State v. . Deberry

Stacy, C. J. Tbe case turns on tbe question of jurisdiction. It is admitted that tbe alleged assault took place “in tbe Federal Courtroom, which is located in tbe Post Office Building in tbe city of Winston-Salem,” and that “said property was acquired by tbe Federal Government in 1899 and confirmed by Judge Boyd in 1900.” It is further conceded that this property was “purchased by tbe consent of tbe legislature of tbe State,” as expressed in cb. 136, Public Laws 1887, and that its acquisition by tbe United States was under and by virtue of Art. I, sec. 8, clause 17, of tbe Federal Constitution. This clause 17 provides that Congress shall have power “to exercise exclusive legislation . . . over all places purchased by tbe consent of tbe legislature of tbe State in which tbe same shall be, for tbe erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings.” In Battle v. United States, 209 H. S., 36, 52 L. Ed., 670, it was said that “post offices are among tbe ‘other needful buildings.’ ” So, also, are court buildings and customhouses. Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed., 726. Indeed, “other needful buildings” would seem to embrace whatever structures are necessary in tbe performance of tbe particular functions of tbe Federal Government for which tbe property was acquired. James v. Dravo Contracting Go., 302 H. S., 142, 82 L. Ed., 155. *836 It is established by the pertinent statutes and decisions on the subject that— 1. The purchase of lands by the United States, within the limits of a State, does not of itself oust the jurisdiction of the State over the lands so purchased; but where the purchase is with the full consent of the legislature of the State, the jurisdiction of the United States then becomes exclusive. Ft. Leavenworth R. Go. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, 29 L. Ed., 264; Supply Trading Go. v. Goolc, 281 U. S., 647, 74 L. Ed., 1091; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S., 19, 83 L. Ed., 455. 2. The consent of the legislature of a State to the acquisition of lands within its borders by the United States, having once been given, may not thereafter be revoked or withdrawn, unless Federal jurisdiction has not been accepted. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S., 138, 74 L. Ed., 761; Adams v. United States, 319 U. S., 312, 87 L. Ed., 1421. 3. The legislature of the State may qualify its consent to the acquisition of lands within its borders by the United States so as to retain some jurisdiction or partial jurisdiction over such lands. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S., 186, 82 L. Ed., 187; James v. Bravo Contracting Co., supra. 4. The most usual qualification to be found in the consent statutes is that of the reservation of authority to execute any civil or criminal process in and on the lands acquired by the United States. See Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, supra. 5. In many of the States concurrent jurisdiction is also retained for the enforcement or administration of the criminal laws of the State. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Co., 204 U. S., 518, 82 L. Ed., 1502. The Legislature of North Carolina, in 1887, gave its unqualified consent to the acquisition of lands within the State by the United States for the purpose of erecting thereon any post office, courthouse, etc., and this statute was in force at the time of the purchase of the post office site in 'Winston-Salem in 1899. Section 5426 of the Eevisal of 1905 undertakes to qualify the State’s consent to the acquisition of Federal lands, and reserves to the State concurrent jurisdiction with the United States over such lands for the service of process issued by the courts of the State, and “the State of North Carolina also retains authority to punish all violations of its criminal laws committed on any such tract of land.” Now Gr. S., 104-1. Two years later, however, in 1907, another statute was enacted which ceded “exclusive jurisdiction in and over any land so acquired by the United States . . . for all purposes, except the service upon such sites of all civil and criminal process of the courts of this State.” Ch. 25, Public Laws 1907. Now G. S., 104-7. *837 Neither the cited section of the Revisal of 1905 nor the cited statute of 1907 makes any reference to lands theretofore acquired by the United States for the purposes named; and according to the general rule of construction, in the absence of such reference, the statute is to be regarded as prospective only. Ashley v. Brown, 198 N. C., 369, 151 S. E., 725; S. v. Pridgen, 151 N. 0., 651, 65 S. E., 617. Hence, the applicable law would be that which was in force at the time of the acquisition of the property in 1899. At that time the Legislature had given its unqualified consent to the acquisition of lands within the State by the United States for the purpose of erecting thereon any post office, courthouse, etc., and the Federal jurisdiction therefore became exclusive. United States v. Unzeuta, supra. The same conclusion would apparently follow, even if the subsequent legislation be given a retroactive effect, since the law as found in the Revisal of 1905 seems to be in conflict with the later statute enacted in 1907. This may lead to an undesirable result. Nevertheless, we can only declare the law as we find it. The motion to abate is well founded. Reversed.