Page v. . Page

Clark, C. J. This is an action for a divorce from bed and board. It was before us, Page v. Page, 161 N. C., 170, upon appeal from a decree granting alimony pendente lite. The defendant excepted to the refusal of the court to dismiss the action upon that opinion. But on reference thereto it will be found that it rested upon the statement that notwithstanding the facts found by the court in that case, the judge had added a finding that he acquitted the defendant of any intended wrong. This Court said: “We do not concur with the court in its conclusion that, assuming the defendant’s testimony to be true, the plaintiff is entitled to alimony. . . . Our decision does not prevent a trial of the issues. The plaintiff, hereafter may allege and establish a better case than she has in the present record and 'one entitling her to a divorce, but there is no such case now presented.” This was based upon the statement above set out, “assuming the defendant’s testimony to be true.” While the plaintiff did not see fit to amend her complaint, she strengthened the testimony in her favor, and the jury further found that the defendant’s testimony was not true, for in response to the issues submitted they returned the issues as follows: *348 1. Did the defendant offer such indignities to tbe person of tbe plaintiff as to render ber condition intolerable and life burdensome, as alleged ? Answer: “Yes.” 2. Did tbe plaintiff, by ber own conduct, cause and provoke tbe defendant to offer sucb indignities as to make ber life burdensome, as alleged? Answer: “No.” Our former decision was based upon tbe finding of tbe judge in that case that tbe evidence of tbe. defendant was true. In tbis trial, bis version was 'submitted to tbe jury and tbe jury found otherwise. Tbe allegations in tbe complaint are sufficiently specific in an action for divorce from bed and board on tbe ground tbat tbe defendant bad offered sucb indignities to bis wife as to render ber condition intolerable and life burdensome. Revisal, 1563 (4). It is unnecessary to recite tbe unpleasant details. It is sufficient to say tbat if tbe jury believed tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff and rejected tbat of tbe defendant, or most of it, there was enough to justify tbe verdict, and tbe weight of tbe testimony was a matter for the jury, subject to tbe supervisory power of tbe judge to set aside tbe verdict if be found it against tbe weight of tbe testimony. Tbis be has not done. Tbe jury have found on tbe second issue, against tbe allegations of recrimination on tbe part of tbe defendant, tbat be bad been provoked to offer these indignities by reason of tbe conduct of tbe plaintiff. Tbe defendant excepted tbat much of tbe evidence as to these indignities was as to bis conduct more than ten years ago. But it was only as a part of tbe whole course of dealings, coming down to • “within six months of tbe beginning of tbis action.” In Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N. C., 230, it is said where “tbe defendant’s conduct was a long course of neglect, cruelty, humiliation, and insult, repeated and persisted in, it is sufficient to bring tbe case within tbe purview of Revisal, 1652 (4), tbat be bad offered sucb indignities to tbe person, as to render ber condition intolerable and life burdensome.” Tbe defendant places stress on tbe fact that tbe plaintiff said she bad forgiven tbe defendant. In Lassiter v. Lassiter, 92 N. C., 129, it is said: “Condonation is forgiveness upon condition, and tbe condition is tbat the party forgiven will abstain from like offense afterwards, and moreover treat tbe forgiving party in all respects with conjugal kindness.” If tbe condition shall be violated, tbe original status is revived. From tbe evidence it would seem tbat tbis was a case of too much mother-in-law on both sides. Tbe parents of both parties seemed to have bad more animosity in tbe case than tbe parties themselves. Though tbe defendant was acquitted of an assault upon bis mother-in-law by kicking ber, tbe court says tbat tbe defendant testified tbat be did not remember whether be did so or not, and tbe judge attributed bis *349 acquittal to the fact that the burden of proof was upon the State. It is true that this statement is made by Judge Long on the appeal in the same case, post, 350, from him, but it was referred to in the argument. We find no error in the charge of the court nor to that part of the decree awarding the custody of the little girl, which is as follows: “The plaintiff is better suited and capacitated to take care of the little girl than the defendant, and she is hereby appointed custodian for the court, pending appeal, on her giving bond in the sum of $2,500 to. keep the child within the jurisdiction of the court, and to keep her amenable to the order of the court. The defendant, Joe Page, is likewise appointed custodian of.the little boy, Paul Page, on like terms, and the custody of the said Eva Page is hereby awarded to her mother, Teresa Page. It is further ordered that the custody of the little boy, Paul Page, is hereby awarded to the father, Joseph Page, and that both the father and mother be required to enter into bond in the sum of $2,500 each, payable to the State of North Carolina, to keep the said children in the jurisdiction of the Superior Court until otherwise ordered.” This decree in no wise conflicts with what was said in this case, Page v. Page, 166 N. C., 90, in which the Court held, citing Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C., 587, that the “lower court should refrain from changing the custody of the child, pending an appeal, nor permit it to be carried out of the State”; and also said that the defendant was “entitled to have the court retain jurisdiction of the child till the hearing of his appeal, so that the final determination of the court, if in his favor, may be effective.” There is no exception to the allowance of $25 per month alimony, which does not indeed seem to be excessive in view of the finding of fact as to the estate of the defendant. While the finding of the jury is against the defendant, there was strong evidence in his favor, but the judges of the facts have determined them. The action of the court in giving the custody of the little girl to the mother, and of the boy to the father, seems to have been well considered, upon all the evidence in the case, and the judge has observed the requirement of this Court to assure the retention of the children in this State to abide the final action upon this appeal. No error.