McLeod v. Board of Commissioners

Walker, J. The decision of this case turns upon what is the true meaning of chapter 482 of the Private Acts of 1907. The objection of the plaintiff to the issuing and selling of the bonds and to the levy and collection of the tax to pay the interest as it accrues, and the principal at maturity, is based upon the ground that the provisions of the act in regard to that matter are repugnant, and that, by a proper construction of the statute, rejecting certain sections thereof because they conflict with other and subsequent sections, where the intent is expressly or at least more clearly indicated, we should" hold that the Legislature has authorized the issuing of bonds by the town of Carthage and the levy of a tax for the payment of the same upon residents of that town outside the limits of the school district created by the act, for the erection of a school and its maintenance within that district for the benefit of persons residing therein and to the exclusion of those residing in the town but not in said district; and this, they contend, is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, and the act is therefore void. ~We are unable to admit the prem *85 ises laid clown by tbe plaintiff, even if tbe deduction therefrom be ever so correct. It is clear to us that tbe Legislature intended to establish a school district within the corporate limits of the town of Carthage and from a part of the territory of the said town for the purposes specified in the act, and that bonds should be issued, not by the town, but by the corporate authorities of the town, the board of commissioners, for and in behalf’ of the school district so created by the statute. It was perhaps considered more convenient and less expensive to have the board of commissioners, the treasurer and the tax collector of the town perform the several duties and functions assigned to them than to provide for the appointment or election of officers within the school district for that purpose. We can see no objection to this method of administering the .affairs of the district and to the procedure adopted in order to execute the purpose the Legislature had in view. The plaintiff argues that, as in section 50 it is provided that an election shall be held to determine Avhether taxes shall be levied “for the support of the schools in said town provided for in this act, and the purchase of land and the erection of school buildings thereon,” and, further, that the money to pay for the land and school buildings “shall only be raised by issuing the bonds of the town, as hereinafter provided for,” the Legislature has attempted to impose a debt upon the people of the town residing outside the school district without their consent, for the support of the school to be established in the district, notwithstanding subsequent provisions of the act, which, we think, negative any such intention. The statute must be construed as a whole, and not by the wording of any particular section or part of it- The law requires that, in the interpretation of a statute, we should give it that meaning which is clearly expressed, and if there is doubt or ambiguity we should construe it so as to ascertain from its language what was the true intention of the Legislature. Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C., 425; Wilson v. Markley, 133 *86 N. C., 616; Fortune v. Commissioners, 140 N. C., 322; Board of Education v. Commissioners, 137 N. C., 312; Lowry v. School Trustees, 140 N. C., 40; Spencer v. Railroad, 137 N. C., 119. If we follow the rules of interpretation and. construction as stated in the cases we have cited, we find no serious difficulty in ascertaining wbat is meant by this act. "When the word “town” is used in section 50 it is with reference to the election which is required to be held “as provided in this act,” and the election is required to be held, not in the town, but within the district. The same may be said of the expression in section 50, that the “bonds of the said town” shall be issued and sold to pay for the school buildings and site, as they are required to be issued “as hereinafter provided for.”’ When we refer to the subsequent sections of the act, especially to section 61, we find that the commissioners of the town are directed to issue the bonds for the school district, and it also appears by the clearest intendment that the taxes are to be levied only on property and polls within the district. It was plainly the intention of the Legislature, when using the word “town,” to designate only that part of it which lies inside the territory of the school district, and we think this intent appears unmistakably if we read and consider the act in its entirety. We hold that the commissioners and other officers of the town of Carthage can proceed to execute the provisions of the act in accordance with our construction thereof, and that the bonds should be issued for the school district and the taxes levied and collected in the manner prescribed therein. The other questions raised by the plaintiff, as to the power of the Legislature to establish a separate school district within another municipality and as to the lack of uniformity of the tax, have been recently decided in Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N. C., 143, and require no further discussion here. The question of discrimination as between the two races is settled against the plaintiff’s contention by the decision of this Court *87 in Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N. C., 33, if sucb a question is presented in the case. We think it is not, as there are no colored children in the school district, and there is no suggestion that those in the town, outside the district, have not been provided with ample means and facilities for their education. There was no error in the ruling of the Judge upon the facts as found by him, and we therefore affirm the judgment. Affirmed.