Ackerman v. . Rubens

Vann, J. When the vendee of personal property, under an executory contract of sale, refuses to complete his purchase, i the vendor may keep the article for him and sue for the entire purchase price ; or he may keep the property as his own and sue for the difference between the market value and the contract price; or he may sell the property for the highest sum he can get, and after crediting the net amount received, sue for the balance of the purchase money. (Moore v. Potter, 155 N. Y. 481; Dustan v. McAndrew, 44 N. Y. 72.) While the courts below recognized this rule they did not apply it, for they held that the sale at auction was no sale at all, because a man cannot sell to himself. This would be true of an attempt to make a private .sale to one’s self, but it is not true of a sale at public auction, fairly conducted by a licensed auctioneer, and made at a reasonable time and place, after adequate opportunity to see the property, due advertisement to the public and personal notice to the vendee, when the real jrarpose is to ascertain the value of the property. The law is satisfied with a fair sale, made in good faith, according to established business methods, with no attempt to take advantage of the vendee. Such, as the jury might have found, was the sale under consideration. The primary object of the sale was not to pass title from the vendor, but to lessen the loss of the vendee. The subject of the sale had no market value, and the amount for which it could be sold depended largely upon taste and fancy. A public competitive sale by outcry to the highest bidder, duly advertised and made upon *409 notice to the vendee, is a safer method of measuring the damages than a sale by private negotiation, which has been held sufficient. (Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70.) A fair public sale, in the absence of other evidence, is competent evidence of value. The plaintiff did not conduct the sale himself, but placed the yacht in the hands of a public auctioneer for sale without reservation, on account of whom it might concern. While the auctioneer was his agent he could not lawfully control him so as to prevent an honest sale. The defendant had notice and an opportunity to protect himself, yet he asked for no postponement, made no request, gave no instructions and did not even appear at the sale. If the plaintiff’s agent had refrained from bidding, the property Avould have gone to a stranger for a less sum- than it finally brought, and yet, in that event, even according to the defendant’s theory,"the sale would have been valid. The fact that the plaintiff outbid all competitors did not render the sale invalid, for he had a right to bid, provided he took no advantage by trying to prevent others from bidding or by disregarding any reasonable request of the defendant,- or in any other way. If he had acted as auctioneer, or in collusion with the auctioneer, or there was any evidence of furtive effort on his part, or anything to challenge the fairness of the sale, the action of the trial court in virtually withdrawing the case from the jury might have been justified, but the mere fact that he was the highest bidder at a public sale, the fairness of which is not questioned in any other respect, did not warrant the direction for nominal damages only. The object of the sale was to measure the damages caused by the default of the defendant, and they were diminished instead of being increased by the action of the plaintiff. We forbear further discussion, because the question is no longer open in this court, as it was involved in a case recently decided by us upon careful consideration after full discussion by counsel. (Moore v. Potter, 155 N. Y. 481.) In that case, as in this, the property was sold at auction to a representative of the vendor, and the point was distinctly made on the argu *410 ment before us that as the vendor was the real purchaser, “ the sale was colorable only and absolutely without effect upon the rights of the parties.” While we did not discuss the question in our opinion, it was necessarily involved, was passed upon in consultation and decided. Both upon principle and authority we think that the amount for which the yacht was struck off to the vendor at an auction sale fairly conducted, upon notice to the vendee, with no suspicion of fraud or. undue advantage, was lawful evidence of the value of the yacht and presented a case for the consideration of the jury. The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.