Shields v. Union Central Life Insurance

Avery, J. : The grant of letters testamentary to H. B. Shields on the estate of Braxton Shields, upon proof that he owned property then in this State, no matter when or how such chattels were brought within his jurisdiction, was valid, although it appeared that the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of. the State of Alabama, and left assets there also. Hyman v. Gaskins, 5 Ired., 267, Code, Sec. 1374 (3). Being in under a valid appoint *385 ment, and having in his hands the policy sued on, the law did not allow the debtor to contest his right to collect on behalf of the administrator in Alabama. Whether Brislin, as the administrator appointed in the jurisdiction where his domicile was at the time of death, could in a pioper proceeding recover the policy, as an evidence of debt due the estate or the proceeds when collected, is a question that does not arise. The acts of an administrator who is not entitled to the appointment are not invalid. lie is clothed with all the power of a properly constituted personal representative, and, though one who has the better right may insist upon his removal, he cannot impeach his acts while in office. In so far as he who has been ousted has administered the estate his acts, like those of a defacto officer, are as valid and binding as if he had been the incumbent de jure. Garrison v. Cox, 95 N. C., 353 ; Springer v. Shavender, 116 N. C., 12; Lyle v. Siler, 103 N. C., 261; London v. Railroad, 88 N. C., 584. Plaving been appointed by a court having jurisdiction, and being bound to administer all assets that come into his hands or the hands of any other person for him, the plaintiff, with the policy in his possession, has the right to demand payment and the authority to have his demand, if resisted, enforced through the courts. Indeed, the law devolved upon him the duty of collecting it. Williams v. Williams, 79 N. C., 417. The payment of the money in satisfaction of a judgment in this action could not be hereafter drawn in question by Brislin, as administrator of the jurisdiction where he resided, leaving out of view all of the agreements between the heirs-at-law and distributees and the two administrators. London v. Railroad, supra. Whether Brislin in his representative capacity could *386 recover, or whether the Alabama creditors could recover, against the plaintiff, is a question which in no way affects the rights of the defendant. It is needless, for the reasons given, to discuss or pass upon the effect of Brislin’s execution of the agreement operating as an assignment. It is sufficient for the maintenance of this suit that the plaintiff is lawful administrator, and has in his hands an unpaid chose in action which the defendant owes to the decedent’s estate. The judge who tried the case below seems to have rendered judgment for the defendant upon a demurrer ore tenus to the jurisdiction on the ground that an action could only be brought against the defendant company, under the provisions of its charter, in the State of Ohio. It is familiar learning that a corporation is permitted to do business outside of the State where it is created, as a matter of comity, but always with the proviso that it is subject to the laws of the forum and has no greater privileges than domestic corporations under its statutes. Barcello v. Hapgood,, 118 N. C., 712, at p. 728. The defendant has been brought into court and has answered on the merits. The Gode, Sections 194 and 195, confers jurisdiction against all foreign corporations doing business in the State, and provides for removal to the proper county, when that named in the summons and complaint is not the proper one. McMinn v. Hamilton, 77 N. C., 300. The court below erred in refusing the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, and the ruling below is reversed. The case must be remanded, to the end that judgment may be entered for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict. Eeversed.