Elliott Building Co. v. City of Greensboro

Varseb, J. Plaintiff’s representative was at the opening of the bids on 12 February, 1924. No objection was made to the continuance for further consideration. Plaintiff’s letter to defendant’s manager on 16 February, asked for an early acceptance or rejection of its bid filed with defendant on 12 February. The action of the defendant through its *504 council, on 13 February, 1924, as set forth in its resolution, is not material to this matter, for that it appears that the acceptance relied upon by defendant took place 19 February. This fact eliminates from our consideration the contention that the resolution of 13 February is conditional and not an acceptance, but a rejection. It is certainly not a rejection and no notice thereof haying been given to plaintiff, and with plaintiff’s letter of 16 February plainly treating its bid as still open for defendant’s consideration and acceptance and requesting that defendant take early action thereon, does not amount to a withdrawal. The rights of the parties depend upon whether there was a contract. It is admitted that the plaintiff did not, upon notice of defendant’s acceptance of its bid, execute the contract specified in its written proposal and did not attempt to perform the work contemplated by its bid. It is further admitted that the defendant retained the $5,000 deposited with plaintiff’s bid on account of plaintiff’s failure to execute the contract and perform the work. A contract is “an agreement upon sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing.” Blackstone, Book 2, 442; Mordecai’s Law Lectures, 1104. Three things are contemplated in all contracts: First, the. agreement; second, the consideration; third, the thing to be done or omitted, or, the different species of contracts. Blackstone, supra; Morde-cai’s Law Lectures, supra. Only the first element of contracts concerns us in this ease. The other two are admittedly present if the first exists. We are of opinion that the first' element, to wit, the agreement, does exist in the instant case. When the plaintiff filed its written bid or proposal, containing definite terms, with defendant, and the defendant accepted this written proposal, the contract was complete. The two primary elements constituting the agreement, to wit, the offer and the acceptance, were existent. Bailey v. Rutjes, 86 N. C., 517, 520; May v. Menzies, 184 N. C., 150; Brunhild v. Freeman, 77 N. C., 128; Pendleton v. Jones, 82 N. C., 249; Elks v. Insurance Co., 159 N. C., 619; Crook v. Cowan, 64 N. C., 743. This offer and acceptance created an agreement and did not leave the matter subject to what either party may have thought. Brunhild v. Freeman, supra. The acceptance of plaintiff’s offer (Crook v. Cowan, supra), within a reasonable time (Mizell v. Burnett, 49 N. C., 249; Rucker v. Sanders, 182 N. C., 607), completed the agreement. The acceptance in the instant ease was identical with the offer made in every respect and constituted mutual assent to the identical proposal made by plaintiff without “doubt or difference.” Grandy v. Small, 50 N. C., 50; Walker v. Allen, 50 N. C., 59; Morrison v. Parks, 164 N. C., 197; Sumrell v. Salt Co., 148 N. C., 552; Rucker v. Sanders, supra; Baker v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 577; Freeman v. Croom, 172 N. C., 524; Gregory v. Bullock, *505 120 N. C., 260, 261; Elks v. Insurance Co., supra; Wooten v. Drug Co., 169 N. C., 64; Croom v. Lumber Co., 182 N. C., 217, 220; Howell v. Pate, 181 N. C., 119; Page on Contracts, vol. I, sec. 46; National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S., 43; Egger v. Nesbitt, 43 Am. St. Rep., 596; Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S., 149; Cozart v. Herndon, 114 N. C., 252; 6 R. C. L., 608; Golding v. Foster, 188 N. C., 216. A delay in accepting an offer permits a withdrawal (Watters v. Hedgpeth, 172 N. C., 310), which is the right of the offerer. Cooper v. Lansing Wheel Co., 34 Am. St. Rep., 341; Page on Contracts, see. 33; 6 R. C. L., 603; Eskridge v. Glover, 26 Am. Decisions, 344, 349; Strook Plush Co. v. New England Cotton Yarn Co., 100 N. E., 617; Rucker v. Sanders, supra; Elliott on Contracts, see. 175. The acceptance must precede notice of withdrawal of bid. Cozart v. Herndon, supra; Edmondson v. Fort, 75 N. C., 404. The telegram from plaintiff to defendant was dated 20 February, 1924, the acceptance by defendant of plaintiff’s offer was on 19 February, 1924, and the evidence offered by plaintiff shows clearly that defendant did not receive the telegram of withdrawal prior to its acceptance. Plaintiff claims that its letter of 16 February, when it advised defendant that it would sublet the machine work, was such a modification as to constitute a new bid and withdraw the old. The letter as a whole, treats the original bid as still in force and the statement as to subletting is made upon the assumption that the original bid will be accepted and the contract named therein will be executed. This contract provided that subletting could only be done with the written assent of the defendant, and construing the letter with the written proposal, the letter is not a modification. At most it is only notice that, if the bid is accepted, its right to request permission to sublet, will be exercised. The defendant had the right to modify before acceptance, but we are of the opinion that it did not modify. The defendant, therefore, is within its rights in holding the money deposited by plaintiff with its bid as security for its performance of the contract when accepted. McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, vol. 3, sec. 1221; Turner v. Fremont, 170 Fed., 259, 263; 95 C. C. A., 455; City of Portsmouth v. Portsmouth & Norfolk Corporation, 95 S. E., 279; Wheaton Lumber Co. v. Boston, 90 N. E., 598. This is an action at law to recover the money deposited, and after acceptance this cannot be done. McQuillan on Mun. Corps., supra; Moffitt v. Rochester, 198 U. S., 873; Kimball v. Hewitt, 2 N. Y. S., 697; Baltimore v. Robinson Construction Co., L. R. A., 1915-A, 225. The defendant had a reasonable time in the absence of notice of withdrawal or modification to consider plaintiff’s bid and determine whether it would accept it or not. The money deposited was to guarantee that *506 plaintiff would execute tbe contract, witb tbe bond contemplated, if its offer was accepted. Baltimore v. Robinson Construction Co., supra; Wheaton Bldg. & Lumber Co. v. Boston, 90 N. E., 598. We see no reason to disturb tbe judgment of tbe court below. Opportunity to change tbe offer is afforded tbe offerer until acceptance, but wben accepted and tbe constituent elements of an enforceable contract exist, it is to tbe interest of tbe parties, and society, as well, that contracts be performed as made. Let it be certified that tbe judgment of tbe court below is Affirmed.