Town of Wllkesboro v. Jordan

DeviN, J. An examination of the allegations of the complaint leads us to the conclusion that the demurrer on the ground of misjoinder of parties, and causes of action should have been sustained. The complaint joins (1) an action on contract by the plaintiffs Harris, Lenderman, and Blevins for the recovery from defendants Jordan, Henderson, Doughton, and Love, as principals, and Bumgarner and Prevette sureties, the different items of salary due the named plaintiffs, according to the condition of the bond attached to the complaint; (2) with an action by plaintiff Eussell Hendren, superintendent of water, to recover of defendants, other than Bumgarner and Prevette, $39.00, being part of his salary wrongfully withheld by defendant (not included in the bond) ; and (3) an action, sounding in tort, by the town against the defendants other than defendants Bumgarner and Prevette, for six thousand dollars of town funds alleged to have been wrongfully collected and unlawfully and fraudulently expended by the defendants. It is obvious that the individual plaintiffs, as such, under the allegations of the complaint, could not maintain an action to recover town funds wrongfully collected and fraudulently misapplied. Ordinarily, the town alone could be heard to make that claim. Equally, the town of Wilkesboro has no interest in the cause of action by the individual plaintiffs to recover of the defendants on the bond the different amounts alleged to be due them; and the defendants Bumgarner and Prevette, *200 tbe sureties on tbe bond, are not alleged to be in any way liable on tbe cause of action by tbe town against tbe other defendants for alleged fraudulent collection and disbursement of tbe funds of tbe town; nor are tbey alleged to be liable to plaintiff Hendren on bis claim. Illustrating tbe mix-up in parties and causes of action, it appears tbat tbe town of Wilkesboro, party plaintiff in tbis action, was one of tbe signers of tbe bond upon wbicb tbe action of its coplaintiffs is based, tbus being placed in tbe unusual position of being joined as a party plaintiff in a suit for tbe breach of a bond wbicb it executed. » Tbe several causes of action united in tbe complaint do not affect all tbe parties to tbe action, as required by C. S., 507. . Sasser v. Bullard, 199 N. C., 562. It is well settled in tbis jurisdiction tbat separate and distinct causes of action set up by different plaintiffs and against different defendants may not be incorporated in tbe same pleading. Williams v. Gooch, 206 N. C., 330; Weaver v. Kirby, 186 N. C., 387; Rose v. Warehouse Co., 182 N. C., 107; Roberts v. Mfg. Co., 181 N. C., 204. In Rose v. Warehouse Co., supra, it was said: “Tbe several causes of action wbicb may be united or joined in the same complaint are classified and enumerated in C. S., 507; and, in addition, tbe following limitation is expressly incorporated therein: ‘But tbe causes of action so united must all belong to one of these classes, and, except in actions for tbe foreclosure of mortgages, must affect all tbe parties to tbe action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated.’ ” It was said in Land Co. v. Beatty, 69 N. C., 329, tbat tbe plaintiff could not in tbe same complaint join a cause of action on contract against one defendant with a cause of action on tbe fraud of both. To the same effect is tbe bolding in R. R. v. Hardware Co., 135 N. C., 73, where tbe general principle is stated that all tbe parties must be affected by each cause of action to warrant their joinder. Tbe situation here set forth in tbe complaint differs from tbat upon wbicb was predicated tbe rule that, where tbe facts alleged show a connected series of transactions, all tending to one end, in order to a conclusion of tbe whole matter in one suit, tbe complaint would be upheld, as was decided in Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N. C., 717; Shaffer v. Bank, 201 N. C., 415; Young v. Young, 81 N. C., 92; Barkley v. Really Co., 211 N. C., 540; Leach v. Page, 211 N. C., 622. We are of opinion, and so decide, tbat tbe judgment overruling the demurrer must be reversed, and tbe action dismissed. Bank v. Angelo, 193 N. C., 576; Shuford v. Yarborough, 197 N. C., 150. Tbis disposition of tbe case renders it unnecessary to decide whether tbe complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against tbe defendants for alleged fraudulent disbursement of town funds. Judgment reversed and action dismissed.