Barbour v. County of Wake

Clarkson, J. Tbe plaintiff assigned error as follows: “1. For that tbe court erred in not bolding tbat tbe issuance of tbe $200,000 of bonds is unlawful and should be enjoined.” We cannot so bold. Constitution of N. C., Art. YII, sec. 7, is as follows: “No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.” It has been held in this jurisdiction that the construction and repair of bridges and roads are necessary expenses. To contract a debt for such purposes, a vote of the majority of the qualified voters of a county is not a prerequisite. Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C., 420; Crocker v. Moore, 140 N. C., 432; Hendersonville v. Jordan, 150 N. C., 35; Commissioners of Yancey v. Road Commissioners, 165 N. C., 632; Moose v. Commissioners of Alexander, 172 N. C., 419; Woodall v. Highway Commission, 176 N. C., 377; Parvin v. Commissioners of Beaufort, 177 N. C., 508; Guire v. Commissioners of Caldwell, 177 N. C., 516; Davis v. Lenoir, 178 N. C., 668. Constitution of N. C., Art. Y, see. 6 (N. C. Code, 1927, anno.) is as follows: “Tbe total of the State and county tax on property shall not exceed fifteen cents on the one hundred dollars value of property, except when the county property tax is levied for a- special purpose and -with the special approval of the General Assembly, which may be done by special or general act: Provided, this limitation shall not apply to taxes levied for the maintenance of the public schools of the State for the term required by article nine, section three, of the Constitution: Provided further, the State tax shall not exceed five cents on the one hundred dollars value of property.” In R. R. v. Reid, 187 N. C., at p. 324, it is said: “While the construction and maintenance of the county home and the building and repairing of bridges may be considered a part of the ordinary expenses of the county, to be defrayed out of the general county revenue when sufficient for these purposes, still a tax levied under a special or general act for the specific and exclusive purpose of constructing, maintaining or repairing courthouses, jails, county homes, highways, or bridges is deemed to be levied for a special purpose, . . . Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244; Jones v. Commissioners, 107 N. C., 248; Williams v. Commissioners, 119 N. C., 520; Herring v. Dixon, supra; R. R. v. Commissioners, 148 N. C., 220, 240; Jackson v. Commissioners, 171 N. C., 379, 382; Moose v. Commissioners, 172 N. C., 419, 428; Parvin v. Com *318 missioners, 177 N. C., 508; R. R. v. McArtan, 185 N. C., 201.” Commissioners v. Assell, 194 N. C., 412; Owens v. Wake County, 195 N. C., 132; Commissioners v. Assell, 195 N. C., 719; R. R. v. Cherokee County, 195 N. C., 756; Mayo v. Commissioners of Beaufort, 196 N. C., 15. Plaintiff assigns as error: “2. For that the court erred in not bolding that the issuance of the $28,000 of refunding bonds will be unlawful and should be enjoined.” We cannot so hold. On 1 January, 1929, there became due $28,000 of bonds of Wake County, $8,000 issued 1 January, 1899, and $20,000 issued 1 January, 1909. No provision had been made for the payment of these valid and outstanding bonds of the county. It was important that the credit of the county be maintained. The board of commissioners of Wake County, by resolution, borrowed from the general county fund the $28,000 and took up said bonds, and the resolution in regard to the transaction was to the effect “that the said bonds.be held by the treasurer of said county as security for said loan, to be later retired by refunding bonds.” To meet an emergency like the one in question, we can find nothing to criticize. Constitution of N. C., Art. VII, see. 2, is as follows: “It shall be the duty of the commissioners to exercise a general supervision and control of the penal and charitable institutions, schools, roads, bridges, levying of taxes, and finances of the county, as may be prescribed by law. The register of deeds shall be, ex officio, clerk of the board of commissioners.” We know of no statute, and none was called to our attention, prohibiting the doing of what was done in the present case. It was a temporary loan to meet a pressing emergency to save the county’s credit. It was afterwards approved by Legislative enactment. In reference to the indebtedness, the preamble of the act of the General Assembly of 1929 is as follows: “All such outstanding indebtedness incurred by said county for said purposes is hereby legalized, validated and declared to be for a special purpose.” As was said in Board of Education v. Commissioners, 183 N. C., at p. 302: “Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule is that the Legislature may validate restrospectively any proceeding it might have authorized in advance.” Construction Co. v. Brockenbrough, 187 N. C., at p. 77; Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N. C., at p. 683; Holton v. Mocksville, 189 N. C., 144; Commissioners v. Assell, 194 N. C., at p. 418. The judgment of the court below is Affirmed.