Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co.

Seawell, J. ¥e consider it necessary to consider only the defendants’ contentions that plaintiff’s injury was not caused by accident within the meaning of section 2.f of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, eh. 120, Public Laws of 1929. Upon the evidence there can be no contention that whatever it was did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. There is no definition of the term “by accident,” or of the word “accident” in the act. In the section and subsection cited, injury is defined as meaning only “injury by accident, arising out of and in the course of employment.” Priefly stated, the contention of the defendants is that the term “by accident” necessarily means by an accident taking place entirely outside the body of the person injured, as the result of which, and through the application of external force, the injury is produced. Therefore, they contend that no fortuitous, unusual or unexpected happening within the body, such as a sudden rupture under the strain of lifting while the employee is doing the work in the usual way, is to be considered in determining whether the injury is by accident. They think they are aided in this view by the phraseology employed in the statute — “injury by accident” — instead of “accidental injury,” as used in some similar statutes. In this connection, they point out that the plaintiff was lifting a box, as he must have done many times before in the same service; that he admitted “my foot did not slip and I do not know of anything of that kind that happened. I just lifted the box up like I usually did every day when I delivered the milk.” This, they contend, excludes the theory of external causation. In Moore v. Sales Co., 214 N. C., 424, 199 S. E., 605 — also a hernia case — the same question was raised, but was not decided, because the Court thought that the essentials of external accident were present under the facts of the case. And this ease might be disposed of in a similar way if the Court thought it could, with any further propriety, evade an issue which is squarely laid before us, and is likely to arise again and again, especially in hernia cases. In that event, decision would depend on the following phase of the evidence: The plaintiff testified that he *472 leaned over the big box, which “hit” him, or shall we say, in terms of measurement and correlation, came to within an inch of the point of his abdominal injury. There is a reasonable inference that he was in contact with this box at the time of the lifting in a constrained position, and that this aided the rupture or traumatic enlargement of the inguinal rings, under the tension already brought about by the efforts to lift the box. It is contended by the defendants that this Court has adopted the view taken by them in Slade v. Hosiery Mills, 209 N. C., 823, 184 S. E., 844, and Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C., 365, 193 S. E., 664. But on a fair interpretation of these cases the Court did not go that far. In the cited cases there was an absence of unusualness or unexpectedness in both the external facts and the internal conditions with which the opinions deal. A sudden rupture producing hernia is not a natural and probable consequence of the work the plaintiff was doing, but only an accidental result. This Court has never attempted definitely to align itself with the minority view that a sudden disruption or breaking of the bones or tissues of the body under the strain of strenuous labor, such as lifting, wholly unusual and unexpected, may not be considered as an element of accident leading to compensable injury. An accident, although tangible things are involved, is largely intangible. If the influences, often complex and minute, which brings it about were capable of exact analysis, it would lose its character as accident. As judicially defined, unusualness and unexpectedness are its essence. It is defined in Love v. Lumberton, 215 N. C., 28, 1 S. E. (2d), 121, as “an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured employee.” This is near the definitions given in the dictionaries. Century Dictionary has it: “A casual or undesigned occurrence; a fortuitous event.” "Webster: “An unexpected or unforeseen event, generally unfortunate.” There is no sound reason to believe that the Legislature intended to put upon it other refinements. If the plaintiff had burst a blood vessel or broken a leg or pulled a tendon under the strain, there would be little argument. The injury he suffered is no different in principle. We do not, of course, hold that hernia, or any other condition not classed in the act as an occupational disease, is compensable unless caused by accident. Hernia is not so classed, and yet we know that the vast majority of hernias are produced by the strain of lifting. To adopt the theory presented by the defendants would relieve industry from liability for most of the hernia injuries it causes. This we do not believe to be within the contemplation of the statute, liberally construed. West v. Fertilizer Co., 201 N. C., 556, 160 S. E., 765; Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C., 38, 154 S. E., 66; Stacy Brothers Gas Construction Com *473 pany v. Massey, 92 Ind. App., 348, 175 N. E., 664; Empire Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Purcell, 76 Ind. App., 551, 132 N. E., 664; Ind. Com. v. Sodec, 55 Ohio App., 177, 177 S. E., 292, 293. These cases are pertinent with respect to the interpretation we shall put on the covering clause of the act. The Court certainly does not intend to say that compensation may be awarded for an injury which is not the result of fortuitous circumstances or for an injury which is but the natural and probable result of the employment. We only go so far as to hold that in considering the constituent elements of “accident” it is competent to take into consideration the sudden and unexpected rupture of the parts supporting the viscera, as happened to the plaintiff, under the strain of lifting, as a part of the fortuitous circumstances making up the accident. It was not, as in Slade v. Hosiery Mills, supra, and Neely v. Statesville, supra, a natural and probable result of the work being done, and the facts of the case justified the finding on the part of the Commission, as affirmed by the court, that plaintiff sustained his injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. There is sufficient evidence of injury by accident to sustain the award of the Industrial Commission, and the judgment is Affirmed.