Brown v. Stewart.

*361 CoNNOR, J. We do not entertain any doubt of the correctness of the conclusion reached and the judgment rendered by his Honor. The Board of Oommissioners of the town of Washington were empowered by chapter 48, Acts (Private) 1903, to issue the bonds for the purpose of paying a valid, outstanding and past-due indebtedness of said town as therein stated. This act is full and complete in its provisions. Having been enacted in strict conformity to the constitutional requirement, as uniformly construed by this Court, there can be no possible doubt of its validity. We are unable to perceive how by any rule of construction the provisions of section 85 of chapter 170 can be said to “pledge the faith” of the town, or “impose any tax.” It will be observed that by chapter 48, section 2, the bonds were to mature May 1, 1933. This date is changed to 1988. Two thousand dollars of the bonds were to be paid in 1918, the date is changed to 1923. The first annual tax to pay the first installment is directed to be levied in 1917, the date is changed to 1922. The effect of the amendment is to postpone the date of maturity five years, and the other dates are so changed that the harmony of the original scheme is preserved. Hpon the principle announced in Glenn v. Wray, 126 N. C., 730, we can see no reason why the bill as amended Was not passed in the Senate in conformity with the Constitution and the well-lrnown rules of procedure in both Houses of the General Assembly of this State. We can see no reason why the amendment, imposing no tax, creating no debt nor increasing the amount of the bonds or the rate of interest thereon, could not be adopted by the Senate and incorporated into the original bill on, and before, its second reading. Certainly this ruling in no manner conflicts with what is said in Glenn v. Wray, supra. His Honor was of the opinion that the effect of section 85 of chapter 170- was to amend chapter 48. Much could be said in support of the view that chapter 48 as *362 amended was incorporated into and made a part of chapter 110. It is not very material which view we take, as the result will be the same. The judgment of his Honor is affirmed. To prevent any possible misconception, we think it proper to say that we have decided this case upon “an agreed state of facts” in a controversy without action. We do not pass upon the admissibility of the Journals, or other evidence, for the purpose of invalidating or affecting the integrity of the certificates of the presiding officers that said act was “In the General Assembly read three times.” It does not appear that there was any objection made to the evidence in Glenn v. Wray, supra. The Court has held in Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N. C., 214, and several recent cases that the Journal is competent evidence to show whether the provisions of section 14, Article II, of the Constitution have been complied with. The writer of this opinion thinks it is not improper to say, speaking for himself, that, unless compelled by overwhelming and controlling authority, he would hold that the principle announced in Broadnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244, is to be rigidly adhered to, save in the clearly defined exception made in Bank v. Commissioners, supra. The judgment of his Honor is Affirmed.