Jenkins v. . Floyd

Clarkson, J. Tbe sole question presented in tbis action: Tbe owner of land placed in buildings on bis land (1) a cotton gin, used for tbe purpose of ginning cotton for bimself and tbe public; (2) a corn mill, used for tbe purpose of grinding corn for bimself and tbe public, botb run by tbe same boiler. Are tbey fixtures, and do tbey become part of tbe realty? We tbink so as between vendor and vendee. It was in evidence that tbe gin and corn mill were in separate buildings, but run by tbe same boiler. Tbe machinery was installed by J. J. Baird for tbe purpose not only of ginning bis own cotton and grinding bis own corn, but operated for tbe purpose also of ginning and grinding corn for other people. Tbe gin and corn mill were installed prior to tbe deed of 10 April, 1917, from J. J. Baird to bis wife, Mary E. Baird. Tbe positive evidence was to tbis effect, although there was some negative uncertain evidence that tbe corn mill was installed a little later than tbe date of tbe deed, but its probative force was not sufficient to be submitted to tbe jury. It will be noted tbe question of fixtures arises between vendor and vendee. In Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y., 287 (100 Am. Dec., p. 485), a portable grist mill was held to be a fixture and at execution sale went as part of tbe realty to tbe purchaser. Daniels, J., at p. 297, said: “For it was annexed to tbe building erected upon tbe land, to be applied and appropriated to tbe business there to be carried on, with tbe design that it should be a permanent structure for use as a custom grist mill for the neighborhood existing about it.” In McKenna v. Hammond, 3 Hill Law, 331 (S. C.), (30 Am. Dec., 366), Evans, J., said: “Tbe principle upon which that ease was decided, is, that whatsoever is erected upon land as a means of enjoying it, is a fixture; but whatever is intended for tbe purpose of carrying on a trade which has no necessary connection with tbe use of tbe land, is a mere chattel, and belongs to tbe administrator. And it was on tbe authority of tbe reasons of tbis case, that it was held in Fairis v. Walker, 1 Bail., 540, that a cotton gin was a fixture, and passed with tbe freehold.” DeGraffenreid v. Scruggs, 4 Humphreys, 451 (Tenn.). In Richardson v. Borden, 42 Miss., at p. 77, we find tbe following: “It seems to us, therefore, that it is clear from tbe authorities, here cited, as well as upon reason, that tbe gin-stand in tbis case, standing *473 as gin-stands usually stand for use, being the only one on the place, and no reservation having been made at the time of sale or delivery of possession of the premises, was a fixture and passed with the title to the realty.” In Latham v. Blakely, 70 N. C., at p. 371-2, Settle, J., speaking to the subject, said: “In answer to the suggestion that the gin was not sufficiently attached to the house to make it a part thereof, we observe that the later and better authorities pay more regard to the purposes which are to be served by the thing attached than to the manner of making the actual attachment. In South Carolina it is held that a cotton gin in its place, i. e., connected with the running works in the gin house, is a fixture which passes to the purchaser of the house. Bratton v. Clawson, 2 Strobhart, 478. And this Court has held that planks laid down as an upper floor of a gin house, and used to spread cotton seed upon, though not nailed or otherwise fastened down than by their own weight, become a part of the gin house by being put in it for the purpose of being used with it, and the Court says, ‘In that view it makes no difference whether they were nailed to the sleepers or not.’ Lawrence v. Bryan, 5 Jones, 337 (50 N. C., 337).” Bond v. Coke, 71 N. C., 97; Deal v. Palmer, 72 N. C., 582; Foote v. Goach, 96 N. C., 265; Horne v. Smith, 105 N. C., 322. The case of Overman v. Sasser, 107 N. C., p. 432, is distinguishable from the present case. In that case the tenant by the curtesy put the cotton gin on the land. Clark, J., distinguishes it from the cases above cited relative to vendor and vendee, says that the case comes under second class mentioned by Lord ETlenborcmgh as follows: “Between executor of tenant for life, or in tail, and the remainderman, in which case the right of fixtures is considered more favorable for the executor.” Basnight v. Small, 163 N. C., 15; Pritchard v. Steamboat Co., 169 N. C., 457. See Finance Co. v. Weaver, ante, 178. In that case it is held that where personal property is sold under conditional sale contract, which is duly registered, does not become realty as against the conditional sale. On the record there is No error.