Martin v. Glenwood Park Sanatorium

*224 ClabicsoN, J. In this day and age in tbis commonwealth., the wife no longer, as in the days gone by, confines her activities strictly to home and domestic duties. The “help meet” frequently takes her part in industry, not connected with the home. Whether this is for weal or woe, we are not here called upon to determine. This being a fact, the General Assembly of North Carolina, in reference to the wife as a wage-earner, no doubt, in view of this changed condition, passed the provisions in the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act we are now called upon to construe. On the present record the only question presented: “Is the plaintiff, J. H. Martin, widower of Daisy V. Martin, deceased employee, conclusively presumed to be dependent upon his said wife for support, and as such entitled to compensation under the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act?” We think so. The husband and wife were living together at the time of her death, and had been for years. In Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C., at p. 40, we find: “It is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation. . . . National Cast Iron Co. v. Hegginbothem, 112 Southern, 734; Eddington v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 202 N. W., 374.” Smith v. Light Co., 198 N. C., 614; Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 199 N. C., 236; Rice v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 199 N. C., 154. There is no dispute on the record that the wife “sustained an accidental injury, from which she died on 10 September, 1929, that arose out of and in the course of her employment as a nurse at the Glenwood Park Sanatorium.” The defendants contend that from the testimony of her husband, he is barred from recovery: “Q. Were you dependent on Mrs. Martin for support? A. No, I wouldn’t say that. Q. Did she ever contribute in any way to your support ? A. Well, she was just like any good woman; she was always buying something for the house. Q. Did she ever contribute to your support? A. No.” This testimony must be considered in reference to the Compensation Act. From the husband’s' testimony, “She was always buying something for the house,” it may be inferred that by the contributions from her labor she made the home more comfortable and attractive than he alone was able to do from his salary. Our decision must be premised on the language and intent of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act. In reference to the subject, it reads as follows: “Section 2. When used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires.” . . . Subsection (o) reads as follows: "Widower defined. The term 'widower’ includes only decedent’s husband, who at the time *225 of ber death lived with her and was dependent for support upon her.” . . . Section 39, reads as follows: “Dependents defined. A widow, a widower, and/or a child shall he conclusively presumed to he wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee. In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be- determined in accordance with the facts as the facts may be at the time of the accident; but no allowance shall be made for any payment made in lieu of board and lodging or services, and no compensation shall be allowed unless the dependency existed for a period of three months or more prior to the accident. If there is more than one person wholly dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them; the persons partly dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof. If there is no one wholly dependent, and more than one person partially dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of their dependency. The widow, widower, and all children of deceased employees shall he conclusively presumed to he dependents of the deceased and shall he entitled to receive benefits of this act for the full periods specified in the act.” It will be noted that in section 39, “Dependents defined,” the section says in the first part that the widower “shall he conclusively presumed to he wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee.” In the latter part the widower “shall he conclusively presumed to he dependents of the deceased and shall he entitled to receive benefits of this act for the full periods specified in the act.” We are not here considering the wisdom of the legislation, that is for another branch of the government. We are called upon to construe the meaning. But in 25 R. C. L., part sec. 70, at p. 777, we find; “Many of the statutes, however, provide that husband and wife shall be presumed to be dependent on each other for support, if they are living together, or are living apart for some justifiable cause. Some of the acts make no distinction between the dependency of the husband and the presumption in favor of the wife. If a wife living with her husband is fatally injured in an employment coming under the act, the husband living with her at the time of her death is likewise conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon her, irrespective of what the real facts may be.” In Kornegay v. Goldsboro, 180 N. C., at p. 452: “The Court, speaking through Hoke, J., says (Bramham v. Durham, 171 N. C., at p. 198) : 'It is a well recognized principle of statutory construction that when there are two acts of the Legislature applicable to the same subject, their provisions are to be reconciled if this, can be done by fair and reasonable intendment, but, to the extent that they are necessarily *226 repugnant, the latter shall prevail. The position is stated in substantially these terms by Associate Justice Field in U. S. v. Tynen, 78 U. S., 92, as follows: “Where there are two acts on the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both, if possible; but if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, and without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first”; and in Sedgewick on Statutory Construction, p. 127, quoting from Ely v. Bliss, 5 Beavan, it is said: “If two inconsistent acts be passed at different times, the last is to be obeyed, and if obedience cannot be observed, without derogation from the'first, it is the first that must give way.” ’ ” The North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed as a whole, yet by analogy we think the above principle prevails in construing the sections relating to the subject if they are irreconcilable. Leonard v. Sink, 198 N. C., p. 119. The acts of the various states differ — some are manufacturing states, some agricultural and some both. This State is now to a considerable extent a manufacturing State. We are concerned here only in construing the act of this State. We think the construction placed on it by the unanimous decision of the Industrial Commission and the court below correct. The judgment is Affirmed.