Gibson Ex Rel. Black v. Leaksville Cotton Mills

*268 Per Curiam. The defendant introduced no evidence, and at the close of plaintiff’s evidence made a motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit. C. S., 567. The motion was granted and plaintiff excepted, assigned error and appealed to this Court. We think the court below should not have allowed the motion. Gibson was a youth, fourteen years old. One Murray was his boss, or superintendent, and the evidence on the part of plaintiff is to the effect that he did not instruct him as to the danger. Gibson testified, in part, as follows: “Mr. Murray told me to do what I was doing at the time I got hurt. I was up on the table straightening out the cloth and the blade cut my finger. The blade that folds the cloth struck my finger. I could see it. I knew it was there. I knew it was in motion. I did not know any danger in the machine. The blade is that part of the machine that folds the cloth. The blade travels backward and forward. It follows the cloth. It was as long as across the table (pointing to table). It was in plain view moving backward and forward at the time I put my hands on the cloth to straighten it out.” In Roth v. Northern Pacific Lumbering Co., 22 Pac. Rep., 845 (18 Ore., 205), it was said: “But it is tO' be borne in mind that there is a difference between a knowledge of the facts and a knowledge of the risks which they involve. One may know the facts, and yet not-' understand the risk; or, as Mr. Justice Bytes observed, ‘A servant knowing the facts may be utterly ignorant of the risks.’ Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & N., 937. For, after all, Mr. Justice Hulletl said, ‘It is not so much a question whether the party injured has knowledge of all the facts in his situation, but whether he is aware of the danger that threatens him. What avails it to him that all the facts are known, if he cannot make the deductions that peril arises from the relation of the facts ? The peril may be a fact in itself of which he should be informed.’ McGowan v. Mining Co., 3 McCrary, 393, 9 Fed. Rep., 861. So that ,in a case like the present, where the evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the defendant had knowledge of the risks to which he was exposed, the question is preeminently for the jury.” Boswell v. Hosiery Mills, 191 N. C., at p. 557. The law as stated in Sutton v. Melton, 183 N. C., at p. 372 (citing numerous authorities), is as follows: “It is the duty of the master who employs a servant in a place of danger to give him such warning and instruction as is reasonably required by his youth, inexperience, and want of capacity, and as will enable him, with the exercise of ordinary care, to perform the duties of his employment with reasonable safety to himself.” For the reasons given, the judgment is Reversed.