Northcott v. . Northcott

WalkeR, J., after stating the case: We are of the opinion that Judge Winston was right in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment for a sale of the land to pay for the improvements which he had put upon it. The reason is that he has improved it for the better enjoyment of his admitted estate in it, knowing the length of his term, or the quantity of his interest, and, therefore, when his estate will ex *150 pire. He is not witbin tbe protection of the equitable principle allowing for betterments made by one who honestly and in good faith believed he had a good title and is afterwards deprived of the land, when an equity arises for his compensation, at least out of the rents and profits, or the value of use and occupation chargeable against him, and our statute is in affirmance of the principle, Eevisal, see. 652 et seq., but perhaps more liberal in its provisions and broader in its scope. We need not discuss or decide as to the extent of this equitable doctrine, because the benefit of it cannot be claimed by the plaintiff, who shows no equity that entitles bim to it. 16 Cyc., 631, says: “If the life tenant himself makes permanent improvements, it will be presumed that they were for his own benefit, and he cannot recover anything therefor from the remainderman or reversioner.” Many cases are cited in the note to this text in support of the.statement, and among them Merritt v. Scott, 81 N. C., 385, where Smith, G. J., said: “We think it clear that improvements of any kind put upon land by a life tenant during his occupancy constitute no charge upon the land when it passes to the remainderman. He is entitled to the property in its improved state, without deduction for its increased value by reason of good management or the erection of buildings by the life tenant, for the obvious reason that the latter is improving his own property and for his own present benefit. This proposition is too plain to need the citation of authority.” Lord Thurlow said that a tenant for life, with remainder over to others, could not lay out a sum of money on the estate and charge it on the reversion or remainder, although the estate itself would be benefited. Bostick v. Blackeney, 29 Eng Reprint, 362, 364 (2 Bro., ch. 656). And in Stewart v. Matheny, 14 Am. St. Rep., 538, the same rule is stated with the reasons for it, that “the holders of the land during the life estate must be held to have known the nature and duration of their estate, and to have improved it for themselves, taking the risk of its duration, and nothing is shown to entitle the life tenant to pay for improvements.” Wilson v. Parker, 14 Sou. Rep., 264, 266; Doale v. Wiswell, 38 Me., 569; Warren v. Lauman, 91 Md., 90. The judgment entered by order of Judge Winston was clearly intended to cover the whole case submitted to him for his decision, and that was based upon all the matters alleged in the complaint, and the question was treated by the parties and the learned judge as if raised by demurrer to the complaint. The judgment, therefore, was equivalent to one of nonsuit, under the statute, whereby the action is dismissed. It was a final decision upon the merits of the case. While the judge stated therein that plaintiff was not entitled to a sale of the land to collect for the improvements placed thereon by him, this does not limit the conclusive effect of the judgment as to all matters alleged in the complaint. The *151 truth is that plaintiff wanted a sale to himself of the .land at its unimproved value, and if that could not be allowed to him, then a sale of it as it stood with the improvement, so that he might have an opportunity to buy the remainder, taking his chance on the price. He was looking out for his own interests, and not for those of the remaindermen; and the court viewed it as an effort on his part to be reimbursed for his outlay, whether the sale was private and restricted, or public and unrestricted. At any rate, the judgment was intended to cover the whole case, and if plaintiff elected not to amend, then he should have prosecuted his appeal. Not having done so, Judge Whedb&e properly held and adjudged that he was barred of any recovery in that action by Judge Winston’s decree. The case was not conducted with a very precise regard to due formality. The judgments should have been drawn out in full and signed, but, while this was not done, enough appears to show that the plaintiff has had a full day in court and lost. If the decision was erroneous, he could only be restored to his right by an appeal. He cannot now explain or attack the judgment by showing that he had another cause of action which could have been brought forward but was not. We think the case falls under the principle of estoppel as defined in McKimmon v. Caulk, 170 N. C., 54, at p. 56, quoting from Coltraine v. Laughlin, 157 N. C., 287; but if not, we fail to see how plaintiff can now relitigate a matter covered and closed by a final judgment, and especially so when it was agreed by the parties that the case be submitted to the judge for his decision and judgment upon all matters embraced within the pleadings. He did consider it and gave judgment for the defendants, and this ends the litigation, no appeal having been prosecuted to this Court. We, therefore, agree with Judge Whedbee that the proceeding should be dismissed. No error.