State v. . Mundy

Hoice, J. It is held with us that an objection to the bill of indictment, on account of duplicity, comes too late after verdict. The bill undoubtedly contains a proper charge,of the unlawful manufacture of spirituous liquors under C. S., 3409, and as a matter of form this will suffice to uphold the judgment. S. v. Burnett, 142 N. C., 577; S. v. Cooper, 101 N. C., 684. And the objection to the ruling of the court on the question of evidence must also be disallowed. There is doubt if the proposed declaration comes within the principle permitting corroboration by consistent declarations of a defendant who has testified. They seem to be rather an effort to fix the crime on a third party, Babe Still-well, but if it be conceded that the evidence was competent there was no testimony from Stillwell or any other that they heard defendant make these alleged statements. And on the facts presented in the record, it is clear that the excluded evidence added nothing to the testimony of the defendant already received, and that if the same had been admitted it could have had no appreciable effect on the result. In Goins v. Indian Training School, 169 N. C., 739, speaking to an exception of this character, the Court said: “Besides, if the evidence had been properly excepted to, it is not a matter of sufficient importance that we could see it would have probably affected the result. Courts do ’not now grant new trials upon merely technical objections, unless the error is of sufficient importance to justify a belief that if the error had not been committed the result reasonably would have been different.” A ruling that finds support in many of our recent decisions. Powell v. R. R., 178 N. C., 243-248; Brewer v. Ring, 177 N. C., 476. In this last case Walher, J., delivering the opinion has well said; “Courts do not lightly grant reversals, or set aside verdicts, upon grounds which show the alleged error to be harmless, or where the appellant could have sustained no injury from it. There should at least be something like a practical treatment of the motion to reverse, and it should not he granted except to subserve the real ends of substantial justice,” citing Hilliard on New Trials (2 ed.), secs. 1 to 7. We find no reversible error, and the judgment against the defendant must be affirmed. No error.