Burke Transit Co. v. Queen City Coach Co.

DeviN, J. The defendants’ appeal presents the question of the sufficiency of the evidence offered to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order pending the trial of the action. The defendants base their objection to the order entered below principally on three grounds ydiich we will consider seriatim. 1. It is contended that the equitable remedy by injunction should not be invoked to restrain alleged slanderous statements affecting plaintiff’s business, but that plaintiff should be left to its remedy at law. Undoubtedly the general rule is that where no breach of trust or contract appears equity will not enjoin libelous or slanderous statements even when injurious to complainant’s business or property. But where it appears necessary for the protection of plaintiff’s business and property rights, and it is alleged that the systematic circulation of false statements seriously affecting these rights will work irreparable and continuing injury, injunction relief may be granted pending final determination of the action. Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-Am. Pul. Co., 245 Mass., 262; 28 A. J., 312; 43 C. J. S., 681. 2. It is argued by defendant that the complaint in effect charges the criminal offense denounced by the statute, Gr. S., 75-1, for that it is alleged that defendants have conspired to injure and destroy plaintiff’s competitive business, with the purpose of attempting to fix the price after competition is removed, in violation of Gr. S., 75-5, and that equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime, since the remedy is by indictment. It was declared in Hargett v. Bell, 134 N. C., 394, 46 S. E., 749, that “there is no equitable jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of a crime,” but this was said with reference to a suit in equity to enjoin the sale of spirituous liquors. It was also said in that case that injunction is “confined to cases where some private right is a subject of controversy.” Patterson v. Hulls, 65 N. C., 119; Motor Service v. R. R., 210 N. C., 36, 185 S. E., 479. Wrongful acts, which may also be criminal, but which threaten injury to private property rights may invoke the aid of equity to prevent irreparable loss. The power of the courts to enjoin wrongful and injurious acts is not divested because such acts may also be in violation of the criminal law. “Injunction will issue to inhibit a criminal act when the act invades civil or property rights and where there is no other adequate remedy available.” 43 C. J. S., 762; 28 A. J., *773 339. Particularly is tbis so where a public service is involved. McIntosh, 978. When the enforcement of criminal law is merely incidental to the general relief sought in equity it is well settled that a court of equity may grant relief by injunction. Barrett v. Fritz, 316 Ill. App., $1.7. While conspiracies in restraint of trade, and undertakings to destroy o? injure the business of a competitor, with purpose of attempting to fix tie price when competition is removed, are made unlawful (G. S., 75-5 (3)), these provisions do not prevent one whose business as a corh-mcn carrier has been injured and threatened by any of the acts thus denounced from pursuing a remedy by civil action for damages and seeking the interposition of equity, if necessary to restrain wrongful acts which threaten irreparable loss. Said Justice Brown in Town of Roper v. Leary, 171 N. C., 35, 87 S. E., 945, “Both remedies may be available.” See also Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 171 A. L. R., 913. 3. Can the plaintiff have adequate and complete remedy from the North Carolina Utilities Commission? Under /the statutes the North Carolina Utilities Commission is vested with power and authority to supervise and regulate motor vehicle carriers (Gr. S., .62-109), and to grant franchise certificates, and to make and enforce regulations and restrictions as to fares, schedules, speed, and the ordinary transactions between carriers as to territory. Utilities Com. v. Trucking Co., 223 N. C., 687, 28 S. E. (2d), 201; Utilities Com. v. Coach Co., 224 N. C., 390, 30 S. E. (2d), 328. It is also made the duty of the Commission to investigate any complaint that any licensed operator is engaged in violating provisions of the act or any rule or regulation prescribed by the Commission or the laws of the State with respect to rights, duties and privileges of carriers. G. S., 62-110. And if a franchise carrier is engaged in practices violative of the terms of the franchise or the rules and regulations the Commission may order suspension of such practices. G. S., 62-110. And the franchise certificate may be canceled “for failure to observe and comply with schedules and tariffs approved by the Commission.” G. S., 62-111 (7). The present action, in so far as its purpose is to recover damages for injuries sustained and to restrain continuation of the wrongful acts alleged in respect to the making and circulating of false statements as to plaintiff’s business, undoubtedly presents matters beyond the power or jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission to afford adequate remedy. However, in view of the comprehensive nature of the statutes creating and empowering the Utilities Commission, particularly in respect to the schedules and operation of motor buses on the highways and the fares charged for transportation of passengers, it would seem the plaintiff has ample remedy for its protection in those respects by complaint to the agency which the State has created for that purpose. *774 It would seem therefore that the matters complained of relating to operating schedules and fares charged by the defendant for transportation on its buses are peculiarly within the power of the Utilities Commission to remedy, upon complaint made, and are not properly subjects which would call for the interposition of a court of equity, or invoke it) equitable jurisdiction. Coach Co. v. Transit Co., 227 N. C., 391, 42 S. E. (2d), 398; Motor Service Co. v. R. R., 210 N. C., 36, 185 S. E., 479. Hence the order issued below should be modified by removing fwm the restraint thereby enjoined matters relating to schedules and fares on the highways over which the defendants hold franchise certificates. As thus modified the order appealed from is affirmed. Modified and affirmed. Ervik, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.