Leonard v. . Poole

Follett, Ch., J. When the transactions out of which this action arose were being carried on the statutes of this state provided that if two or more persons conspire to commit any act injurious to trade or commerce, each of them is guilty of a misdemeanor. (2 B. S. 692, § 8, subd. 6.) The same provision is contained in the Penal Code, section 168. The scheme entered into, by the parties to the contract of August 13, 1879, was an indictable misdemeanor. (2 B. S. 692, § 8; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349; Stanton v. Allen, 5 id. 434; Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558, 565; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Penn. St. 173.) The scheme which the parties to the contract for a time pursued, and sought to consummate, was identical with the one described in the contract, *378 and equally criminal. That Keene, Washington Butcher’s Sons and D. & FT. G. Hiller agreed to engage, and actually engaged, in an unlawful plot to advance the price of lard cannot be successfully denied, and the courts of this state will not entertain an action to adjust their differences. This proposition is well settled ; and we do not understand that the learned counsel for the appellant gainsays it, nor does he assert that the rule would not be applicable to a case arising between those parties and out of these transactions. The learned counsel for the appellant insists that Kent & Co. were not prin- • .cipals, but were mere agents for the principals, and that they cannot avoid payment upon the ground that the transactions were illegal. When persons knowingly promote and participate in carrying out a criminal scheme they are all principals, and the fact that one of the parties. acts, in some respects, in subordination .to the others, and is to profit less than the others, or not at all, by the consummation of the scheme, does not render such person less a principal. This rule is elementary, and does not require elaboration or the citation of authorities. Thoughout the period covered by the transactions these defendants bought and sold lard and futures and options in lard, and actively.engaged in the attempt to carry out the unlawful enterprise. If, at the close of their transactions, Keene and his associates had been found to be owing Kent & Co., we think it very clear that the illegality of the enterprise would have been a perfect defense to an action brought by Kent & Co. to recover the sum due. (Bartlett v. Smith, 13 Fed. Rep. 263; Cobb v. Prell, 15 id. 774; Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499.) In the case last cited Hr. Justice Matthews, in speaking for a unanimous court, said: “ In Roundtree v. Smith (108 U. S. 269), it was said that brokers who had negotiated such contracts, suing not on the contracts themselves, but for services performed and money advanced for defendant at his request, though they might under some circumstances be so connected with the immorality of the contract as to be affected by it, they are not in the same position as a party sued for the enforcement of the original *379 agreement. It is certainly true, that a broker might negotiate such a contract without being privy to the illegal intent of the principal parties to it which renders it void, and in such a case, being innocent of any violation of law, and not suing to enforce an unlawful contract, has a meritorious ground for the recovery of compensation for services and advances. But we are also of the opinion that when the broker is privy to the unlawful design of the parties, and brings them together for the very purpose of entering'into an illegal agreement, he is partioeps crimimis, and cannot recover for services rendered or losses incurred by himself on behalf of either in forwarding the transaction.” (110 IJ. S. 509.) Several cases have been cited holding that money or property deposited with a third person, which was derived from or through an unlawful enterprise, may be recovered; and that the illegality of the transaction out of which the money or property arose cannot be successfully asserted as a defense by a mere agent or depositary. This rule is well settled, but it is not germane to this case. Other cases are cited holding that when the parties to an illegal transaction have accounted, as between themselves, ■ and agreed that a definite sum belongs to each, that an action may be maintained upon the accounting or new promise, and the sum, once admitted to be due, recovered. Admitting these cases to be well decided, they do not aid the appellant. These parties have had no accounting. Ho admission has been made that a specified sum is due to any one of them. Ho promise has been made since the completion of the illegal scheme upon which a recovery is sought. On the contrary, this action is for an accounting between the parties. It is alleged in the complaint that the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover is unknown, and can only be ascertained by an investigation of the illegal transactions between the parties. The judgment prayed for is: “ That an account may be taken of all the dealings and transactions, purchases and sales of lard made and conducted by said defendants E. A. Kent & Co., under the agreement hereinbefore mentioned,” etc. The relief sought would require the court to investigate all *380 of the various transactions of these parties, from the beginning to the end of their unlawful enterprise, and adjust the differences between them. This is precisely what courts have always refused to do. The. fraud, which the trial court found was practised by these defendants upon their associates cannot be too strongly condemned, but courts are not organized to enforce the saying that there is honor among law-breakers, and the desire to punish must not lead to a decision establishing the doctrine that law-breakers are entitled to the aid of courts to adjust differences arising out of, and requiring an investigation of, their illegal transactions. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur. Judgment affirmed.