Baker v. Ætna Life Insurance

Stacy, C. J. Defendant contends that no satisfactory evidence of total and permanent disability was ever furnished by plaintiff; that Dr. Martin’s report, instead of showing a permanent disability, disclosed a temporary disability; and that no liability has attached under the total and permanent disability clause contained in the policy in suit. The doctor’s report did show, however, that total disability began 1 August, 1931; that it still' existed on 20 October, and that it would probably continue for two or three weeks longer. This was evidence of total disability for more than ninety consecutive days, which, under the terms of the policy, is presumed to be permanent: “If . . . the assured becomes totally disabled . . . for a period of ninety con *108 secutive days, then if satisfactory evidence bas not been previously furnished that such disability is permanent, such disability shall be presumed to be permanent within the meaning of this provision.” We then have evidence furnished the defendant of a total and presumably permanent disability, which the jury later found to be total and permanent. Fields v. Assurance Co., 195 N. C., 262, 141 S. E., 743. This is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover under the terms of the policy. Mitchell v. Assurance Society, 205 N. C., 721. The case of Ammons v. Assurance Society, 205 N. C., 23, 169 S. E., 807, cited and relied upon by plaintiff as authority to the contrary, is easily distinguishable. The evidence was amply sufficient to carry the case to the jury on the totality and permanency of plaintiff's disability. Bulluck v. Ins. Co., 200 N. C., 642, 158 S. E., 185; Misskelley v. Ins. Co., 205 N. C., 496, 171 S. E., 862. It differs materially from that appearing in Thigpen v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C., 551, 168 S. E., 845, and Buckner v. Ins. Co., 172 N. C., 762, 90 S. E., 897. The verdict and judgment will not be disturbed on any of the exceptions presented by defendant’s appeal. No error.