Brennan v. . Gordon

Potter, J. This action is brought upon the theory that the plaintiff being inexperienced in the running of an elevator, and that to the knowledge of defendant, and that having been assigned by the defendant to perform this duty, the defendant was bound to qualify him for such service, and that in doing *494 bo if the machinery was found to be defective or Henry Dill-worth, who was assigned as instructor for the .plaintiff, was incompetent to perform this duty, or was negligent in his -manner of performing it, and that by reason of the premises the plaintiff was injured, the defendants are liable to pay him the •damage he had sustained. The principles of law involved are well defined, and are not .seriously controverted by the counsel upon this appeal. Those principles are, that a duty devolved upon the master of a servant hitherto in the capacity of a common laborer, before ■such laborer should be put in charge of dangerous machinery with which he is not acquainted, to instruct and qualify him for such new duty. (Connolly v. Poillon, 41 Barb. 366, 369; Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410; Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59; Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553.) That if the master selects a co-servant in his employment to instruct and qualify the servant for the new and more dangerous service, the master must select a competent instructor or l)e liable for his incompetency or his negligence while performing the duty of instructor, or for discontinuance of his instruction until it is completed, by which the promoted servant is injured, and if such is the case, the master will be liable for the injury, and it will be no defense that the injury was caused by one servant to his co-servant, for the servant whose negligence caused the injury stands for the master and the latter is liable in such case the same as if the injury was caused by the personal negligence of the master. (Mann v. D. & H. C. Co., 91 N. Y. 500; Wood on Mast. & Serv. §§ 349, 350, 444; Brennan v. Gordon, 13 Daly, 208, 210, this case on former appeal; Loughlin v. State of N. Y., 105 N. Y. 159, 162-3; Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553.) The questions in dispute in this case, therefore, are whether the person giving the instructions for the defendants to qualify the plaintiff to run and manage the elevator, properly performed that duty, or was himself guilty of negligence in starting the elevator, or leaving it in plaintiff’s charge before he was qualified, or whether the machinery was imperfect in *495 any respect, and the defendants were negligent in selecting and putting it in use. If either of these conditions is shown to exist by proper and sufficient evidénce to support it, the defendants would be liable to plaintiff for the injuries he ■sustained. It does not strike me that it can be reasonably claimed that the machinery was defective in starting up at the time the accident occurred from inherent defect and without somebody’s interference. It was not intended to move and never had been known to move, unless the rope was applied to start it. The testimony in this case is abundant to show that somebody applied the rope to start the elevator up. The difficulty just here is that the evidence is too abundant, so much so that it is difficult from the superabundance of it to decide who it was that applied the rope to move the elevator up. The case seems to have been tried upon the true theory to determine whether or not the defendants are liable, and if any mistrial has taken place it is owing to errors in the charge of the learned trial judge, or in receiving or rejecting testimony or in rulings in conducting the trial. It is very evident, from a perusal of the case and the exceptions to the rulings upon the evidence, and the requests to charge and the exceptions thereto, that the trial was very closely contested, and it would be somewhat remarkable if a trial court, in the hurry and confusion incident to a trial conducted in this manner, should have avoided the commission of some error. In order to properly dispose of these exceptions, it is necessary to have a just understanding of the questions upon trial. They are whether Henry Dillworth was designated by the defendants as the instructor of the plaintiff to run and manage the elevator, and if so, whether he properly and sufficiently performed the duty thus devolved upon him by the defendants. I think there was error in the charge of the court made at the request of defendant “if the jury find as matter of fact that the plaintiff was put under instruction of a competent instructor, and that the instructor Avas as Avell acquainted as defendants Avith the nature and character of the service which *496 he undertook to perform, he cannot recover.” The jury could not otherwise understand this instruction than to mean that the defendants’ whole duty to the plaintiff was performed when they assigned as competent an instructor to plaintiff as the defendants were. This was erroneous in two respects. The degree of the instructor’s competency was gouged by the, competency of the defendants. The plaintiff was entitled to, have, and the defendants were bound to provide him with, an instructor competent to teach the art of managing an elevator,, regardless of the competency of the defendants in that respect, and of which there was no proof whatever in the case. But the defendants were not only bound to furnish plaintiff with an instructor absolutely competent to manage an elevator, but the defendants were also bound to provide such an instructor for a reasonable length of time to teach the plaintiff how to manage the elevator, and that the instructor should be guilty of no negligence to the injury of the plaintiff while he was being instructed. These relations spring from the fact that during this period the instructor is doing the work and standing in the place of the defendants, the master. There are other questions in the case deserving consideration upon this appeal, but I do not deem it necessary or worth the while to discuss them, having reached the conclusion that a new trial must be granted on account of the ruling already considered. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. All concur, except Haight and Parker, JJ., not sitting. Judgment reversed.