Nall v. . Kelly

Hoice, J., after stating the case: In Laws of 1897, ch. 480, it was enacted, “That in any action instituted in any courts of this State upon .an account for goods sold and delivered, a verified itemized statement *719 of sucb account shall be received in evidence, and shall be deemed prima facie evidence of its correctness.” This law now appears in Eevisal 1905, in the chapter on Evidence, section 1625, and is confined, as its terms clearly import, to actions on account for goods sold and delivered. Hospital Association v. Hobbs, 153 N. C., p. 188, and was clearly designed to facilitate this collection of claims about which there was no bona fide dispute, and to relieve the plaintiff in cases of that character of the expense and delay of formally taking depositions. Statutes of this character, here and elsewhere, for obvious reasons, have very generally received a strict construction by the courts. Knight v. Taylor, 131 N. C., p. 84; Mernam Co. v. Thomas Co., 103 Va., p. 24; Foster and Webb v. Scott Co., 107 Tenn., 693. And in this jurisdiction it has been very generally considered that an affiant who verifies an account, under this and cognate statutes, shall be regarded and dealt with as a witness pro tanto, and to such extent must meet the requirements and is subject to the qualifications and re^-strictions of other witnesses. Atkinson v. Simmons, 33 N. C., p. 416; Kitchin v. Tyson, 7 N. C., p. 314. It will be noted that this section we are discussing contains no provision as to who shall make the affidavit, and the contents of a proper affidavit being given the force and effect of evidence, and the affiant being regarded, as we have seen, as a witness .pro tanto, we are of opinion that the-verification should be by some one competent to testify, if he were present, and when it appears on the face of the account and verification that the affiant has no personal knowledge of the transactions covered by the account, or that affiant, on the record, is otherwise incompetent to testify, in such case the account and affidavit offered does not come within the statutory provision, and the same, in this form, should not be received. In the case before us, an examination of the account accompanying affidavit will show that the goods were bought, if at all, from E. D. Nall Company, a corporation, and that the company has assigned all of its choses in action, accounts, etc., to plaintiff. So far as appears plaintiff, himself, does not seem to have had any personal knowledge of the transactions, but on the face of the account the goods purport to have been sold by M. B. Hudson. The verification, therefore, appears to have been made on information from others, and if this be the true interpretation of this account, the plaintiff would not be able to testify to it as a witness, and should not be allowed to verify under the statute. Kennedy v. Price, 138 N. C., p. 173. And if it were otherwise, if the verification should be held to pro- , ceed on personal knowledge of the affiant, in such case he becomes an *720 incompetent witness under section 1631 o£ tbe Revisal, prohibiting a party interested from testifying as to personal transactions or communications with an adversary who is, at tbe time tbe evidence is offered, deceased or a lunatic. Tbis section, 1631, enacted as necessary to protect tbe estate of deceased persons and lunatics from unconscionable claims, and based upon tbe gravest reasons of public policy, approved by repeated decisions of tbis Court, and found eminently desirable in practice, should not be set aside or impaired unless tbe purpose of tbe Legislature to do so is very clearly expressed, and we think tbis section, 1625, appearing as a section on tbe law of evidence, should be construed in subordination to section 1631, under tbe principle decided in Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., p. 431, and other similar decisions, and in cases presenting tbe question, however meritorious a particular demand may be, when it involves a personal transaction between a claimant and tbe estate of a lunatic or deceased person, it must be established by proper testimony, and under tbe statute as now drawn an ex parte affidavit of tbe living claimant should not be beard. 1 Corpus Juris., p. 665, citing Swertt v. Wherry, 4 Tex. Civ. App., 15 S. W., 121. In making tbis decision, we are not inadvertent to cases in tbis State bolding that sections 1622 and 1623 of Revisal are not subject to tbe provisions of section 1631 of the same chapter, VII of Revisal. See Leggett v. Glover, 71 N. C., p. 211. At tbe time our laws were enacted permitting parties to testify, and tbis section, 1631, was passed as necessary to tbe safe enforcement of such a policy, these sections, 1622 and 1623, commonly known as tbe Book Debt Law, bad long been tbe law of tbe State, being very carefully drawn as to form and substance, and applying only to small sums, not greater than $60, they were supposed to have served a useful purpose, and it was held, in several cases, that they would still be recognized in tbe very restricted instances to which they could apply.' But while we have no- disposition to disturb these cases, as correctly construing tbe sections referred to, we must decline to extend tbe principle further, and are of opinion, as stated, that under tbe terms of section 1625, as now drawn, an affiant, verifying an account so as to make tbe same prima facie evidence, must be a competent witness to tbe facts, and when it appears on tbe face, of tbe account that be has not personal knowledge of these facts, or it is established that be is otherwise an incompetent witness, tbe ex parte account so verified should not be received in evidence, and when, as in this case, it is tbe only evidence offered, a nonsuit should be allowed. There is error in refusing tbe defendant’s motion to nonsuit, and tbe same is Reversed.