Commissioners of Dare County v. Commissioners of Currituck County

MekrimoN, J. (after stating the facts). It cannot be questioned seriously, that the Legislature has power to create new counties, composed of territory and the people inhabiting it, taken from one or more existing counties, aud to change the boundaries of counties. It likewise has power, in the formation of new counties, to require that the people who live in the portion of territory so taken from a county, shall continue to pay their proportionate part of the county debt of the county from which they shall be so separated, existing at the time of the separation ; and it may likewise relieve them from such debt. Indeed, they would be relieved if there were no provision to the contrary. It may also provide that the new county shall have such parts of the property of the county or counties from which its territory is taken, as it shall deem wise and expedient, or it may entirely omit to allow it any part thereof. The power thus possessed by the Legislature is a necessary one. It is legislative in its nature, in the absence of any constitutional provision to the contrary, and the exercise of it gives character to counties when established. These are not created for the particular, special, or exclusive benefit of the people having property in them. They are of, and constitute parts of the State government. They are created for political and civil purposes of the State, and may be created without special regard to the will, wish, or convenience of the people who inhabit them. They are instrumentalities of the State government, and subject to its legislative control; they possess such corporate powers and delegated authority as the Legislature may deem fit to confer upon them, aud such power and authority must be exercised in the way, and only for the purpose prescribed by legislative enact *192 ment; and moreover, they are always subject to legislative control, and their powers rhay be abolished, enlarged, abridged, or modified. The property of a county of whatsoever nature, is required for its purposes as a county, that is, for the purposes of government in the particular locality or territory embraced by it, and in aid, and as part of the State government and subject to the legislative control. The people inhabiting it have no-right- to, or personal interest in its property, as corporators, that they can use and control for their private benefit or advantage, independent of legislative authority ; nor have a portion of' the people, residing in a particular part of its territory, separated from it and made part of a new county, a right to or interest in its property, as a body of people. Its property does not belong to the people, as such, individually or collectively; it belongs to the county as an organization — an instrumentality of government, possessed of prescribed corporate powers, and subject to the legislative control. The State, in the exercise of its function, through the county, acquired the property by means of' its revenues, taken from the people by taxation and otherwise,, and the exercise of other lawful powers of government, and thus the property is of, and belongs to the government. The-people have only an interest in it, as citizens of the State. Hence,, the Legislature may make such disposition of it, under the constitution, for the purposes of government, as it may deem just and expedient. Of course, we mean that this, like all other-legislative powers, is always subject to such limitations as may be imposed by the constitution. Nor do we mean to say that the Legislature can in any way interfere with the vested rights of individuals. The constitution is paramount, and all authority must have its sanction. Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired., 558;. Watson v. Com’rs, 82 N. C., 17; White v. Com’rs, 90 N. C., 437; McCormack v. Com’rs, Id., 441; Com’rs of Currituck Co. v. Com’rs of Dare Co., 79 N. C., 565; Laramie Co. v. Albany Co., 92 U. S., 307; Mount Pleasant v. Beehwith, 100 U. S., 514. *193 The Legislature could, therefore, by enactment, detach a part of the county of Currituck, and attach it to, and make it part of, the county of Dare, as it did by statute (Acts 1869-70, ch. 36). By section four of this statute, it is, among other things, provided, that the part thus detached, and the people inhabiting the same, shall “ not be released from their proportions of the outstanding county debt, contracted for public improvements (of Currituck county), before the passage of this Act, to be determined by the Commissioners of Currituck and Dare counties.” This provision has been upheld by this Court as valid; Currituck County v. Dare County, supra. But there is no provision in that, or any statute amendatory of it, that in terms, or by the remotest implication, grants to the people so detached, or to the county of Dare for them, or on their or any account, any part of the property of Currituck county, and particularly any part of the stock of that county in the Albe-marle and Chesapeake Canal Company mentioned, or the proceeds of the sale thereof. The plaintiffs have no right whatever to the money sued for and demanded by this action, and the Court properly sustained the demurrer. The judgment must be affirmed. No error. ■ Affirmed.