Farr v. Babcock Lumber Co.

*727 Adams, J. His Honor beld that the court had no jurisdiction of the first cause of action, and retained the second, third, and fourth causes for trial by jury. The defendant, thereupon excepted and appealed. The order appealed from was not final, or of such character as to deprive the defendant of any substantial right, and fot this reason the appeal was premature. The defendant can preserve its exception until a final judgment is_ rendered. In numerous cases this Court has held that a premature or fragmentary appeal will not be considered. Hailey v. Gray, 93 N. C., 196; Lane v. Richardson, 101 N. C., 182; Mfg. Co. v. Buxton, 105 N. C., 74; Emry v. Parker, 111 N. C., 261; R. R. v. King, 125 N. C., 454. We are requested, however, to review so much of the judgment as retains for trial the second, third, and fourth causes of action. As now advised, especially in the absence of an opposing interpretation by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, we are of opinion that the sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act cited and relied on by the defendant do not purport to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Graham as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action stated in the complaint, and that there was no error in his Honor’s order that 'these causes be retained for trial. Appeal dismissed. WalKER, J\, concurs only in dismissal of appeal.