Whitehurst v. North Carolina Mutual Insurance

Pearson, C. J. We differ from his Honor upon the first point, by the plaintiff, and forwarded to the secretary of the compapany, was not, in the opinion of this Court, a full compliance with the condition of the policy, which requires “all persons sustaining loss or damage by fire, forthwith to give notice thereof to the secretary, and within thirty days after the loss to deliver a particular account of such loss or damage, signed with their own hands, and verified by oath or affirmation,” &c. This condition imposes two duties; the latter was com *435 plied with, but the former was not, and consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, according to the decision in Woodfin v. Asheville Insurance Company, 6 Jones’ Rep. 558. The first, or general notice is required to be given “forth with.,” to enable the company, as soon after the loss as practicable, to institute proper enquiry; and the second, or particular notice, within thirty days. It was not proven that any notice was given until after the expiration of some twenty lays. This, certainly does not satisfy the word “forthwith,” which must be construed, considering the purpose for which it is required, to mean immediately, or within reasonable time; and, under the circumstances, the rule which has been adopted in regard to bills of exchange, i. e. on the same day, if in the same town, or else by the next mail, would seem to furnish a fit analogy. As this point is decisive, we will not enter upon the other, especially as the statement, made up by his Honor, and his charge in reference to it, are not so clearly set out as to enable us to see, that we understand it. There is error. Venire de novo. Per Curiam, Judgment reversed»,