McNair v. . Yarboro

Hoice, J. The statute establishing a proper form for verification of pleadings (C. S., sec. 529) requires a statement by affidavit in substance and effect that “the facts set forth in the designated pleading are true, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters he believes them to be true.” And it has been held in various decisions construing the section that the attempted verification in the present instance is not a sufficient compliance. Carrol v. McMillan, 133 N. C., 140; Cowles v. Hardin et al., 79 N. C., 577. This being true, our legislation is to the effect, further (C. S., sec. 595, subsec. 1), that in order to judgment by default final in a moneyed demand, properly stated, the pleading should be verified as the statute requires, and our cases on the subject hold that a judgment by .default final in that kind of suit, on an unverified complaint, is irregular and will be set aside on motion made in apt time and on a proper show of merits. Miller v. Curl, 162 N. C., 1; Cowan v. Cunningham, 146 N. C., 453; Becton v. Dunn, 137 N. C., 562. It is earnestly insisted for appellant that, under subsequent legislation amending the Consolidated Statutes, more especially chapter 92, Extra Session 1921, a verified complaint is no longer required for a judgment by default final, where a copy of complaint, properly setting forth the cause of action, is served on the defendant with the summons, but we do not so interpret the amendments referred to. On the contrary, the statute relied upon (section 1, subsection 9) provides in terms that if no answer is filed, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment by default final, or default and inquiry, as authorized by sections 595, 596, and 597 of the Consolidated Statutes, thus expressly affirming the requirement of section 595, subsection 1, to the effect, as.stated, that on a moneyed demand a verified complaint is required to a proper judgment by default final. Appellant cites and relies chiefly upon subsections 11 and 12 as *113 modifying subsection 9 in tbe respect suggested, but we do not so construe tbe law. In our opinion, a proper perusal of subsection 11 refers to tbe time wben judgments shall be entered before tbe clerk, wbere a copy of tbe complaint bas been served on defendants or any of them. And subsection 12 contains an enumeration of tbe eases wherein tbe clerk is authorized to enter judgment, but neither 11 nor 12 contains any modification of tbe provision of section 595 of Consolidated Statutes, expressly affirmed in subsection 1, and wherein it is provided that a verified complaint is required — in suits on a moneyed demand. It may be noted that, under section 595, subsection 4, in actions to recover real property, a verified complaint is not always required. Patrick v. Dunn, 162 N. C., 19. And we consider it well to state further that, while this chapter 92, in section 3, provides that “wbere copy of tbe complaint bas been served upon each of tbe defendants, tbe clerk shall not extend tbe time for filing answer beyond twenty days after such service.” This restriction applies to tbe clerk, and does not and is not intended to impair tbe broad powers conferred on tbe judge in this respect by section 536 of Consolidated Statutes, to tbe effect that wbere tbe cause is properly «before him, “be may, in bis discretion and upon such terms as may be just, allow an answer or reply to be made or other act done after the tim’e or by an order to enlarge tbe time.” Tbe judgment of bis Honor, therefore, is affirmed in its entirety, that tbe judgment by default final be set aside and defendant allowed a reasonable time to answer. Affirmed.