In Re Niagara, Lockport & Ontario Power Co.

Hiscock, J. The respondent petitioner instituted this summary proceeding for the purpose of compelling the *496 appellant, an attorney, to deliver to it certain documents to which it claims to be entitled and which he claims to hold under an attorney’s lien for compensation for services. Thus far it has succeeded in its application, an order having been made requiring the appellant to deliver to it the papers in question on execution of a bond conditioned for the payment of any compensation which ultimately may be determined to be due from respondent. We think, however, that the position assumed by the respondent in denying that appellant at any time acted as its attorney is irreconcilably inconsistent with its right to maintain this proceeding, and that, therefore, the order appealed from must be reversed. The relationship of attorney and client is the very foundation of a summary proceeding such as this. The courts will not by such a proceeding enforce ordinary contractual obligations not springing out of this relationship, even though the obligor happens to be an attorney. Thus it has been held that the courts will not on such application compel an attorney to pay money in satisfaction of an ordinary debt. (Windsor v. Brown, 15 R. I. 182; Matter of Gray, L. R. [2 Q. B. 1892] 440.) Likewise it is an answer to an application to compel an attorney to deliver papers that they were received by him as a mere agent and not by reason of his professional character as an attorney. (Matter of H-, an Attorney, 87 N. Y. 521.) It has been decided at the General Term, although this doctrine was somewhat questioned by the judge writing in this court on appeal, that such a proceeding is so based on the personal relationship between the' attorney and the client that the right to employ it will not pass to an assignee of the client. (Matter of Schell, 58 Hun, 440; Schell v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 128 N. Y. 67, 69.) • When, however, this relationship of attorney and client does exist the courts by virtue of their inherent power and control over their own officers, and quite inde *497 pendent of specific statutory provision, will under proper circumstances exercise jurisdiction and summarily compel an attorney to fulfill his obligations toward his client by paying money or delivering documents which belong to him, adequate provision being made in the latter case for satisfaction of any demands against the client for compensation and for which the attorney might have a lien on the documents. (Matter of Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284; Matter of Hollins, 197 N. Y. 361; Matter of H-, an Attorney, supra.) Applying these well-established principles to the present proceedings we find that the respondent has unequivocally deprived itself of the right to maintain them by expressly and broadly contesting any relationship of attorney and client between it and the appellant. In effect it denies that it ever retained him in connection with the proceedings which placed in his hands the documents now sought and expressly alleges that his retainer and employment were by another corporation, and to emphasize this situation it sets forth the details of the litigation now pending undetermined between it and him over this very issue. The order which was made on its application fully recognizes this contest and preserves to respondent the right to continue it notwithstanding the papers in question are turned over to it. It requires the respondent as a condition of procuring the papers to execute a bond to the effect simply that it “will pay such sum as shall eventually be determined to be now justly due the said John Pallace, Jr., by this petitioner on account of legal services performed, or alleged by him to have been performed.” Thus while the courts have compelled appellant to act on the theory that he was the attorney of the respondent, it has permitted the respondent to proceed on the theory that it was not the client of the appellant. This is obviously so unreasonable and unfair that it makes it *498 easy to understand why precedents are not found for such a course or justifying such an order. Of course what is thus said does not in any manner question the right of the court under proper circumstances to proceed in this manner against an attorney where the amount due him is controverted, the fundamental relationship not being denied, and to which situation the courts below undoubtedly assumed inadvertently the present case to be analogous. Two minor propositions remain to be considered. It was urged by respondent on the argument that any objections to the order appealed from might be obviated by requiring respondent’s undertaking to be conditioned also for the payment of any compensation which might be determined to be due to appellant from the construction company. This suggestion is in effect condemned by what we have already said. The respondent had no part in or relation to the retainer of appellant by the construction company, and is not called on or permitted to settle the obligations or take advantage of the relationship between those parties as a basis for this application. Having denied that it entered into the relation necessary to enable it to maintain this proceeding, it cannot supply the defect by agreeing to fulfill the obligations which may exist in favor of the attorney against some other client. Such a course might protect the attorney from loss as the result of surrendering the papers and losing his lien but it would not at all give the respondent that character of client by virtue of which alone it can seek the relief which it is now asking. It is further argued that the appellant received the documents in question under such circumstances and for such special purposes as prevent him from holding them under a lien for compensation. It is, of course, well settled that papers may come into the possession of an attorney under such conditions as are inconsistent with the enforcement of a lien for services and when such is the *499 case he will not he allowed to hold them. (Matter of Hollins, 197 N. Y. 361.) There are, however, two answers to this argument of respondent in this case. In the first place, even assuming that respondent’s petition did sufficiently set forth special circumstances inconsistent with the retention of these documents under a claim of lien, these allegations were denied by the appellant in his answer. Thus an issue of fact was presented which it must he assumed from the order made by the Special Term was determined in appellant’s favor. In the second place, if we are correct in the view that respondent under the allegations of its petition is entirely without right to maintain this proceeding, it is immaterial that the appellant for the reason suggested is improperly retaining the papers. Such improper conduct might be a subject for consideration between him and his client, but it is not of consequence here and now. The orders of the Appellate Division and the Special Term should be reversed and the application denied, with costs in all the courts. Cullen, Oh. J., Haight, Werner, Willard Bartlett, Chase and Collin, JJ., concur. Orders reversed, etc.