McPhaul v. . Walters

AlleN, J. When an issue is raised upon tbe trial of an action, involving fraud and undue influence in procuring tbe execution of a deed, tbe consideration paid is an important and material fact, and is frequently controlling. If it is near tbe value of tbe land conveyed, it is natural and reasonable to conclude, in tbe absence of peculiar conditions and circumstances, tbat there is no fraud, as men are not apt to engage in fraudulent conduct with no hope of gain; and, on tbe other band, if there is a gross *184 inequality between tbe price paid and the value of the property, the inference of mistake or deception arises almost irresistibly. Some of the authorities upon the subject are reviewed in Leonard v. Power Co., 155 N. C., 16, and the conclusion was then reached that inadequacy of consideration is evidence of fraud, and when grossly so may, standing alone, justify submitting the issue of fraud to the jury. The Court quotes with approval from Perry v. Ins. Co., 137 N. C., 406, language used in reference to awards which is equally applicable to deeds, that “Where there is a charge of fraud or partiality made against an award, the fact that it is plainly'and palpably wrong would be evidence in support of the charge, entitled to greater or less weight according to the extent or effect of the error and the other circumstances of the case. There might be a case of error in an award so plain and gross that a court or jury could arrive only at the conclusion that it was not the result of an impartial exercise of their judgment by the arbitrators”; and from Goddard v. King, 40 Minn., 164: “The settled rule, which is applicable, not only to awards, but to other transactions, is that mere inadequacy alone is not sufficient to set aside the award, but if the inadequacy be so gross and palpable as to shock the moral sense, it is sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury on the issues relating to fraud and corruption or partiality and bias.” If, therefore, value is a material inquiry, is evidence competent upon the issue that the land conveyed was worth $75 per acre at the time of the trial in 1914? The fact in controversy was the value of the land at the time of the execution of the deed in 1905, the plaintiff contending it was then worth $30 per acre, and the defendant that it was worth $8 per acre, which is about the amount he paid, and the question is therefore presented, whether it is competent to offer evidence of the value of land nine years after the execution of a deed without further explanation as some proof of its value as of the date of the deed. We think not. The evidence is too remote, and has a tendency to mislead the jury, and in this case had much additional weight by the failure of the learned judge, inadvertently, to instruct the jury that the adequacy or inadequacy of the consideration was to be determined as of the time of the execution of the deed. The case of Gross v. McBrayer, 159 N. C., 374, is in point, the only difference between that case and this being that the evidence of value excluded in the Gross case was anterior to the transaction, while in this it was subsequent; and of this evidence the Court says.: “There was evidence that the land brought its full value at the sale, and that which the plaintiff offered to show its value, not at the time of the sale, but many years before, was too remote to have any bearing upon the question.” *185 Tbe allegations in tbe answer as to value were not introduced and do not affect tbe competency of tbe evidence admitted. Tbe answer is, in our opinion, sufficient to raise tbe issue of fraud growing out of tbe relation of mortgagor and mortgagee, as well as because of tbe alleged false representations, and as a new trial is necessary, it is advisable to submit issués presenting tbe question of actual and constructive fraud separately. New trial.