would have judicious had he been, as he supposed he was, the owner. In Benedict v. Gilman (4Paige, 58), the plaintiffs had purchased under a statute foreclosure which did not cut off the rights of judgment creditors whose lien was subsequent to the mortgage, and had taken possession; and he had made permanent improvements in ignorance of the existence of certain judgments in the hands of the defendants. He filed a bill, claiming a strict foreclosure unless the defendants would pay up the mortgage and the value of the improvements *Page 87 and this was decreed. The chancellor said it would be inequitable and unjust to give the defendants the benefit of these improvements without compelling them to pay an equivalent therefor. The defendant's case in the present controversy is much stronger than the plaintiff's in Benedict v. Gilman, inasmuch as the judgment creditors had done nothing to mislead the party in possession, and the negligence of the latter in omitting to search for subsequent incumbrances was at least as great as that of Dillaye in this case. Judge STORY has carried the rights of a party in possession who has in good faith made improvements, altogether beyond what would be necessary to protect the defendant in this case. He says generally that courts of equity have extended the doctrine to cases where the party making the repairs and improvements has acted bona fide and innocently and there has been a substantial benefit conferred on the owner (Treatise on Eq., § 1237); and he has carried the principle into practice in a case decided by him in the Circuit Court of the United States. In Bright v. Boyd (1 Story, 478), lands had been sold by an administrator, but the sale was void because he had not given security according to the statute. The heir of the intestate had sued for and recovered the possession against the plaintiff, who derived his title under the administrator's sale The latter filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States to recover of the heir the value of certain improvements which he had in good faith made upon the land, and which included the building of a large dwelling-house. The heir was an infant, and resided in another state; but Judge STORY notwithstanding referred the case to a master to take an account of the enhanced value of the premises, deducting the rents and profits, with a pretty strong intimation that the plaintiff was entitled to recover them, though he said he would look into the case again upon the coming in of the report. This conclusion could not probably be sustained except upon the principle that one who fraudulently stands *Page 88 by and sees another expending money in good faith upon his land, shall not reclaim the land without paying for the improvements. Chancellor WALWORTH, I think, laid down the true principle inPutnam v. Richie (6 Paige, 390). He decided in a case very similar to that which was before Judge Story, that where there was no fraud or acquiescence on the part of the person having the legal title, he could not be compelled, even in favor of a party in possession who had made improvements bona fide, to allow for such improvements; but he said that such allowances were constantly made by courts of equity where the legal title was in the person who had made the improvements in good faith, and where the equitable title was in another, who was obliged to resort to the court for relief. This, as we have seen, is precisely the case now before the court. In Wetmore v. Roberts, (10 How. Pr. R., 51), the question we are are now considering was examined in the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice HAND, with his accustomed industry. It was a suit for foreclosure by a junior mortgagee, the defendant having purchased the premises from one who had bid them in upon a foreclosure of the elder mortgage, in which proceeding the junior incumbrancer was not made a party. It was alleged that the defendant had made improvements, in good faith, of the value of $6000, and it was decided that the premises should be sold, and that the value of the permanent improvements as well as the amount due on the elder mortgage should be paid out of the proceeds; after which the plaintiff was to be paid the amount due on his mortgage. I refer to the authorities relied on by Judge HAND, and also to Talbot v. Braddill (1 Vern., 184) and to Coote on Mortgages, (pp. 392, 561.) I am clearly of opinion that the refusal to allow for the erection of the building was erroneous. The judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed, as respects the account stated by the referee, and there should be a reference in that court to take an account *Page 89 between the plaintiff and the defendant Dillaye, in which the latter should be allowed for the enhanced value of the premises on account of the improvements made by the defendants. In other respects, the order should direct the usual allowances between mortgagor and mortgagee on a bill for redemption.