McRae v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad

Ashe, J. Howe and Maultsby contracted with the defendant for the use of its train for an excursion from Wilmington to Washington and return. They were the managers of the excursion. The excursion was advertised in handbills, over their signatures, to leave Wilmington on the 13th of June, and return on the 17th, and tickets, called cards, were issued by them at the reduced price of $6.50, being less than one-fourth of the price of the regular fare from Wilmington to Washington and back. The plaintiff purchased one of these tickets. They were sold to him by Howe and Maultsby, the managers of the excursion. The contract was with them, and not with the defendant, for a seat in the excursion train for the round trip from Wilmington to' Washington. The only question for our consideration is: did the plaintiff have a right to a seat upon the regular train of the defendant? *532 Railroads have the power to make reasonable regulations for the management of their trains (1 Red. on Railways, 98; Thompson's Carriers, 306), and with the same qualification of reasonableness, it is also well settled, that one who buys a ticket is bound to inform himself of the rules and regulations of the company governing the transit and conduct of its trains. Deitrich v. R. R. Co., 71 Penn. St. Rep., 432. It follows that where a passenger purchases a ticket, he only acquires the right to be carried according to the custom of the road. When he purchases such a ticket, he should inform himself as to the usual mode of travel on the road; and so far as the customary mode of carrying passengers is reasonable, he should conform to it. The requisite information can always be obtained from the agent from whom the ticket is procured; and it is but reasonable to require passengers to obtain the information and to act upon it. R. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 Ill., 515. The evidence shows that at the time of this excursion there was a regulation of the defendant company that persons purchasing tickets for an excursion train should return by that train, and no other; and the regulation is reasonable. For if several hundred passengers on an excursion train could leave that train at any point and take seats in a regular train, it would prodiice great discomfort to the proper passengers, and intolerable confusion and inconvenience. The regulation was proclaimed throughout the cars, and in three feet of the plaintiff; and, although he says he did not hear it, it was his business to inquire. But he did have notice, for he admits in his testimony that he had seen the handbills advertising the excursion before he purchased his ticket from the managers. It was subject to this regulation that he made the contract with the managers, and when the ticket, or card, Avas paid for and received by the plaintiff, the contract between them was consummated, and the rights of the parties were then determined. Raw *533 son v. R. R. Co., 48 N. Y., 212. Most unquestionably, this contract did not give the plaintiff the right to a seat on the regular train. The plaintiff insists the contract was changed by the defendant after leaving "Wilmington, when its agent, the conductor, took up the card and substituted in its place the coupon-ticket. He admits when he received the ticket from Howe and Maultsby that ho had no idea but that he would have to return on the excursion train, but that after receiving the coupon-ticket from the defendant’s conductor, he concluded he would have the right to travel upon a regular train of the defendant, but not upon those of the other roads. In other words, that he and the several hundred excursionists, who had purchased tickets at the reduced price of $6.50, were entitled to travel on any of the regular trains of the defendant between "Wilmington and Weldon. The conclusion of the plaintiff is so preposterous, in a business point of view, that it is not surprising that he alone, of all the passengers on the excursion train, should have been the only one who asserted such a right under that construction of the ticket. But the jury, upon the issues submitted under the instructions of the court, seem to have come to a like conclusion. The question, then, is: was there error in the instructions given to the jury? The defendant requested the court to submit this issue to the jury: “Was the coupon-ticket issued without- any intention of changing the contract between the parties?” The purpose, it seems to us, for which the coupon-tickets were issued by the defendant was a material inquiry; and the intent with which they were issued should have been submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by them. But the court refused to submit the issue, and in lieu thereof submitted the following: “Did the plaintiff have a ticket which authorized him to occupy a seat in a regular train, as alleged in the complaint?” and upon this His Honor charged the jury, that if the plaintiff accepted the coupon-ticket from the agent of the defendant company with *534 the understanding and agreement that it was only to be used upon the excursion tain, and he returned upon another train than that provided for the excursion party, the company would have had the right to demand pay for carrying him upon the other train, “and you should say in response to that issue, no;” but if the plaintiff did not accept the ticket upon this condition, that lie was to return on the excursion train, and no other, “you should respond to the issue, yes.” We are of opinion there is error in this instruction. The error consists in leaving it to the jury to consider the understanding and agreement of the parties in determining the character and effect of the coupon-ticket. The understanding of the parties amounted to nothing unless it was mutual and concurrent, and there was no evidence of such a mutual understanding. The defendant understood the ticket as only carrying out the original contract, and issued in lieu of the card only for the purpose, as testified by one of its agents, that the roads beyond Weldon might have vouchers or checks to show the amount of the excursion money due to each, in settling with the defendant. The plaintiff says, on the other hand, that he understood the ticket as giving him the right to ride upon any train of the defendant. The construction of a contract does not depend upon what either party thought, but upon what both agreed. Brunhild v. Freeman, 77 N. C., 128. The question then arises, was there an agreement between the parties that the coupon-tickets were to be used on the excursion train only, or upon any other train of the defendant? There was no actual agreement, and none can be inferred from the tickets itelf. There is not a word in it about the right or authority to use it on a regular train. So far from that, it bears internal evidence that it was to be used on the excursion train, and no other. It is headed, “First-class, Washington and return, form special, Wilmington & Weldon railroad company, special limited excurson ticket.” We are unable to conceive how any one could suppose that *535 such a ticket, delivered as it was, on a special excursion train, to a passenger, who had purchased a ticket at a greatly reduced price, with full knowledge that it was to be used on that train only, could give him the right to travel on any other train of the defendant. It could have reference only to the moving special train, upon any reasonable interpretation. But the plaintiff contends that the contract, contained in the ticket, extended the plaintiff’s right to return on the 18th day of June, and as the excursion train, by the contract between the defendant aud managers, must return on the 17th, it follows that if he should see proper to defer his return until the 18th, he would have the right to travel on a regular train, and that, if it gave him the authority to do so, on that day, it must equally confer the right to do so on the 16th of June. But we cannot concur in that interpretation. The language of the ticket is: “This ticket and all checks attached shall be used in conformity to the above conditions, between June the 13th and June the 17th, 1881, and in any event shall be void on and after June the 18th, 1881.” The time for the return of the excursion train by the original contract, as well as by the terms of the coupon-ticket, is limited to the 17th of June; and what is added, “in any event shall be void on and .after June the 18th, 1881,” was used to make the limitation to the 17th the more definite — that is, that it should be void on the 18th; as a matter of course it would be void after that date. The evidence in the case is, that the coupon-ticket was given solely for the purpose of carrying out the original contract between the defendant and the managers, and was no evidence of a change in that contract. His Honor should, therefore, have instructed the jury that there was no evidecee of an understanding and agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the plaintiff might ride on any train of the defendant, except that provided specially for the excursion; and that even if there was such an agreement, it was without consideration. His failure to so instruct the jury is error. *536 Under this view of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the question of damages, or the other 'exceptions taken. There must be a new trial. Let this be certified, &c. Error. ' Venire de novo.