Vandyke v. . Farris

Faircloth, C. J. This is an action of ejectment. The defendant after denying the allegations of the complaint, entered a plea in bar of the action, and the case was tried on that plea alone. His Honor held that the evidence and judgment relied on in support of the plea were an estoppel ag;ain,st the plaintiff, and the plaintiff appealed. The plea was, that in 1893 the plaintiff instituted a processioning pro *745 ceeding before tire Clerk against the defendant to locate the line between plaintiff and defendant, under the Act of 1893, chap. 22, and that judgment was entered against the plaintiff for costs, from which no appeal was taken. At the trial of the present action, it was admitted bj the plaintiff that said processioning proceeding and judgment therein were in all respects regular and in strict compliance with the Act of 189.3, chap. 22. It was admitted by both parties that the question presented is, whether, after said processioning proceeding, the plaintiff can bring an action in the Superior Court to recover the same land. We have to consider this question without any argument or authorities ■cited by counsel. Does the proceeding before the Clerk, and his judgment therein, simply establish a line between the parties without determining tire title to the land on. either side of the line?’ The Act of 1893, chap. 22, repeals chap. 48 of The Code. That chapter was a.n innovation on the common-law remedy in settling titles to land, and is therefore to be strictly construed. Several cases came to this Court thereunder, but practically nothing was accomplished in any case. The original act indicated that two processionings would he conclusive as to title. As amended, Code, sec. 1929, it declared that “airy person whose land shall he processioned to bim, according to the directi oar of this chapter, shall he deemed and adjudged to he tire sole owner thereof; and upon any suit commenced for such lands tire party in possession may plead and give the proceedings under this chapter in evidence.” And singularly no decision has been found on tire question now presented. The inference is that under The Code, chap. 48, the processioning proceedings would establish title, and henee this Court required strict conformity in every particular. In Hoyle v. Wilson, 29 N. C., 466, Ruffin, C. J., said: “Indeed, the very important and conclusive effect given by tbe *746 statute to these inquisitions, whereby two of them vest an absolute title, requires the Court to exercise the utmost vigilance to prevent surprise and injury to the true owners of land, by tolerating any undue, laxity in the proceedings.” In Cansler v. Hoke, 14 N. C., 268, Hall, J., for the Court, said: “When I observed that the first act * * * de-dared that any person whose land was twice processioned according to that act, shall be deemed and adjudged the sole owner of such land, and that it was supposed that clause gave a title to land which might be twice processioned under the Act of 1792, I could not but consider it as a proceeding fraught with danger to tire rights of land proprietors, and felt myself altogether justified in throwing every legal impediment in the way of a title to- be thus consummated.” The Act of 1898 contains no language similar to that above quoted, Code, sec. 1929, on which the remarks of Judges Ruffibt and Hall were predicated, and leave the inference that the Legislature desired no longer to continue the danger referred to- by those- Judges. In Williams v. Hughes, 124 N. C., 3, it was held that in processioning under the Act of 1893, chap-. 22, the title was not in issue, and in Wilson v. Alleghany Co., 124 N. C., 7, that an auxiliary remedy by injunction could not be given in such processioning proceedings, because there- was no substantive relief under said act. Upon these considerations and our own reasoning, o-ur opinion is that the Act of 1893, chap. 22, provides that a line or lines may be established as therein provided if the parties desire to do so, but does not prohibit either party from asserting his rights as to the title to the same land. Whait benefit the act confers to the citizen, it is not o-ur province to say. We think therefore that his Honor was in error in holding that the defendant’s plea was a bar to- the plaintiff’s action. Error.