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Asheville Street Railway Company v. City of Asheville.
*690 Mebjrimon, C. J. after stating the facts: The trespass complained of in this action is not an ordinary civil trespass, as to which the plaintiff may be compensated in damages. . The defendant, a municipal corporation, possessed of large and important powers, undertook, as is alleged, arbitrarily to declare its contract with the defendant at an end, and assert its assumed authority by force. This it could not lawfully do.
If the defendant was constructing or proceeding to construct its branch railway without authority, or in violation of its contract with the defendant, or in such way as to seriously interfere with or imperil the rights of the public, the defendant had its appropriate remedy, civil or criminal, or both, through the Courts. Its officers and agents misapprehended the nature and extent of its powers when it thus undertook to settle and determine its rights and those of the plaintiff and assert its authority.
There is nothing in its charter or in legal contemplation that warrants such exercise of power. It can pass ordinances and make appropriate regulations and enforce them, establish a police force and employ the same for all lawful purposes, and do a multitude of important acts for the protection, convenience, comfort and safety of the people and their property, but it cannot, at its will and pleasure, rid itself of contract obligations and engagements, whether the same concern individuals or other corporations.
It is subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in appropriate cases, and it must seek its remedy in like appropriate cases through the Clour's. It can exercise authority only in the respects and in the way prescribed by law. The interference complained of did not simply affect the plaintiff; it affected in an important sense the public. The rights of the plaintiff were important, and concerned the public as well as itself.
It appears that a principal purpose of the branch road which it was constructing when interfered with, was to reach important tobacco warehouses and facilitate the transportation of *691 tobacco to and from them, and to extend and enlarge business in that connection and locality. Such enterprise must not be interfered with or retarded for light or trivial causes.
The law encourages and will protect just public enterprise, and will interfere to impede or arrest it but in cases where good and substantial cause is shown. There is much of the evidence more or less in conflict. An examination of it satisfies us that the merits of the litigation are not free from doubt in important respects.
It may be that the plaintiff has not constructed its branch road strictly as it had the right and was bound to do, and that to some extent it interferes with the street across or over which it has been or may be built. We think, however, that it cannot do any serious harm to allow it to be constructed, and if it shall turn out that the plaintiff’s right is not well founded, it may be required to change or remove its road as right and justice may require.
This Court is not inclined to interfere with appropriate injunctions granted pending the action, especially when they encourage enterprise and facilitate the public convenience. It will interfere only in clear cases, and when it is probable that serious harm may result from the injunction. Moreover, it will not ordinarily pass upon the general merits of the action until the cause of action has been litigated upon its merits. Navigation Co. v. Emry, 108 N. C., 130, and the cases there cited. ■Affirmed.