Byrd D. Johnson

OlaRksoN, J. Tbe only exception and assignment of error made by defendant was that “His Honor erred in rendering and signing judgment in this cause.” Tbe question involved: Was chapter 352 of tbe Public Laws of tbe General Assembly of North Carolina, ratified 15 March, 1941, available to plaintiff under tbe facts in this case? We think so. Chapter 120, Public Laws 1929 (Workmen’s Compensation Law), was amended as follows: Chapter 352, Public Laws 19-11— “Section 1. That Chapter one hundred and twenty of tbe Public Laws of one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, as amended, be further amended by adding after Section sixty-eight tbe following new Section, to be known as sixty-eight (a) : “'Sec. 68 (a). That as to every employer subject to tbe provisions of this Act who shall fail or neglect to keep in effect a policy of insurance against compensation liability arising hereunder with some insurance carrier, as provided in Section sixty-seven of this Act, or who shall fail to qualify as a self-insurer as provided in tbe Act, in addition to other penalties provided by this Act, such employer shall be liable in a civil action which may be instituted by tbe claimant for all such compensation as may be awarded by tbe Industrial Commission in a proceeding properly instituted before said Commission, and such action may be brought by tbe claimant in tbe county of bis residence or in any county in which tbe defendant has any property in this State; and in said civil action, ancillary remedies provided by law in civil actions of attachment, receivership, and other appropriate ancillary remedies shall be available to tbe plaintiff therein. Said action may be instituted *187 before tbe award shall be made by tbe Industrial Commission in sucb case for tbe purpose of preventing tbe defendant from disposing of or removing from tbe State of North Carolina for tbe purpose of defeating tbe payment of compensation any property wbicb tbe defendant may own in tbis State. In said action, after being instituted, tbe court may, after proper amendment to tbe pleadings therein, permit tbe recovery of a judgment against tbe defendant for tbe amount of compensation duly awarded by tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission, and subject any property seized in said action for payment of tbe judgment so awarded. Tbe institution of said action shall in no wise interfere with tbe jurisdiction of said Industrial Commission in bearing and determining tbe claim for compensation in full accord with tbe provisions of tbis Act. That nothing in tbis Act shall be construed to limit or abridge tbe rights of an employee as provided in Section 68 (b).’ “Sec. 2. That all laws and clauses of laws in conflict with tbe provisions of tbis Act are hereby repealed. “Sec. 3. That tbis Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its ratification.” On 24 March, 1941, judgment was rendered by tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission (Hearing Commissioner) in favor of Mrs. Etta Dayton Byrd, widow, and Irene Byrd, daughter of Mac 0. Byrd, in tbe sum of $4,770.50, hospital and medical bills, etc. Tbe warrant of attachment against defendant’s property was issued after tbe passage of tbe above Act on 19 April, 1941. Tbe Act does not disturb a vested right, impair a binding contract, or create a new obligation. If it did it would be void under tbe authorities in tbis State. Hicks v. Kearney, 189 N. C., 316; Bank v. Derby, 218 N. C., 653. "We think tbe Act effects only tbe remedy and so must be construed prospectively and retrospectively. As to retroactive laws, tbis Court (Ashe, J.), in Tabor v. Ward, 83 N. C., 291 (294-5), said: “It is well settled by a long current of judicial decisions, State and Federal, that tbe Legislature of a state may at any time modify tbe remedy, even take away a common law remedy altogether, without substituting any in its place, if another efficient remedy remains, without impairing tbe obligation of tbe contract. And whatever belongs to tbe remedy may be altered, provided tbe alteration does not impair tbe obligation of tbe contract. Cooley Const. Lim., 350. Laws wbicb change tbe rules of evidence relate to tbe remedy only. They are at all times subject to modification and control by tbe Legislature and changes thus made may be made applicable to existing causes of action.” In Gillespie v. Allison, 115 N. C., 542 (548), we find: “No vested right of property has been disturbed, and, in our view, tbis is a remedial statute enlarging rights instead of impairing them. ‘Statutes are reme *188 dial and retrospective, in tbe absence of directions to the contrary, when they create new remedies for existing rights, remove penalties or forfeitures, extenuate or mitigate offenses, supply evidence, make that evidence which was not so before, abolish imprisonment for debt, enlarge exemption laws, enlarge the rights of persons under disability, and the like, unless in doing this we violate some contract obligation or divest some vested right.’ Larkins v. Saffarans, 15 Fed. Rep., 147. These principles as to vested rights and retrospective laws are carefully discussed in the great and leading case of Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386. See, also, many cases collected in Myers on Vested Rights, ch. 1; Hinton v. Hinton, Phillips, 410; Tabor v. Ward, 83 N. C., 294.” Martin v. Van Landingham, 189 N. C., 656 (658); Bateman v. Sterrelt, 201 N. C., 59 (61-2); Woodmen of the World v. Comrs. of Lenoir, 208 N. C., 433. In 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, at page 830, section 383, it is written: “Statutes directed to the enforcement of contracts, or merely providing an additional remedy, or enlarging or making more efficient an existing remedy, for their enforcement, do not impair the obligation of the contracts. In like manner, an act providing a remedy for the enforcement of an agreement which was theretofore unenforceable is valid.” For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below is Affirmed.