Mote v. White Lake Lumber Co.

BeosjdeN, J. Deeds for standing timber convey a fee-simple interest in such timber, determinable as to all such timber as is not cut and removed within the time specified in the contract. Austin v. Brown, 191 N. C., 624. In Timber Co. v. Wells, 171 N. C., 262, Justice Hoke, in discussing the nature and effect of extension clauses in timber deeds, says: “The cases on the subject are to the effect, further, that a stipulation of the kind now presented, providing for an extension of the time within which the timber must be cut, is in the nature of an option, and it is held by the great weight of authority that contracts of this character do not of themselves create any interest in the property, but only amount to an offer to create or convey such an interest when the conditions are performed and working a forfeiture when not strictly complied with.”' Upon this principle of law, the plaintiffs assert that, as the defendant did not pay the extension money as required in the deed, the right to cut the timber terminated on 22 January, 1926. It will be observed that in plaintiff’s deed to defendant it was recited that the plaintiff ‘Tas received full payment of all extension money to which he is entitled on account of his ownership of a portion of said original tracts up to and including 22 January, 1926. The said deed contained a further clause providing that if the timber should not be cut and removed before 22 January, 1926, then the defendant “shall pay to George W. Mote, his heirs or assigns the sum of $100.00 per annum for each year of said additional period after 22 January, 1926, in advance of or before 22 January of each year of said additional five-year period.” The payments provided for in the contract were annual payments. If a payment had been made on 22 January, 1926, such payment under the terms of the contract, would have extended the period of cutting until 22 January, 1927. Plaintiff’s deed to the de *464 fendant was dated 12 May, 1922, and it would seem clear that, if on 12 May, 1922, the • plaintiffs had been paid up to and including 22 January, 1926, the extension money for 1926, had, as a matter of fact, been paid in advance as provided in the second clause of the deed between the parties. But, however this may be, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover by reason of the application of the principle of estoppel. The undisputed evidence is that the agent of defendant called upon the plaintiffs prior to 22 January, 1926, in order to ascertain if any extension money was due the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs assured the defendant that they had been paid for the year 1926, and that “nothing was or would be due or owing to them on that account by the White Lake Lumber Co.” In addition to this positive statement by the plaintiff, he pointed out to the defendant a place to locate his tramroad, and, with apparent approval, permitted the defendant to build said tramroad over the land, move his machinery and other equipment thereon and to begin cutting and removing timber in the usual way. The -ultimate and final question, therefore, is whether or not such conduct and statements on behalf of plaintiffs create an equitable es-toppel. Bispham on Equity (5 ed.), see. 282, defines equitable estoppel as follows: “Equitable estoppel, or estoppel by conduct, has its foundation in the necessity of compelling the observance of good faith; because a man cannot be prevented by his conduct from asserting a previous right, unless the assertion would be an act'of bad faith towards a person who had subsequently acquired the right. It is the presence of this bad faith, either in the intention of the party or by reason of the result, which would be produced if he were permitted to deny the truth of his statement, that distinguishes this species of estoppel from estoppel at common law.” , This principle was approved by Justice Walker in Boddie v. Bond, 154 N. C., 369. In Wells v. Crumpler, 182 N. C., 358, Justice Walker reasserts and enlarges the principle as follows: “We cannot imagine a case where the doctrine of equitable estoppel could more justly have been applied than to this one. Where a party who has, or claims, a right, either openly and unequivocally abandons it, or does not assert it when he should do so, and induces another by his silence or conduct to believe that the right does not exist, or that he makes no claim to it, if he has it, and abandons and surrenders it, and the other party, acting upon such conduct as it was intended that he should do, and is induced thereby to do something, by which he will be prejudiced, if the party who so acted is permitted to recall what he has done, equity steps in *465 and protects the party thus misled to his prejudice, and will forbid the other to speak and assert his former right, when every principle of good faith and fair dealing requires and even demands, that he should be silent.” Mfg. Co. v. Building Co., 177 N. C., 104. In Cromartie v. Lumber Co., 173 N. C., 712, the defendant offered to pay plaintiff the extension money more than once prior to the expiration of the period specified in the contract. The plaintiff said, “he was not going to charge it; that he had been paid for the timber . . . and would not require anything more.” The court held “that the plaintiff could still collect extension money, but that he could not, after leading defendant to believe that he would waive the extension money, treat it as a trespasser and sue for the value of the timber cut during the extension period.” Whereupon, judgment was entered against the defendant for the extension money due under the contract, from which judgment plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. The judgment so rendered was upheld, the Court holding that “while waiver is not in the proper sense of the term a species of estoppel, yet where a party to a transaction induces another to act upon the reasonable belief that he had waived or will waive certain rights, remedies or objections which he is entitled to assert, he will be estopped to insist upon such rights, remedies or objections to the prejudice of one misled.” The facts in the Cromartie case, supra, and the principle of law declared therein are decisive of this, appeal. The decision in the Gromar-tie case was per curiam, but such an opinion carries all the force of a formal utterance. Hyder v. Henderson County, 190 N. C., 663. For the reasons given we hold that the judgment should be Affirmed.