Town of Roanoke Rapids v. Patterson

Adams, J. On 1 January, 1920, tbe defendant bad situate in tbe town of Roanoke Rapids real property of tbe value of $2,700, and owned personal property of tbe value of $21,321. Tbe plaintiff levied for that year a tax of 85 cents on property valued at $100. Upon tbe defendant’s *136 refusal to pay tbe tax assessed against bis property, tbe plaintiff brought suit and recovered judgment. Tbe appeal involves tbe two questions whether tbe owner was required to list bis property as of 1 January, 1920, and if so, whether at that time tbe defendant was a resident of Roanoke Rapids. In 1919 tbe taxpayer filed bis verified statement with tbe list-taker on 1 May; but tbe next year it was not so. Special machinery was provided by tbe Revaluation Act. “All real property shall be valued as of 1 May, 1919, and when such valuation has been completed, it shall become tbe value to be used for all tax purposes for tbe years 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1923. All personal property shall be listed as of 1 January in each year, and from and after tbe completion of the revaluation herein provided for all real property shall be listed as of 1 January of each year.” Public Laws 1919, ch. 84, sec. 6. See secs. 19, 21. “Tbe assessment of valuation of property, made under provisions of chapter 84 of tbe Public Laws of 1919, is hereby approved by the General Assembly and adopted as tbe basis for tbe levy of tax rates by tbe State, and by all subdivisions of tbe State for which taxes are levied for tbe year 1920, and tbe valuation of real property so fixed shall be adopted for tbe years 1921, '1922, and 1923, except as such valuations may be hereafter changed according to law.” Public Laws, Extra Session, 1920, ch. 1, sec. 1. “Tbe tax upon all real and personal property shall be charged upon tbe tax books for tbe year 1920 against tbe owners of such property on 1 January, 1920, in accordance with tbe intent and purpose of chapter 84 of tbe Public Laws of 1919, and whenever in said act there is any provision requiring property to be listed for taxation after tbe year 1920 on 1 January, that such provisions are hereby amended by substituting in lieu thereof tbe words ‘1 May/ to tbe end that all personal property may be listed, and all real property relisted as of 1 May after tbe year 1920, under tbe rules and regulations as may be hereafter provided by tbe General Assembly.” Public Laws, Extra Session, 1920, sec. 8. In these statutes tbe legislative intent is clearly indicated; tbe language is unambiguous, and resort to extrinsic aids to construction is not required. Tbe conclusion is unavoidable that for tbe year 1920 tbe tax on property was to be charged on tbe tax books as of tbe first day of tbe year. Tbe time for listing property since 1920 is designated in Public Laws, Extra Session, 1920, cb. 1, sec. 8, supra. The law provides that all personal property and all taxable polls shall be listed in tbe township in which tbe person so charged resides. Ordinarily this is tbe place of domicile. Hall v. Fayetteville, 115 N. C., 281. Tbe question of tbe defendant’s domicile was submitted to tbe jury. His counsel requested tbe instruction that if it was bis intention to terminate bis legal domicile in Roanoke Rapids on 31 December, 1919, and to transfer it to Rosemary, and in pursuance thereof removed with *137 Ms family from Roanoke Rapids on tbe morning of 3 January, and thereafter listed his personal property in Rosemary ¿ he was not a resident of Roanoke Rapids on the first of January. This instruction his Honor declined, and charged the jury that both an intention or purpose and the consummation of such purpose were necessary to effect a change of domicile. When accurately used, “domicile” and “residence” are not convertible terms. Domicile is a person’s fixed, permanent, established dwelling-place, as distinguished from his temporary, although actual, place of residence. Salem v. Lyme, 29 Conn., 74; Reynolds v. Cotton Mills, 177 N. C., 412; Wheeler v. Cobb, 75 N. C., 21; Horne v. Horne, 31 N. C., 99. Domicile implies both physical presence in a particular locality and an intention to make such locality a permanent abiding place — -both a residence and the animus manendi. The defendant’s own testimony is to the effect that he acquired his domicile at Roanoke Rapids in 1901, and is, moreover, substantially an admission that he made no change of domicile or residence until 3 January, 1920. By careful examination of the record, we are satisfied that the defendant’s exceptions should not be sustained, and that the appeal presents No error.