Green v. North Carolina Railroad

PjíARsoN, 0. J. The plaintiff claims the value of 2200 cords of wood, standing on the land, which he estimates at fifty cents per cord, making eleven hundred dollars, cut and carried away by the defendant, as upon a common count in assumpsit “quantum valebat.” The defendant admits the taking of the 2200 cords of wood and avers that it was done under a contract that the. wood was to be paid for by the deed of defendant to plaintiff, for a certain other tract of land particularly described, and. avers that it has always been “ ready, able and willing ” to-make the deed upon a compliance by the plaintiff of his part of the agreement. To this the plaintiff makes replication as provided for by C. C. P. § 127. The answer sets up a special contract, and it is settled that so long as it exists, neither party can resort to the common counts in assumpsit. The question then is, what had put an end to this contract at the time the action was commenced ? The defendant says he has received all or the greater part of the wood, and is ready to make a deed for the landL if the plaintiff has complied with his part of the contract, and whenever the plaintiff executes the contract on his part he is ready to make the deed. , This alternative mode of pleading (which should never be allowed) made it necessary to leave the issue to a jury. There is no distinct issue presenting the point. The nearest to it is “issue V” by which it is found that the defendant did agree verbally to sell the land described in payment for the wood and to give him a deed therefor to which the jury respond “yes by consent *98 . The section (O. C. P. 127) relied -on by plaintiff’s counsel allows the plaintiff to be considered as putting in ‘'a direct denial” or a replication by confession and avoidance “as the ease may require” him. The case did not require a ‘‘direct denial” for the $arol contract to pay for the wood by a tract of land is proved and in fact is admitted. As to the matter in avoidance the plaintiff by way of replication says, ‘‘the contract being for land is void under the •statute.” That is true. The contract is void unless “signed by the party to be charged therewith.” There is no attempt liere to charge the plaintiff. He is the actor in the matter, and as the defendant agrees and offers to comply with the contract and does not seek to avoid it under the statute, the plaintiff cannot take shelter under- it for the purpose of getting rid of the contract and holding the defendant liable for the value of the wood, as if there had been no agreement oii his part to take the tract of land in full payment. The parol contract was to exchange land for wood. The defendant admits the contract and is'ready and willing to perform it. 1 he plaintiff says he has performed his part of the contract and seeks to repudiate it and recover the value ■of the wood, as if there had been no contract by which he was to be paid in laud and not in money, cn the ground: 1. That so far as he is concerned, the contract being to sell land was void. Reply; the statute applies only to “ the party'- to be charged therewith.” See Mizell v. Burnett, 4 Jones; 249. So he cannot repudiate the contract, the defendant being willing to perform it. - 2. That the defendant had delayed for an unreasonable time to execute the deed. There was delay on both sides, but there is no doubt of the truth of the averment iu the answer that defendant was ready and willing to make the deed when the plaintiff complied with his part of the contract, which was supplemented by an agreement that plaintiff was *99 to cut and haul the balance of the wood that had not been received by defendant. Without going into details, the merits of the case depend upon this; Iiow has the plaintiff freed himself from the ¿agreement to take the tract of land in payment for the wood ? Denial of the contract will not do, for the parol contract is proved and admitted. Plea of the statute of frauds will not do, for he is not “ the party to be charged thereby.” So -the case is that of one who repudiates his contract, the ■validity of which is not disputed, and seeks to recover upon -the common count. Unreasonable delay will not answer the -plaintiff’s purpose to get rid of the special contract, for he might at any time by complying with his part of the contract have compelled the defendant to comply with his part. So there is no ground on which the plaintiff can “ cut loose ” from the special contract and sue for the value of the cords of wood. Foust v. Shoffner, Phil. Eq. 242, settles the question unless, as Mr. Battle contends, the adroit mode of pleading, by ■which no reference whatever is made to the verbal contract to take land in payment for the wood, can distinguish the ■cases. That contract is relied upon by the defendant and is still subsisting. His Honor ought to have ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover upon the common count, quantum valebat,” as it was held in Foust v. Shoffner, that he could not recover upon the common count for “ .money-pad and received,” or on a bill in equity filed in its stead. Error. .Per Curiah. Venire de novo.