Becker v. . Hallgarten

Danforth, J. Becker was at no time in the course of these transactions the agent or representative of the vendors. Until and including the shipment of the goods he was the agent of Boas & Stem, the vendees, or of Goldstein. He obeyed, as was proper, at the different stages of the affair, first one and then the other of these parties. If his special character ceased with the shipment, he neither entered the employ of the ven *173 dors, nor did he act under any instruction received from them.. The finding, therefore, that in behalf of the vendors he stopped the goods, is without evidence to support it. Assuming, in the next place (for 'the purpose only of this discussion), that by the assignment above set out, he became vested with a vendor’s right to stop goods' while on their way to an insolvent purchaser, it is one which, we think, cannot be exercised in this, case, for the reasons: First, that the transit was over before' the goods left Germany. They were sent by. the vendors to Becker, as the vendees’ agent at Bremen. The shipment was-preceded by, and was in consequence of, a request by B. & S. to the vendors, “ to send the boxes ” to Becker “ at our disposition.” Therefore, on the 28th of July, informing Becker of the shipment to him, “ at the request of and for account of' Messrs. B. & S. of Berlin,” they write, we have sent you part of the goods in question and “ request you to carry out. the further instruction of said parties concerning the same; ” and in the next letter, communicating'the shipment of the balance, they say, “ and request you hereby to let Messrs. B. & S. have the further disposal thereof.” It is obvious, then, that the impulse impressed upon the goods by the vendors carried them only to Bremen. Some other action was necessary on the part of the vendees before they moved again. They, at that-point, transferred the "goods to Goldstein, and made them, in the hands of Becker, subject to his order. The trial court finds not only a “ taking of the goods by him as security,” but that Boas & Stern “ directed Becker to hold and ship the goods according to Goldstein’s directions.” This was done. The bills of lading were issued in favor of strangers to the vendees, and who represent a party having actual custody and the right of disposition. The shipment and the consignment by the vendors ended at Bremen. At that place new interests attached, in promotion of which the goods were sent forward. The only consignment by W. & B. was to Becker at Bremen. It has been held that the delivery to the vendee, which puts an end to the state of passage, may be at a place where he means the goods to remain until a fresh destination is commu *174 nieated to them by orders from himself. ( Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837; Biggs v. Barry, 2 Curt. 259; Bolton v. L. & Y. R. W. Co., L. R„ 1 Com. Pl. 439; also Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East, 175; and this case is approved in Covell v. Hithcock, 23 Wend. 611.) In the case before us, it is plain that they had reached the place for which .they were intended, under the direction given by the vendors, and had come under the actual control of the vendees. Dixon v. Baldmin (swproi) is commented upon in Harris v. Pratt (17 N. Y. 249), and distinguished from the rule thought applicable to the facts of that case. There the suspense in transportation was temporary, and to be resumed at a future time in the direction already given by the vendors. But, in the case before us, not only is the actual fact like that in Dixon v. Baldwin, but if the detention at Bremen was originally intended only to give the vendees an opportunity to determine by which of several routes, or at what time, as in Harris v. Pratt, the goods should go on, we have the additional vital circumstance before adverted to of a complete possession and control by the vendees, and its transfer to a third party, who also took the actual possession and control of the goods, and has since retained them. Heither Harris v. Pratt nor any of the other cases cited by the appellant go to the extent of upholding the vendor’s lien in such a case. Second. The transaction between Goldstein and the vendees was effectual to pass the property to him and so deprive the vendors of the right of stoppage if it otherwise existed. That right may always be defeated by indorsing and delivering a bill of lading of the goods to a bona fide indorsee for a valuable consideration, without notice of the facts on which the right of stoppage would otherwise exist. This was held in Lickbarrow v. Mason (2 T. R. 63), and has since been deemed established. It does not impair the force of this position that the money was in fact advanced before the delivery of the bill of lading. The goods were in the possession of Goldstein when he paid over the money. The bill of lading was promised and was part of the consideration on which the money was paid, but more than all he had the right, under the authority given to him by B. & S., *175 to take the bill of lading in any form, and it was made out for his benefit. (City Bk. v. R. W. & O. R. R., 44 N. Y. 136.) BTor is it material, unless made so by the German law (imfra), that the bill of lading was not indorsed. It was not necessary that it should be. Hall gar ten & Co. were Goldstein’s agents,subject to his control, and in making the bill of lading in their names as consignees all was effected which the indorsement of a bill taken in the name of B. & S. would have accomplished. The cases cited by the respondent (Meyerstein v. Barber, L. R., 2 Com. Pl. 45; Short v. Simpson, 1 id. 255), show that a bill so indorsed has the same effect, even if the ship containing the goods was at sea, as delivery of the goods themselves. Here there was a delivery of the goods to Goldstein, and the bill of lading followed the possession. , Third. The German law, as set out m evidence, has no application to the case in hand. It applies when the bill of lading is taken in the name of the vendee or of some person through whom the party claiming its benefit must make title. The observations already made show that in our opinion this is not the plaintiff’s position. BTor are the defendants estopped from disputing the plaintiff’s title. There is no finding of any fact upon which such doctrine can rest; no change of position by the plaintiff; a promise at most by the defendants without consideration, in violation of duty to their principals and in fraud of their rights. If it forms the foundation of any action, it cannot be one the effect of which is to deprive a third party of his property, or subject the defendant to a second action by the real owner of the goods. The right of stoppage, when it exists, depends upon equity, and that of the defendants, by virtue of their representative character, is superior-in any view to the plaintiff’s. If liable at all, it would be upon their assumpsit to keep the goods on his account. But what damages could the plaintiff show from the breach of an agreement to keep for him, or subject to his order, goods to which another person was entitled, and whose claim was as to him exclusive % Some other grounds are urged by the respondent on which *176 he claims the judgment may be sustained. They have been examined, and are deemed untenable. The reasons for this-conclusion need not be stated, since however decided, they would be insufficient to overcome the appellants’ objections-which have been already declared well taken. The judgment appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. All concur, except Folg-eb, Oh. J., absent from argument. Judgment reversed.